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ABSTRACT  
IMPERIAL JANUS: PATTERNS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE WESTERN 
BORDERLANDS OF THE TSARIST EMPIRE 
FEBRUARY 2014 
NICKLAUS LAVERTY, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MAINE  
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST  
Directed by: Professor Jillian Schwedler  
Why did the Tsarist Empire opt for different governance strategies in each of the 
territories of the Western Borderlands (here defined as Poland-Lithuania, the Baltic 
territories, Finland, and Hetman Ukraine)? The existing political science literature tends 
to reduce such a question to a distinction between direct and indirect rule, usually 
developing in the context of a Western European maritime empire. This literature falls 
short of explaining the Tsarist case and requires the addition of intervening variables 
concerning the role of local elites and leadership choice. Employing an interdisciplinary 
literature combining sources from political science, sociology and history, this 
dissertation develops a structural-institutional approach to explaining patterns of direct 
and indirect rule that emphasizes the strength and cohesion of local elites, their 
orientation towards the dominant unit, and the role of leadership choice in the dominant 
unit. In addition to better accounting for the policy trajectory of the Tsarist Empire, such 
an explanation can also be applied to other historical and contemporary political systems 
deciding between centralized and decentralized rule. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The question that my dissertation seeks to answer is: "Why did the Tsarist Empire1 opt 
for different patterns of governance in the territories of the Western Borderlands?" The 
Western Borderlands (here defined as Poland-Lithuania, the Baltics, Finland, and Hetman 
Ukraine) were incorporated into the Tsarist Empire between the mid-17th century and the 
early 19th century. Although each of the territories were initially provided with similar (if 
not identical) political, religious, and economic concessions, by the late 19th centuries 
their paths had diverged with some territories enjoying significant autonomy while others 
were ruled more directly. The general trend was the gradual intrusion of central authority 
on local prerogatives, but some territories (namely, the Baltics and Finland) were far 
more successful at defending their political position within the empire. Answering my 
overarching question will not only help to explain the specific case employed here, but 
can also provide a theoretical model that could be applied to other cases of center-
periphery relations. 
 The literature on state-building and empire provides an important context for this 
case. The initial process of incorporation tracks closely with patterns of rule under 
traditional imperial systems, where peripheral territories were afforded a high degree of 
autonomy so long as they acted as loyal clients of imperial rule and delivered crucial 
                                                 
1
 I have decided to predominantly use the term “Tsarist Empire” in this study for a couple reasons, despite 
its sometimes questionable pedigree of usage, especially during the Soviet period. “Imperial Russia” or 
“Russian Empire” are sometimes used as alternatives, but I find these limiting due to the implication of 
Russian identity in what was a multiethnic empire that actually had Russians as a minority near the end of 
its existence. Nevertheless, reference to “Russia” or “Tsarist Russia” is also made in the text, but these 
usages are generally confined to representing how other scholars have termed the Tsarist Empire 
(especially in the Comparative political science literature, where “Russia” is quite common) or to political 
developments in the Russian “core” of the empire. 
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resources to the center, usually in the form of taxation and conscription. As Michael 
Mann notes, this was usually due to deficiencies in infrastructural capacity and the high 
costs of employing direct coercion in the time period before rapid transportation was 
possible.2 This reality also tracks closely with some of the center-periphery relations 
discussed in the literature on state-building, such as Margaret Levi's emphasis on the 
process of bargaining that takes place between the central state and borderland elites.3 
 The general trajectory of encroaching centralization also corresponds to the 
dynamics detailed in the literature on state-building. Central rulers make concessions 
during times of geopolitical weakness or to secure the loyalties of newly-conquered 
territories, but as central rule becomes consolidated and the state needs to extract greater 
resources in the name of military competition, these concessions give way to more direct 
rule. This is the classic bellicist argument of state-making, first articulated by Weber and 
Otto Hintze and later elaborated on by Charles Tilly, Brian Downing, and many others.4 
These same pressures also exerted themselves on the Tsarist Empire, and even if the 
trajectory of the Tsarist state does not correspond to the classic European examples used 
in the bellicist literature, the general direction of assertive state-building was undoubtedly 
present at least from the reign of Peter I onward. 
 But if this helps to explain why the Tsarist state initially made concessions to the 
borderlands and then gradually circumscribed those concessions, how are we to explain 
                                                 
2
 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986). 
3
 Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy 13 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). 
4
 Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Charles 
Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, Rev. pbk. ed, Studies in Social Discontinuity 
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992); Brian M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: 
Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
1992). 
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the variations of rule among the different territories? The 'imperial turn' in Tsarist 
historiography offers one possible explanation, with multiple levels of imperial rule 
instituted in an ad hoc manner across the varied expanse of the Tsarist Empire. This 
'multidimensional' rule was influenced by many factors: the timing of conquest, the level 
of economic development in the conquered territory, the ethnic and confessional status of 
the inhabitants, the articulation of political institutions, as well as a multitude of other 
subtle variations. Historiographically, it is a compelling and nuanced explanation of the 
actual practices of imperial rule, and similar literatures can be found detailing the 
multidimensionality of other imperial systems. Any theoretical model must therefore take 
into account this sense of multidimensionality, even if it does not replicate the 
conclusions of the historiographical literature. 
 Recent literature in political science on the differences in direct and indirect rule 
offers one possible theoretical path that could be applied to more than just historical 
empires. Gerring, Ziblatt, et al. (2011) offer what they call an 'institutional theory' of 
direct and indirect rule and focus primarily on the prior level of institutionalization 
present in a territory before being incorporated by a dominant power.5 They argue that, 
all else being equal, a higher degree of stateness in the subordinate political unit will lead 
to indirect rule while a low degree of stateness will lead to direct rule. The reasoning 
behind this dynamic is that preexisting levels of political institutionalization offer 
dominant units a political infrastructure to rule through, thus minimizing their costs of 
rule versus employing the coercion necessary to achieve direct rule. Likewise, the leaders 
of the subordinate unit will likely want to retain their position, and so will cooperate with 
                                                 
5
 John Gerring et al., “An Institutional Theory of Direct and Indirect Rule,” World Politics 63, no. 03 
(2011): 377–433. 
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the dominant power. This explanation is likewise extended to explain the likelihood of 
violent coercion, which is a more frequent recourse in less institutionalized polities 
because they cannot act as credible negotiating partners and thereby necessitate direct 
rule. 
 As Gerring, Ziblatt, et al. caution, this theory is not meant to be exclusive of other 
theories and is instead a general account of what they consider to be the most important 
single factor. In addition to the potential interposition of other variables, it is also possible 
that dominant rulers can make 'mistakes' with respect to their ruling strategy, such as by 
using force against an institutionalized unit and subsequently finding that the costs of rule 
are much higher. These mistakes can be attributed to limited information, misplaced 
priorities, bounded rationality, etc, but they nevertheless impose significant limits on the 
theory. 
 The performance of this theory in the case of the Tsarist Empire suggests some 
possible modifications that could be made in order to produce finer-grained analysis. 
Under this theory, it is expected that indirect rule would be employed in the more 
'statelike' territories (the Baltics, Finland, and Poland-Lithuania) and direct rule would be 
employed in the less statelike territory (Hetman Ukraine). In reality, direct rule was also 
employed in Poland-Lithuania and this despite the fact that Poland-Lithuania enjoyed the 
highest degree of institutionalization, having previously been the only sovereign state 
among the borderland territories. Poland-Lithuania enjoyed moments of significant 
autonomy (primarily, the Congress Kingdom of 1815-1830), but the periods of more 
direct rule are more notable (the late 18th century partitions, and the repressions after the 
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1830-1 and 1863-4 rebellions). Accounting for the deviation of this highly significant 
case is imperative. 
 I find that Poland-Lithuania differed from the expected outcome due to the 
character of the local elites and the hostility of central elites to the idea of an autonomous 
Polish Kingdom. Specifically, I find three intervening variables played a significant role 
in the Polish-Lithuanian case while also still serving to explain the other borderland 
territories: 
• The strength and cohesion of local elites 
• The orientation of the local elites 
• Leadership choice in the dominant unit  
A crucial test of this theoretical contribution is the degree to which it can be used to 
explain some of the cases employed by Gerring, Ziblatt, et al. These cases (the various 
colonies of the British Empire, the Incan Empire, colonies in the Americas) do show that 
prior level of institutionalization was very important in determining whether direct or 
indirect rule was used, but they also testify to the multidimensional character of imperial 
rule. Specifically, these cases seem to bear out the importance of local elites and their 
relations to central rule, whether in the case of the strategic marriage alliances used by the 
Incan Empire or the kaleidoscopic patterns of governance employed across the states and 
statelets of British India. Imperial rule was heavily predicated on the cooperation of local 
elites, and where that cooperation was not forthcoming it led to coercion without regard 
for prior degree of institutionalization. 
 In addition to the empirical accuracy of my theoretical contribution, it also adds 
an important dimension to Gerring, Ziblatt et al.'s model. Although they only set out their 
6 
 
theory as a general but not exclusive explanation of patterns of direct and indirect rule, 
the sole emphasis on institutions lends a deterministic feel to their analysis. By adding 
variables that attempt to capture elite interaction between the center and periphery, my 
contribution adds a concern for actor agency operating within the structural boundaries 
set by institutions. This emphasis on actor agency is essential because at its root center-
periphery relations hinge on principal-agent dynamics. If one side or the other are 
unwilling to commit to the bargains necessary for indirect rule, institutional variables 
recede into the background as they can no longer be used as proxies for central rule. 
 This argument and model have applications to a range of historical and 
contemporary cases, imperial or otherwise. The first logical extension is to other 
historical empires, whether contiguous land empires such as the Ottoman or Habsburg or 
maritime empires like France or Britain. The next logical application would be to 
contemporary states that lack the infrastructural capacity to institute direct rule without 
great cost and the bargaining processes they must undergo vis-a-vis peripheral elites. 
Finally, as Gerring, Ziblatt et al. note, this kind of model also has relevance to federal 
states of either democratic or authoritarian types, as Ziblatt's prior work indicates.6 The 
contemporary Russian Federation offers an interesting cross-historical comparison, as the 
Kremlin has faced decentralizing pressures in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. 
 
States and Empires 
 
                                                 
6
 Daniel Ziblatt, Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
7 
 
Most contemporary explanations for state-building draw, at least in part, on the argument 
that military competition was among the most important drivers behind the political 
institutions that came to form the core of the modern state.7 This argument derives in a 
large part from the political writings of the German theorist Otto Hintze, who argued that 
despite the traditional focus on internal conditions for state-making (which characterizes 
social contract theory and many Marxist explanations), it was actually foreign policy 
which had a greater impact on the direction of state development, since foreign policy 
oriented the polity within a broader state system.8 Since the state system often resolved 
its disputes through conflict and violence, all state organization originated in military 
organization, with a community coming together to be able to project offensive and 
defensive capabilities. Only after this fact did other purposes of government emerge, 
usually in conjunction with internal coercion.9 The most compelling contemporary 
version of this argument was made by Charles Tilly, who argued that the outcome of this 
process was by no means intentional, but was instead an accidental byproduct of a series 
of policies employed to fight wars more effectively. Instead, the pressure of military 
competition provoked profound changes in domestic resource extraction (both in terms of 
manpower and economic resources) that favored the development of large, differentiated 
                                                 
7
 In this study, “state” is employed in a manner appropriate to the historical context of state-building in 
modern Europe. As such, it approximates the Weberian ideal of administrative uniformity over a defined 
territory, with a formal bureaucracy serving as the mechanism to ensure this uniformity. By extension, it 
also implies the general processes of centralization that accompanied state-building in continental Europe, 
even if centralization is no longer key to our understanding of the contemporary state, which can be federal 
and decentralized as well as unitary and centralized. It could also be taken to imply the process of 
nationalization that Benedict Anderson describes in his classic text, Imagined Communities, but I consider 
this peripheral to the central, administrative focus of the present study. The term is fraught with 
complexities, and while my usage is certainly imperfect it serves the purpose set out in this research. 
8
 Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. 159. 
9
 Ibid. 181. 
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administrative structures.10 Knudsen and Rothstein capture this dynamic in an evocative 
metaphor: 
The modern state, as an institutional complex, may be compared to a 
coral reef. Much as coral reefs are shaped by deposits over a long 
period, so states are shaped by their institutions. Nobody envisaged the 
national states of Europe in the form we see them today. No one 
designed their principal components - treasuries, courts, central 
administrations. Such institutions typically arose as more or less 
inadvertent byproducts of efforts to accomplish more immediate tasks, 
such as, classically, the creation and maintenance of armed forces. Yet 
once come into this world, these institutions lived on, adding layer 
upon layer to the coral reef.11 
 
This overwhelming imperative of military competition thereby molded the context of 
domestic political rule, providing rulers with a strong incentive to extend the social 
control of the state. As Joel Migdal puts it, the reason for extending or strengthening 
social control is framed as a necessity of political survival, where failure to marshal 
sufficient resources will result in defeat at the hands of external rivals or defeat by 
internal competitors to power.12 
 If extending internal social control was necessary to secure the geopolitical 
position of the state, this had a couple important ramifications for the internal makeup of 
the political system. For one thing, it made the traditional medieval system of 
overlapping sovereignties inadequate and indeed threatening to the state, since it 
undermined the ability to exercise control. As Gianfranco Poggi and others have argued, 
there is a fundamental disjuncture between the internal and external position of the state. 
While the external position of the state is defined by competition between nominally 
                                                 
10
 Charles Tilly, "War-making and State-making as Organized Crime,"  in Social Science Research Council 
(U.S.) Committee on Latin American Studies Joint, and Committee on Western Europe Joint, Bringing the 
State Back In (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 172. 
11
 Tim Knudsen and Bo Rothstein, “State Building in Scandinavia,” Comparative Politics 26, no. 2 
(January 1, 1994): 203–220, doi:10.2307/422268. 203. 
12
 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1988). 23. 
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equal units (oftentimes resolved through war), the internal position of the state must be 
defined by the superiority of the political system over all other political rivals (the classic 
Weberian argument of the monopoly over the means of violence).13 The traditional 
estates system existed in tension with these realities. Poggi offers an argument that fits 
into the bellicist school, placing the pressures behind state development on the needs for 
military buildup. This buildup required more organizational capacity and more resources, 
and required shifting away from the traditional reliance on the estates to an increasing 
reliance on bureaucratic agencies tasked with pursuing these policies.14 The estates 
system diffused political and economic power among different groups within the system, 
generally with the land-owning gentry possessing the most substantial privileges, but this 
arrangement proved to be inefficient for the state's external needs. As Tilly argues, states 
often aimed at some level to homogenize their populations because even though it ran the 
risk of producing a united front of opposition, it also made it easier for the subject 
population to identify with the rulers, the rulers to communicate with the population, and 
to create uniform administrative frameworks.15 Thus, we have a complex framework to 
understand the process of state-building, since it not only involves external pressures, but 
internal strategies for centralizing political power. Tilly frames the process of state-
building as including a ruler, a ruling class, other state clients, opponents, competitors 
and rivals, the rest of the population, and a coercive and civilian apparatus to enforce the 
state's policies.16 
                                                 
13
 Gianfranco Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects (Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press, 1990). 23-5. 
14
 Ibid. 66-7. 
15
 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992. 106-7. 
16
 Ibid. 34-5. 
10 
 
 This approach to understanding state-building has been elegantly applied to a 
number of historical and contemporary cases. Tilly separates the cases into capital-
intensive trajectories and coercive-intensive trajectories, with Western Europe following 
the former and Eastern Europe the latter. France, Britain, and Prussia are often employed 
as the classic examples of state-building, with Prussia clearly demonstrating the military 
roots of political change. As Samuel Finer shows, after the defeat at Jena, the Prussian 
government under Hardenburg, Stein and Scharnhorst pursued radical state-building from 
above, to try and address the deficiencies of the Prussian state. The reform efforts ended 
up being shadows of what was intended due to the obstruction of traditional, landed 
forces, but the changes were still significant and can be paralleled in many ways to the 
changes pursued after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War.17 Beyond the classic 
examples, Henry Wright argues that we can actually see similar dynamics in older 
political systems (he uses the example of polities in Madagascar and Mesopotamia) with 
intense competition leading to a more thoroughly-articulated political system, even if 
those systems do not closely resemble the bureaucratic complex of the contemporary 
nation-state.18 Knudsen and Rothstein find that the same logic holds in the Scandinavian 
countries, especially in Sweden and Denmark.19 Likewise, the model has been applied 
profitably to more recent cases, with Cameron Thies expanding the model to include 
geopolitical rivalry (not necessarily always military rivalry) in Latin America, as well as 
                                                 
17
 Samuel Finer, "State- and nation-building in Europe: the role of the military," in Social Science Research 
Council (U.S.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Studies in Political Development 8 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1975). 153-4. 
18
 Henry T. Wright, “Early State Dynamics as Political Experiment,” Journal of Anthropological Research 
62, no. 3 (October 1, 2006): 305–319. 314. 
19
 Knudsen and Rothstein, “State Building in Scandinavia.” 
11 
 
in parts of Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East.20 Thomas Ertman and Brian 
Downing have also extended the bellicist argument to explain other state dynamics, 
including the variation in regime type and the likelihood of a state becoming democratic. 
Ertman argues that variation of political regimes in Europe can be explained by 
examining 1) the organization of local government after state formation, 2) the timing of 
sustained geopolitical competition, and 3) the influence of strong representative 
assemblies.21 The timing of geopolitical competition in stimulating state-building was 
"nonsimultaneous," and so the timing had a large impact on the type of state built. States 
that began processes of formation before 1450 had to rely on structures and expertise that 
would become increasingly outdated, while later state-builders could exploit more recent 
developments towards the end of constructing "proto-modern bureaucracies."22 Likewise, 
Downing argues that democracy tended to develop in cases where rulers did not need to 
engage in heavy domestic resource mobilization in response to military competition, as it 
allowed the persistence of medieval institutions and constitutionalism. In states that 
responded to international pressures with extensive resource mobilization, the more likely 
outcome was military-bureaucratic absolutism.23 (Incidentally, he excludes Tsarist Russia 
from this schema as it lacked a feudal constitutional order.)24 
 That being said, applying this framework of state-building to the contemporary 
world is not without complications. Different patterns of political development and armed 
                                                 
20
 Cameron G. Thies, “State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial 
Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000,” International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 1 (March 1, 
2004): 53–72. Cameron G. Thies, “War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America,” American Journal 
of Political Science 49, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 451–465. Cameron G. Thies, “National Design and State 
Building in Sub-Saharan Africa,” World Politics 61, no. 4 (October 1, 2009): 623–669. 
21
 Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern 
Europe (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 6. 
22
 Ibid. 26-8. 
23
 Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change. 9. 
24
 Ibid. 38-43. 
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conflict necessitate modifications, especially since contemporary state-building exists in a 
context where the national state is already a fact of political life. As Tilly cautions, by and 
large the historical European experience is not broadly comparable to the contemporary 
world, but the experience of Europe may point to general dynamics that occur across time 
in state-building. The military and war-making connection may be just such a dynamic.25 
As such, the general model has been modified to take into account differences in 
contemporary state-building, including the previously mentioned effort by Cameron 
Thies to expand the criteria from military competition to strategic competition, given the 
lack of open interstate warfare in regions like Latin America.26 Likewise, the relative lack 
of persistent interstate warfare (at least compared to the formative period in European 
history) and its replacement by intrastate warfare and violence has been used as a 
mechanism for explaining the emergence of weak states. One of Migdal's "sufficient" 
conditions for the emergence of a strong state is the presence of an external military 
threat. If a threat exists, it gives the rulers a strong incentive to marshal resources as 
efficiently as possible to guarantee that the state possesses enough power to fend off 
challenges. In the absence of this threat, rulers may have the incentive to protect their 
own rule and come to understandings with internal rivals, but this may result in a weak, 
rather than a strong, state.27 This explanation is employed by Jeffrey Herbst to explain the 
emergence of profoundly weak states in sub-Saharan Africa, since the post-colonial norm 
of territorial inviolability reduced the prevalence of interstate conflict.28 
                                                 
25
 Tilly, "War-making and State-making as Organized Crime," in The Formation of National States in 
Western Europe. 81-2. 
26
 Cameron G. Thies, “War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America.” 460. 
27
 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States. 
28
 Jeffrey Ira Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton 
Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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 How does Tsarist Russia fit into the bellicist model of state-building? As a 
Eurasian land power, it consistently faced threats not only from Europe, but also from the 
Ottoman Empire and a number of groups on the Central Asian steppe. Pressure to keep 
up with the military advances of rival powers was overwhelming, and its relative position 
of technical backwardness only sharpened this need. It is characteristic to begin an 
account of changes in Russian military organization with the reign of Peter I, but as 
Michael Paul points out, shocks to Russia's military infrastructure can actually be dated 
back to the mid-16th century, as the rival powers of Poland-Lithuania, Sweden, and the 
Livonian Germans began to adopt gunpowder weapons and large contingents of 
artillery.29 Sweden, though eventually eclipsed by other powers, may have been the most 
important source of external pressure for Russian state-building (as well as for Prussia 
and other German states), since the combination of superior state organization and mobile 
military forces provided the Scandinavian power with significant victories over its 
rivals.30 Peter I, when he began his own military (and, consequently, state-building) 
revolution in the late 17th-early 18th century, consciously modeled his reforms on 
Sweden's government infrastructure, as well as adopting influences from Prussia, 
although these were obviously altered to take into account the radically different social 
system present in the Tsarist Empire. The eventual outcome to these reform efforts also 
points to another necessary caution for the state-building model: the role of contingency 
and the presence of preexisting institutions necessarily modify state-building efforts and 
militate against determinism. As Poggi argues, the outcomes of pivotal military conflicts 
(such as the Great Northern War in the case of Russia) largely dictates which institutions 
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will be adopted, leading to different government infrastructures in different cases even if 
the same general dynamic (increased centralization and bureaucratization) is present.31 
 Up to this point, I have been emphasizing the external conditions of state-
building, but it is also necessary to consider how these external pressures translate to 
changes in domestic policies and institutions. The most important domestic effect of 
external military competition is increased extraction from the population (in terms of both 
taxation and conscription of military personnel), as the state shifts from indirect to direct 
rule (since indirect rule is less efficient when it comes to the task of extraction).32 The 
theoretical approach often employed to understand this process of extraction is referred to 
as the predatory theory of the state. As Margaret Levi argues, in predatory theory rulers 
will try to monopolize economic and political power to increase their bargaining position 
vis-a-vis powerful internal groups. The stocks of power these groups possess, versus the 
transaction costs (monitoring, enforcement, etc.) that the state has to pay, will increase 
their bargaining position and make it more likely that they will receive concessions from 
the ruler to guarantee loyalty. Tax exemptions, economic privileges, and some degree of 
autonomy are common outcomes of this bargaining process.33 Gaining compliance is the 
primary consideration of state-builders, and building coercive capacity is at the root of 
efforts to create compliance. The state must possess enough coercive capacity to suppress 
internal rivals and to extract resources from the population, but it cannot "plunder" the 
population lest it threaten its own stability. The existence of strain, in the form of 
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ecological pressure or foreign enemies, can also increase the likelihood of gaining 
compliance.34 
 Predatory theories of the state view the state as an agent capable of imposing itself 
on civil society to some degree, and this relationship between the state and civil society is 
very much framed in the cost-benefit analysis lens of rational choice.35 Migdal's 
definition of the state's capabilities meshes well with this approach, as he emphasizes the 
state's ability to penetrate society, regulate social relations, extract resources, and use 
those resources in determined ways.36 Extraction of resources helps to support the 
primary goal of the state, but different strategies to achieve this end must be assessed 
based on the costs they would incur. This differs from my previous discussion of state-
building, which more closely approximates what Michael Mann calls "institutional 
statism." Institutional statism emphasizes institutional structures over actors, since those 
structures provide constraints over all actors in the system and will vary across different 
states.37 In addition to the strategy of side-payments (concessions to internal groups), 
rulers have other options for gaining compliance, such as the use of outright coercion or 
what Levi calls "quasi-voluntary compliance" (such as would be provided under the rule 
of law, where individuals are aware that crimes will be punished). Coercion is costly, and 
that cost is broken down into effective monitoring and enforcement. Coercion will not 
completely eliminate noncompliance, but the goal is to minimize it through the use of 
technologies and strategies. The less extensive the administrative framework, the more 
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costly coercion becomes.38 Quasi-voluntary compliance is another strategy for gaining 
compliance, by creating a system where individuals will choose to comply and where 
noncompliance will be met with punitive sanctions. For this to work, the threat of 
punishment from the state must be credible, and the individual must believe that others 
are also complying. A perception that others are free-riding will increase the likelihood of 
noncompliance by creating concerns of exploitation while also undermining the ruler's 
credibility.39 
 The effect of this effort to gain internal compliance is that rulers must engage in a 
complicated game of balancing external and internal rivals. Thies points of that while 
strong external rivals may result in strengthened state capacity, the presence of strong 
internal rivals may have the opposite effect. States that have strong external rivals are 
generally more capable of extracting resources from society (since they can offer society 
protection from those rivals), but the efficiency of extraction relies on successful 
bargaining with internal rivals.40 Even if these efforts at bargaining are successful, it is 
uncertain whether the presence of internal rivals would enhance or impair the state's 
overall strength. Since the state will need to raise revenue to impose its will on internal 
rivals, extraction will likely increase (at least in the short term) on already-loyal portions 
of the populace, potentially straining this relationship. In addition, if the bargaining with 
internal rivals includes substantial economic concessions (such as tax exemptions, 
conscription exemptions, or other economic privileges), it may impair the state's overall 
extractive capacity, which would weaken the state vis-a-vis rivals that don't necessarily 
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make the same kinds of bargains.41 However, this imbalanced arrangement could also 
disappear in the long term, as actual military conflict introduces a "ratchet effect" that 
increases the ceiling on tolerable levels of extraction. The theory of the ratchet effect 
argues that war disrupts institutional arrangements such that the state is able to expand its 
administrative apparatus, though it is unlikely that such a ratchet effect would completely 
eliminate the privileges that internal groups enjoy.42 
 Predatory theory has extensive relevance to the state-building experience in both 
contemporary and historical cases. The process of state-building in Europe sometimes 
required appealing to the people over the traditional elites, sometimes required 
negotiating with the traditional elites without the participation of the people, and 
sometimes involved direct coercion on the part of rulers to create the desired ends. The 
tradition of kingship in Europe helped to advance this process, but the sheer volume of 
political entities that were eventually absorbed indicates the contingency and chaos of the 
process, as well as the necessity of bargaining.43 This process ranged from the stable 
arrangement made between the Prussian monarchy and the Junkers to the relative chaos 
experienced between the estates in France and the king. As Joseph Strayer notes, the lack 
of preexisting strong local institutions in England made the task of spreading 
administrative rule comparatively easy, since it was not necessary to negotiate as much 
with local notables or to rely as much on bureaucratic enforcement. In countries where 
this was not true, the process of state-building was far more difficult due to the 
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concessions made by the state.44 In contemporary cases, much the same relationship is 
present. In Latin America, where Thies identifies strategic over military rivalry as the 
most important impulse, there is still a strong correlation between external rivals and 
increased extractive capacity, even if the states had to feed more slowly due to the 
absence of overt military threats.45 Conversely, Migdal finds that the presence of strong 
internal rivals may help to explain the emergence of weak states. As societies in the 
developing world indicate, part of the struggle of state-building has revolved around 
accommodating powerful organizations within the territory when there is not sufficient 
social control to suppress those organizations or enforce compliance.46 On the other hand, 
increasing extractive capacity may still be present in these societies, if only on a smaller 
scale than the dramatic examples of Europe. Sub-Saharan Africa, often used as the 
example for explaining weak states, still shows a strong relationship between military 
spending, productivity, and extraction levels, but the scale is much smaller because 
productivity is comparatively low.47 
 The logic of predatory theory also applies to state-building in the Tsarist Empire, 
but with some important qualifications. In Western and parts of Central Europe, the 
process of increasing extraction through taxation corresponded with concessions on the 
part of the state to powerful internal groups and to the population as a whole (usually in 
the form of expanded citizenship). Tilly refers to this as the capital-intensive or the 
capitalized-coercion mode of state-building, depending on the degree to which the state 
employed direct coercion as part of its bargaining. In contrast, the coercion-intensive 
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mode, which characterized Prussia, Russia, and other Eastern European polities, 
emphasized compelled extraction without the same concessions on the part of the state as 
in Western Europe.48 Russia was the exemplar of the coercion-intensive mode, with Tilly 
placing it at the top of the coercion scale and the bottom of the capitalization scale (since 
Russia lacked urban centers of comparable capital power or a significant merchant class). 
As a result, the social structure in Russia produced different outcomes in how the state 
responded to external pressure. Class structure in part dictated the kinds of struggles that 
emerged during state-building. In Western Europe, the capital-intensive nature of society 
made taxation the most salient issue. In Eastern Europe, the disposition of the land was 
the most important feature and the source of class subjection.49 Basing resource 
extraction off of land ownership was less efficient than the capital extraction proceeding 
in other parts of Europe, but it had the merits of being stable and predictable. 
 The imposition and administration of taxation proved to be difficult for a few 
reasons in the Tsarist Empire, and that difficulty resulted in specific institutional 
arrangements. The first major problem was demographic: the Tsarist Empire had a huge 
population, but that population was spread over a vast territory. As Paul notes, Russia 
(and other Eastern European powers like Poland) had a population density of around six 
persons per square kilometer. In contrast, France had a population density of around 40 
per square kilometer, and the German lands were generally in the 50 range. In addition to 
the dispersed nature of the population, Tsarist subjects were also poorer than in other 
states, creating a tax pool that was both spread out and resource-poor.50 The Tsarist state 
also lacked an easy source of taxation, as Britain enjoyed with its low-cost customs 
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duties. Initial efforts to address this deficiency comprised a number of direct taxes on 
commodities such as salt, as well as other less obvious solutions such as taxing travel 
(Richard Hellie notes that there were over 280 distinct taxes in 17th century Russia), but 
these proved difficult to manage and either were revoked or brought in less revenue than 
desired.51 These inadequacies produced the solution of binding peasants to the land - the 
imposition of serfdom. As Gabriel Ardant argues, the imposition of serfdom arose due to 
a lack of capital exchange, making indirect taxes insufficient (as in the British customs 
duties), but the state lacked the capacity to levy direct taxes and prevent taxpayer flight. 
The solution, the tying of individuals to land to guarantee their compliance, was the 
solution to the problem of extraction.52 The need for reliable food production also drove 
the imposition of serfdom, as Russia lacked the capital and agricultural productivity of 
Western Europe. As a result, the bargain between the gentry and the state produced an 
inefficient, but predictable, system of agricultural development that was adequate for 
food production through the manorial system.53 
 Serfdom may have solved the short-term problem of creating a stable tax base, but 
it made future policy changes and administrative expansion more difficult. It did nothing 
to enhance coordination with local government (or to strengthen local government), and 
it created an incentive structure for the gentry that guaranteed they would resist any 
changes to the status quo. These deficiencies became apparent when the military costs of 
the Great Northern War stressed the state's financial standing and triggered Peter I's 
efforts at reform. Military need undoubtedly drove Peter's reforms, and his successes 
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were reflected in the tripling of the tax burden and budget, and a more aggressive effort 
to take a census for taxation purposes. Since local institutions were underdeveloped, Peter 
mostly relied on the army to oversee these efforts, while using decrees to force through 
the reforms. This arrangement proved unsustainable after much of it was reversed under 
his successors, but it at least laid the groundwork for later efforts of state-building.54 
However, when Catherine II decided to expand on the Petrine reforms to create a well-
ordered, more centralized state, these problems resurfaced. Catherine's ambitious 
provincial reforms efforts were undone due to the lack of Tsarist penetration in the 
countryside and the lack of skilled professionals able to fill the roles that were 
envisioned, both in terms of the government apparatus and in other areas like education. 
The desire was to undermine local abuse of power which was one of the major stimulants 
of the Pugachev rebellion, but the outcomes demonstrated that Petersburg only possessed 
limited infrastructural capability to effect lasting change.55 This limited capacity 
remained up until the end of the Tsarist state, despite periodic efforts by Tsars to increase 
administrative control. 
 This problem was heightened in the borderlands (not only the Western 
borderlands, but it was most salient there), as lack of Tsarist capacity came into contact 
with historical grants of autonomy and relatively powerful internal groups like the Polish 
szlachta or the Baltic German gentry. As Thies notes, in the predatory theory of the state 
borderlands that possessed strong groups or significant resources enjoy even more 
leverage in bargaining vis-a-vis the center, making it more likely that border regions will 
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enjoy substantial privileges versus the rest of the territory.56 Given the dramatic 
differences in coercive capacity, the Tsarist state certainly had the ability to force 
submission on the borderlands if they flouted central rule too egregiously, but as the case 
of the suppression of Poland indicates, the use of this coercion was very costly and as 
predatory theory would predict, it made the state weaker vis-a-vis external rivals. 
Moreover, this is a consideration that goes beyond the time period I am considering, as 
the argument could be made that the same dynamic applies to Post-Soviet Russia and its 
considerable hinterland. As Alexseev argues, the collapse of Soviet institutions released 
central-periphery conflicts that had been kept under wraps and presented Boris Yeltsin 
with much the same choice that Tsarist administrators had: to either coerce or to 
accommodate peripheral regions seeking greater autonomy from the center.57 Yeltsin 
opted for accommodation, with the notable exception of Chechnya, and Alexseev argues 
that this was actually better for the territorial integrity of the Federation than other 
commentators believed, because it was the only viable strategy for holding together such 
a vast, diverse territory. Instead, Alexseev saw the greatest threat to the Russian 
Federation as being the possibility that the center may try to reassert strong control over 
the regions, bringing it into conflict with local elites and potentially facilitating the 
merger of civic and ethnic nationalisms.58 The efforts of the Putin government to follow 
just such a path may therefore have interesting effects down the road, making predatory 
theory relevant not only to my cases, but also to the contemporary Russian state. 
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 The state-building literature provides important theoretical context for the 
relationship between the Tsarist center and the Western Borderlands. If we are seeking to 
explain the differences in imperial policy towards the constituent parts of the Western 
Borderlands it is necessary to understand the role played by general European military 
competition and the internal transformations it wrought in the Tsarist state. Upon coming 
into contact with strategic rivals employing more advanced military and governing 
institutions (Sweden, Prussia, etc.), the Tsarist state sought to 'catch up' by reforming its 
own institutions and increasing its domestic extractive capability. When increased 
resource extraction became pivotal for military success, the state was faced with two 
options: accommodation with internal elites to secure these resources or coercive action 
to directly gain control of these resources. Although the state did indeed employ coercion 
as one of its tools, it would have proven inadequate as the sole tactic given the 
geographic expanse and diversity of the Tsarist Empire. This is where the bargaining 
process described by Levi and others becomes relevant, as the state made significant 
concessions (in the form of serfdom for the entire empire and in the form of high levels 
of autonomy in the borderlands) to secure its goal. This bargaining then set the stage for 
the subsequent transformations of the Tsarist political system, as the internal elites that 
proved capable of retaining their leverage vis-a-vis the state were also successful in 
retaining their privileged positions, with the obverse also being true. 
 The literature on empire59 has a great deal of overlap with the literature on state-
building, both with regards to the role of external threats and the predatory aspect of 
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resource extraction. Large, multi-national empires like the Tsarist Empire, the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire (just to take the examples in closest contact 
with the European mainstream) experienced these pressures in the same way as Western 
and Central Europe and attempted to make many of the same adaptations to address the 
pressures. However, the starting point for these political units was dramatically different 
both in terms of social and political structure, and these pressures threatened the stability 
of the imperial status quo more so than was experienced in the rest of Europe. The most 
salient difference was that of space - unlike the far-flung empires of Britain, France and 
Spain, the Tsarist Empire was a territorially-extensive but contiguous multiethnic empire. 
This contiguity made it impossible for the Tsarist state to completely separate political 
administration in the core versus the periphery, and in many cases that distinction 
between core and periphery was ephemeral and subject to change (the case of Ukraine is 
the best example of the shifting definition of the imperial core). Moreover, the sheer 
vastness of imperial space heightened the problem of state-building, as the traditional 
reliance on local elites had to give way to creeping administrative centralization. In the 
Tsarist Empire, the largest contiguous political unit on the face of the planet, managing 
space persistently bedeviled the project of state-building. 
 This reality comes into conflict with how the Tsarist state presented itself, and 
how it has been presented by some scholars. Tsarist ideology framed the entire territory 
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of the empire as the Tsar's personal patrimony, which could be dispensed with or 
administered as the reigning sovereign saw fit. Alongside this patrimonial conception of 
rule was the attendant notion that the Tsar possessed absolute power over this domain, a 
power that exceeded the limits of Western absolutism, which at least had to balance itself 
to a degree with the estates. However, this conception of power did not translate well into 
practice, as Tsarist pretensions came into conflict with the realities of projecting power 
over extensive territories. Michael Mann provides us with a useful rubric for 
conceptualizing this conflict, as he emphasizes two different dimensions of power: 
despotic and infrastructural. Despotic power is the power of the state to take actions 
without the regular input or negotiation from civil society. Infrastructural power is the 
ability of the state to penetrate civil society and logistically support its decisions, 
guarantee that compliance is achieved, etc.60 Empires fall along the high-despotic, low-
infrastructural portion of the axis, as they accumulate territory without simultaneously 
accumulating the means to directly rule that territory. The costs of extending 
infrastructural power through the buildup of local administration and police forces (the 
shift from indirect to direct rule that Tilly highlights as one of the hallmarks of the 
modern state) were generally too high, leading the state to pursue alternative strategies.61 
 Territorially-extensive societies in the pre-modern era by necessity ruled through 
local intermediaries, since routine political control could not easily outpace the maximum 
marching distance of military forces (around 75-100 miles from the center). This only 
changed with the increased agricultural base of support in the 19th century.62 Hence, even 
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the most despotic rulers could only pretend to real territorial control. Older empires relied 
primarily on standing militaries and conquest, as military force provided a more 
extensive radius of action than political control or economic integration. The force 
required a base of production to guarantee the resources and manpower for military 
action, so the different stages relied on one another for long-term success.63 The 
absolutist states of modern Europe enjoyed essentially unlimited despotic power, but this 
accompanied severe limitations on infrastructural power. Naked coercion was costly and 
difficult to maintain, so the most effective strategy became targeted coercion combined 
with divide-and-rule tactics involving negotiation with powerful corporate groupings.64 
This characterized all European states to an extent, but the reliance on local elites was 
more pivotal in the contiguous empires of Europe, as the state did not have a realistic 
capability to implement direct rule (in contrast to states like France or Prussia which were 
able to effectively centralize power). As a result, the Tsarist Empire more resembled a 
patchwork of local autonomies (both political and economic) rather than the idealized 
patrimony of the Tsar. 
 By comparison, political units that relied more on infrastructural power responded 
more adeptly to the challenges of state-making. Although medieval Britain lacked the 
despotic power of Rome (or Russia), the collective power gained through territorial 
coordination with the estates was actually quite formidable, with the King in Parliament 
acting as the epicenter of this government by quasi-consent.65 This made the process of 
building up government infrastructure less difficult in Britain, and made the state more 
flexible in responding to external challenges. The United States, a classical "weak" state 
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in terms of despotic power, also illustrates this dynamic, as cooperation between the state 
and civil society produced a durable status quo even though the state did not possess 
untrammeled police power.66 In the contemporary period, we can continue to observe this 
interplay between despotic and infrastructural power, with Post-Soviet Russia and Sub-
Saharan Africa both fitting the mold of too much despotic power and too little 
infrastructural power. The cost structure African states faced when extending their 
authority not only involved the administrative and security costs of extending the state's 
writ, but also the infrastructural costs given the lower levels of development in the 
hinterlands. The further away from the center the state sought to go, the more the cost 
radically scaled upward, with capitals becoming islands of control in seas of 
underadministration.67 Africa is characterized by low population densities which can 
make it costly and difficult for the state to achieve administrative control over its entire 
territory (given the paucity of skilled personnel for administration). The former USSR 
actually approximates the same kind of population density, which was also much more so 
the case for Tsarist Russia.68 
 The differences in the relationship between the emergent state and civil society 
had important consequences for social structure. As Giddens notes, although the estates 
acted in conjunction with the state in parts of Western Europe, that was not the only 
possible outcome. In Russia, Prussia, Spain, and other absolutist states the estates were 
repressed or made to conform to the state's wishes. The state may have preserved the 
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privileges of the gentry, but it was hardly involved in an equal partnership with them.69 In 
Western Europe, coordination between the estates and the government resulted in civil 
and political concessions as the price for the extension of state power. This process 
gradually resulted in the extension of rights and privileges to other sectors of the 
population, such as the bourgeoisie and eventually the working classes. In Eastern 
Europe, coordination resulted not in political rights, but in economic privileges and the 
extension of serfdom. In this case, the adherence of the estates was needed for the social 
base of the state, but it was an adversarial process. Eisenstadt summarizes the political 
goals of imperial rulers as being directed towards the extension of the state's power vis-a-
vis internal groups, either by weakening traditional loyalties to internal rivals and shifting 
that loyalty to the state, or by co-opting major groups so that they help to reinforce the 
general power of the empire itself.70 One method of binding the gentry to the state was 
through military service. As Hintze asserts, maintenance of the army was the state's 
primary purpose, and the extension of the tax burden and the recruitment of the estates 
into this purpose characterized the emergent police state of modern Europe. The alliance 
with the gentry meant that the officer corps assumed a distinctly noble cast, and that 
social privilege and military duty became fused, much as occurred in Prussia.71 
 In the long-term, however, the solutions of serfdom and the transformation of the 
role of the gentry proved to be unstable. In Western and Central Europe, the emergent 
state worked to mobilize the entire population in support of state-building, whether 
through the expansion of taxation or the expansion of military service. Tsarist Russia 
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attempted to replicate these efforts in the empire, but given the fact that the social system 
was predicated on the absolute subservience of the majority of the population, 
mobilizational capacity was obviously limited. As Hintze observes, the Tsarist state 
implemented universal military service (which started as lifetime duration and was later 
shortened to a still-brutal 25 years for those conscripted) without also extending some 
degree of citizenship to those subjected to the policy. This disjunction between 
extraordinary demands without any simultaneous privilege was an unstable arrangement, 
a judgment that was borne out by the empire's experiences in warfare after 1850 (and 
especially in WWI, where subject discontent with military service helped to bring about 
the empire's collapse).72 Moreover, when the state made overdue efforts to ameliorate and 
eliminate serfdom during the Great Reforms, it served to undermine the basis of gentry 
loyalty to the state, even though the gentry were able to make sure that the terms were not 
that painful to their immediate economic interests.73 By shifting the dependency of the 
peasantry on the gentry to the state, the state hoped to construct a more durable basis of 
political control, but the modesty of the reforms did not garner much appreciation from 
the population and set the tone for the later battles over land tenure and ownership that 
would characterize the waning decades of the 19th century and the first two decades of 
the 20th century. The end of the old order confirmed the final victory of the crown over 
the gentry, but at the cost of imperial stability. 
 As Eisenstadt summarizes, the process of political change in territorially-
extensive empires was sparked by a combination of external and internal pressures, often 
in contradiction to one another. The external pressures, whether economic or military 
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threats, exerted pressure on internal conditions by sharpening the need of the state to 
extract more resources from society and to mobilize greater manpower to meet threats. 
This drive for greater extraction and mobilization served to destabilize the status quo 
within imperial systems, since the internal pressures necessitated the diffusion of power, 
the reliance on local clients, and cultural autonomy.74 In Tsarist Russia, there was an 
attempt to extend some form of law throughout the territory of the empire and to 
construct an adequate policing apparatus capable of surveiling the population and 
enforcing the writ of the state, but state incapacity and traditions of local rule cut against 
this process. As Kivelson notes, the process of mapping territory which was generally 
associated with increasing state power in other European cases actually helps to 
demonstrate the weakness of the Tsarist state. The profusion of competing maps and the 
inability of the Tsarist state to adjudicate such disputes led to bogged-down litigation 
processes, an inconsistent application of law, and arbitrary verdicts handed down by 
judges.75 Likewise, although the state attempted to construct a police state in its major 
cities to suppress dissent, the same was not true of policing in the countryside. As 
Giddens argues, one of the characteristics of the transformation of the modern state was 
the shift from violent, exemplary modes of punishment to incarceration and 
surveillance.76 However, Tsarist capabilities were so limited in this respect (the Third 
Section and the gendarme simply did not have the numbers to cover Russia's huge 
territory) that the state often fell back onto the older, exemplary modes of punishment, as 
with the execution of the Decembrists and the mock execution of the Petrashevsty group. 
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 Thus, although the Tsarist state was responding to the same external pressures as 
the rest of Europe (and in fact, stronger pressures due to the presence of threats from both 
the West and the East), the process of state-building that these pressures triggered was 
largely incompatible with the existing institutional structure of the empire. The territory 
of the empire was too vast for the state to expand its administrative functions adequately 
to all regions, and so the state settled for a thin veneer of administrative structure that 
allowed it to extract enough money and manpower to respond to external military threats. 
Serfdom, the means by which the state co-opted the loyalty of the gentry, also cut against 
state-building processes, as it removed far too much of the population from any sort of 
meaningful civic life, drastically limiting the mobilizational capacity of the state. And 
perhaps most importantly, the diversity of the multinational empire militated against a 
centralized, well-ordered police state on the Prussian model, and the more the state 
attempted to move in that direction, the more resistance it inspired in the non-Russian 
territories of the empire. In Mann's terminology, the Tsarist Empire was all despotic 
power and little infrastructural power, leaving the state adrift without the same 
coordinating capabilities of states like Britain, France or Prussia. 
 
The "Imperial Turn" 
 
Aside from the treatment of empire in political science and sociology, there has been 
renewed interest in the concept of empire in the field of history following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. This so-called "imperial turn" has become an indispensable tool for 
reimagining the political history and institutions of Eurasia, shifting emphasis away from 
the centralized autocracy of imperial capitals to the actual governance of the imperial 
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periphery. This historical literature also performs an important function in this study, as it 
helps to bridge the divide between the concepts of state and empire and explain some of 
the transformations that occurred in the Western Borderlands in the later decades of the 
Tsarist Empire. Specifically, Zygmunt Bauman distinguishes between two types of state 
behaviors, that of the "gamekeeper" and that of the "gardener".77 The transformation of 
Tsarist policy in the Western Borderlands from their incorporation until the collapse of 
the Tsarist Empire largely corresponds to the shift of the Tsarist government from a 
"gamekeeper" position (containing and controlling a diverse population) to the 
"gardener" position (remaking the population along the lines envisioned in the concept of 
the national state). This shift also tracked closely to the increasing importance that was 
placed on defining what it meant to be "Russian" in the 19th century, with alternatives 
including a narrow, coherent ethnic grouping, a pan-ethnic "nation", an Orthodox 
identity, or a linguistic identity, with significant overlap between many of these 
categories (as can be seen in the polemics of the Russian publicist Mikhail Katkov).78 
 The debate within history over the meaning of empire provides illumination on 
several fronts: on the relationship between empire and the nation-state, on the 
relationship of Tsarist Russia to the experiences of other "nationalizing" states, and on the 
variations in governance over different regions of the empire. The first problem lies with 
defining the concept of empire itself, and how that concept relates to the experience and 
structures of the modern national state. Suny defines empire as constituting an 
"institutionalized hierarchy, maintenance of difference between ruling metropole and 
ruled periphery" that is fundamentally incompatible with notions of democracy and 
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popular sovereignty.79 Both Suny and Seymour Becker place empire and the nation-state 
on opposite ends of the political spectrum, largely due to the concept of national self-
determination that is theoretically incompatible with empire.80 Moreover, as Suny notes, 
empires tend to have porous boundaries while nation-states are more exclusively-defined, 
partly due to the political expediency connected with the inclusiveness of heterogeneous 
imperial systems. However, Suny also notes that while this holds true for empire and 
nation-state as ideal types, in actual practice, most political systems will combine some 
elements of each, significantly blurring the distinction.81 It is at this point that traditional 
sociological or typological definitions of empire become problematic, since they tend to 
imply a certain degree of fixity in how empires are structured and governed. This 
problem may be connected to the tendency to define empire in a way consistent with the 
discontinuous European overseas empires, which Becker reminds us have not historically 
been the modal form of empires.82 
 Nicholas Breyfogle and Alexander Semyonov offer alternative methods of 
conceptualizing empires (and the Tsarist Empire in particular), with these methods 
aiming to capture the multi-dimensionality and unevenness of imperial practice within 
specific imperial units. Breyfogle actually opts to eschew the concept of "empire" in 
favor of the more flexible concept of "imperium" since the latter concept escapes the 
typological tendencies of the former. Imperium focuses on the exercise of different types 
of power over "extended territories and diverse peoples" and offers more fine-grained 
analysis of how imperial practices differed across different regions within the same 
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empire, a frequent characteristic of both the Tsarist Empire and other empires.83 
Semyonov alternatively offers the idea of empire as a "context-setting category," which 
further complicates the historical treatment of heterogeneous empires. Heterogeneity is 
undoubtedly a central feature of such systems, but Semyonov also marks that the 
heterogeneity manifests itself in uneven or unpredictable ways, creating a 
"multidimensional" heterogeneity. He captures this in reference to the history of the State 
Duma which was divided not only along political fault lines (Monarchists, Democrats, 
Socialists of various stripes, etc), but also along regional, ethnic, and confessional fault 
lines, many of which had overlaps.84 Combining this observation with the observation 
that nation-states also possessed some "imperial" elements concerning internal 
heterogeneity complicates not only the historiography of imperial political systems, but 
also their treatment within sociological or political science studies. In this way, capturing 
the transformation of imperial systems from "gamekeeper" systems to "gardener" systems 
should also reflect the unevenness of imperial practice. 
 By emphasizing the blurriness of the continuum between nation-state and empire, 
it is also profitable to consider the Tsarist Empire in conjunction with standard examples 
of national states such as France and Britain. As Becker notes, there has been a tendency 
to contrast the "Asiatic" experience of Russia with the "European" process of state-
building, but this dichotomy becomes problematic when taking into account the early 
modern experience of France and Britain.85 During this earlier period, France and Britain 
correspond more closely with the experience of the Tsarist Empire, as budding states 
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sought to deal with internal heterogeneity and administrative centralization, a process that 
was not necessarily successfully complete even by the late modern era. This is part of the 
reason why 19th century Russian publicists like Mikhail Katkov invoked the assimilatory 
experiences of France and Britain as justification for vigorous Russification in the Tsarist 
Empire. However, as Becker also notes, the Tsarist experience diverged for a number of 
reasons, including territorial extensivity and larger cultural divisions, but also due to the 
issue of timing: it is impossible to ignore the fact that Russification occurred in a time 
period defined largely by the "zeitgeist" of nationalism, with this context heavily coloring 
Tsarist government relations with internal groups.86 Stephen Velychenko's comparison of 
the experience of Scots in the British Empire and Ukrainians in the Tsarist Empire is 
therefore instructive. Both groups played a significant role in supporting imperial efforts 
after their incorporation, but the Scots' desire for home rule was acknowledged as 
legitimate while Ukrainians' desire for autonomy were ignored or seen as pernicious.87 
Thus, Becker's conclusion appears apt: in the 19th century the Tsarist government 
continued its long-term policy of further incorporating the periphery into the core, but the 
path chosen by previous states like France and Britain was no longer available to 
heterogeneous, dynastic systems in the age of nationalism.88 By these terms, the Tsarist 
effort to transform itself from a gamekeeper into a gardener was preconfigured to fail. A 
failure that obviously came to pass in the opening decades of the 20th century. 
 Even though this failure did occur, it remains worthwhile to consider imperial 
practices in the context of multidimensional heterogeneity, if only for the fact that such 
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heterogeneity continued to play an important role in both the Soviet Union and now the 
Russian Federation (though truncated). These practices have often been underemphasized 
or omitted in favor of more unified national histories (or political studies, where state-
centric bias is also present), which as Theodore Weeks reminds us is due largely to the 
mundane reason that national histories are easier to define while regional histories are 
often blurry and encounter overlap between different territories (the different yet similar 
experiences of the Western Borderlands is a good case in point here).89 Accounts of 
multidimensional heterogeneity in imperial states also run into the problem that 
definitions of the state are often colored by Weberian notions of uniform, bureaucratic 
penetration of territory linked together by a standard medium of communication (a state 
language). As John Armstrong points out, in the Tsarist Empire the need of a bureaucratic 
apparatus preceded the creation of a standardized civil service elite, leading the empire to 
draw from the available expertise of non-Russian groups and thereby reinforce rather 
than erode differences.90 The result of this was a patchwork of governance where 
different regions were ruled by different government ministries (or by themselves to a 
large extent, as with the Baltics and Finland), with governors-general presiding in some 
areas, the military in others, and state agencies like the Ministry of Interior in yet others.91 
Little surprise, then, that the Duma factions ended up reproducing this dizzying array of 
regional, ethnic, and confessional difference. And the problem was by no means resolved 
in the Soviet period, despite the promise to create "Soviet Man," with the creation of 
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ethnofederalism and policies of korenizatsiya (though not always followed in practice) to 
deal with the "problem" of heterogeneity.92 Tsarist methods of dealing with 
multidimensional heterogeneity may have eventually failed, but understanding how they 
worked and did not work can help to shed light on the experiences of contemporary 
heterogeneous states. The transformation from gamekeeper state to gardener state is still 
a transformation that many states attempt, even if they do not bear the trappings of 
traditional imperial systems. 
 When applied to the case of the Western Borderlands of the Tsarist Empire, the 
empire literature can help to explain why the treatment of the regions differed over time 
and what role the local elites played in these policy differences. The provision of 
extensive economic and political privileges to the local elites of the borderlands, in return 
for their political loyalty and service, fits with the expectation that a territorially-
extensive empire lacks the infrastructural power necessary for direct rule and therefore 
requires effective local clients. However, a cooperative relationship with local elites also 
requires that the goals of those elites are broadly compatible with the institutional matrix 
of the empire itself. In a political system premised on absolute political subservience to 
the Tsar and a land-based political economy, the service of the Baltic Germans and the 
Finnish elites meshed more with Tsarist interests insofar as they sought to preserve a 
conservative political order that did not directly challenge Tsarist suzerainty. This fact is 
in part demonstrated by Tsarist efforts to impose land reform on the Baltic Germans 
rather than the Baltic Germans attempting to outpace the political development of the 
imperial core. In contrast, the Polish szlachta and Ukrainian starshyna explicitly or 
implicitly challenged the primacy of the Tsarist political system as it attempted to 
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progress down the road of state-building. The szlachta, by emphasizing a history of 
political rights more in consonance with Western European tradition, threatened the 
ideological syntax of the Tsarist system. The starshyna, by representing a Ukrainian state 
that sought an autonomous existence from Tsarism, required absorption to keep the 
project of the Tsarist state intact. These threats were only redoubled in the 19th century as 
the Tsarist state shifted to the goal of nation-building, as Polishness and Ukrainianess 
were increasingly viewed as undermining the unity of the state. By comparison, the 
Baltics and Finland were relatively protected after this shift, as they were not seen as 
threatening to the reimagined empire. This eventually changed in the last decade of the 
19th century, but only after Russification policies had finally erased the old basis of 
imperial stability. 
 
Direct and Indirect Rule 
 
The literature on state and empire provide a structural and geopolitical context for 
understanding the process of incorporation in the borderlands and the general trajectory 
of increasing centralization. The "imperial turn" in historiography likewise contributes an 
important sensitivity to the multidimensionality of imperial governance and the fallacy of 
treating imperial units as monolithic. However, where does that leave us with regard to 
the theoretical contribution of detailing the patterns of governance in the Tsarist Empire? 
In this case, recent social science literature on the distinction between direct and indirect 
rule offers the most compelling theoretical leverage for explaining the variations in 
Tsarist rule in the Western Borderlands. The most important recent study that attempts to 
come up with a systematic explanation for variations in direct and indirect rule is the 
39 
 
2011 article by Gerring, Ziblatt, et al. which proposes an "institutional" theory of direct 
and indirect rule.93 Gerring, Ziblatt, et al. base their theory off a detailed consideration of 
theoretical and historiographical sources in disciplines ranging from political science to 
sociology to history to anthropology. The primary case used to test the theory is the 
British Empire,94 but they also include consideration of a diverse range of other cases 
including the Incan Empire,95 contemporary federal states,96 and other empires, both 
maritime and contiguous. In addition to the cases employed, the authors also examine 
theoretical frameworks that emphasize the different dimensions of decentralization 
(fiscal, administrative, and political),97 the process of organizational bypass that 
accompanies the shift from indirect to direct rule,98 and alternative models that dispense 
with the traditional direct/indirect distinction and instead employ a firm-type model of 
rule.99 
 The product of this research is a complex yet parsimonious theory of direct and 
indirect rule that places the level of political institutionalization in subordinate units as 
the most important variable. Specifically, the authors argue that in subordinate units with 
more 'statelike' institutional structures, dominant units will opt for indirect rule, while 
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direct rule is employed in subordinate units that lack these statelike structures.100 The 
reason for the recourse to indirect rule is threefold: first, indirect rule can enhance the 
"principal-agency" relationship between the two units; second, it can solve the problem 
of political order since local elites would already have the apparatus in place for political 
rule; and finally, it is often in the interests of the elites in the subordinate unit to 
cooperate, since the alternative of direct rule is unappealing.101 For the rulers of the 
dominant unit, the benefits of indirect rule greatly outweigh the costs of imposing direct 
rule. So long as the elites of the subordinate unit can reliably deliver on promises of 
governance, indirect rule is "less expensive, more predictable, and less fraught with 
complications."102 Local elites are highly unlikely to resist the dominant unit, as this type 
of negotiation generally occurs in a context of high power asymmetry, where there is 
little question that the dominant unit will emerge victorious from any military 
confrontation. The imperative for local elites then becomes preserving as many of their 
privileges as possible during the negotiation process.103 A natural corollary to this 
dynamic is that violent coercion is more likely to be employed against subordinate units 
that lack adequate institutionalization because the dominant authorities will need to 
impose administrative structures and deal with any local groups that are displaced by 
direct rule.104 
 The authors also offer some important caveats to their theoretical model. The 
most important caveat is that this theory is meant to be general, but not exclusive. What 
this means is that prior level of institutionalization will be the most important variable all 
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else being equal, and that other intervening factors that affected imperial practices may 
need to be taken into consideration to explain specific cases.105 Therefore, their theory is 
capable of generating broad generalizations across a range of cases, but heightened 
accuracy when explaining specific cases means treating the theory as a starting point. 
Another important limitation to their theory is the capacity of rulers to make "mistakes" 
with respect to policy paths that do not "maximize their own objectives."106 A primary 
"mistake" that may be made is that the dominant elites may opt to destroy an 
institutionalized subordinate unit despite the fact that they would incur greater costs 
through that approach, as with the example of the British destruction of the Ashanti 
Confederation. This kind of mistake is a classic problem with theoretical models that 
assume a certain degree of rationality on the part of political actors, and is usually 
attributed to a lack of information necessary to be able to accurately assess costs and 
benefits. As I will suggest below, another important cause of these kinds of mistakes are 
ideological systems that only poorly take into account rational maximization and guide 
leadership choices in the dominant units. 
 Despite these limitations, Gerring, Ziblatt, et al.'s theory provides a powerful 
analytical tool for understanding the choice between direct and indirect rule. Their theory 
has also been fruitfully amended and extended to account for other cases, demonstrating 
its flexibility. Naseemullah and Staniland offer the most substantial addition to the 
theory, arguing that instead of relying of the basic dichotomy of direct and indirect rule, 
we should investigate the different varieties of each type of rule. They use post-colonial 
India and South Asia as their primary case to delineate the varieties of indirect rule, 
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arguing that many of the same dynamics that could be observed in imperial systems also 
obtain in contemporary polities.107 They offer a tripartite model of indirect rule, with the 
different types being suzerain rule, hybrid rule, and de jure rule. Suzerain rule refers to 
the type of rule where subordinate units retain their nominal independence while still 
being expected to maintain allegiance to the dominant power, a common arrangement in 
pre-modern imperial systems.108 Hybrid rule refers to a situation where the dominant 
power explicitly shares governing authority with the subordinate unit, and usually retains 
coercive forces in the unit to enforce its writ.109 Finally, de jure rule is where the 
dominant power formally possesses authority over the subordinate unit in a manner that 
would correspond to direct rule, but in actual practice local intermediaries are the ones 
responsible for governance and coercion.110 Hariri also begins from premises derived 
from Gerring, Ziblatt, et al. in an attempt to explain the effect that indirect rule had on 
subsequent regime trajectories.111 He finds that indirect rule did not contribute to a 
democratic regime trajectory because of the lack of institutional and ideational diffusion 
and the reinforcement of autocratic indigenous political structures.112 Siroky, et al. extend 
the model further by applying it to the contemporary North Caucasus to try and 
understand how local demand for indirect rule influences governance patterns in 
heterogeneous polities.113 They find that the middle classes tend to demand indirect rule 
and adopt nationalist positions, echoing Miroslav Hroch's classic study on the emergence 
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of nationalism, and that growing cultural differences can also contribute to increasing 
demand for indirect rule.114 
 How well does Gerring, Ziblatt, et al.'s theoretical model explain the case of the 
Western Borderlands? Going strictly by degree of prior political institutionalization, 
Poland-Lithuania was the most 'statelike' unit, the Baltics and Finland were both 
moderately 'statelike', and Hetman Ukraine was the least 'statelike'. Thus, the expected 
degree of indirect rule should have been highest in Poland-Lithuania and lowest in 
Hetman Ukraine, with the Baltics and Finland falling somewhere between those two 
poles (likely closer to Poland-Lithuania, given their well-articulated institutions). In 
contrast to these expectations, however, Poland-Lithuania was governed directly after 
1830 and with the highest degree of coercive violence of all the borderland territories. 
The other territories conform to the theoretical model, as the Baltics and Finland were 
relatively successful in preserving political and cultural autonomy, while Hetman 
Ukraine was eventually absorbed into the imperial apparatus. Although Poland-Lithuania 
enjoyed periods of relative autonomy (primarily the 1815-1830 Congress Kingdom 
experiment), this autonomy is overshadowed by the more coercive methods employed 
during the partitions of the late 18th century and the repressions following the 1830-1 and 
1863-4 rebellions. And the deviation is not strictly due to the presence of insurrection 
provoking Tsarist authorities, as the Tsar and the Tsarist state did not observe the terms 
of autonomy formalized in the 1815 constitution. Accounting for the deviation of this 
highly significant case is imperative.  
 What I find throughout the case chapters is that Poland-Lithuania differed from 
the expected outcome due to the character of the local elites and the hostility of central 
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elites to the idea of an autonomous Polish Kingdom. Specifically, I find three intervening 
variables played a significant role in the Polish-Lithuanian case while also serving to 
explain the other borderland territories. 
 
• The strength and cohesion of the local elites: Gerring, Ziblatt, et al.'s theory 
hinges on the expectation that local elites would be naturally cooperative in the 
face of a much stronger, dominant force. While this is likely true in most cases, 
the ability of the local elites to act as reliable clients depends on their ability to 
deliver social stability and political rule, which is likewise dependent on the 
absence of significant divisions among the local elites. Although the Polish 
szlachta were the most numerous borderland elite group, and although they 
undoubtedly commanded great economic power, they lacked the internal cohesion 
necessary to stable rule. Conversely, the Ukrainian starshyna possessed the 
requisite cohesion but lacked adequate strength to resist absorption into the 
Russian dvorianstvo. In both the Baltics and Finland, local elites were both strong 
and cohesive and subsequently able to deliver on central demands. 
• The orientation of the local elites: An adjunct to the strength and cohesion of local 
elites is their general receptivity to negotiation and cooperation with central rule. 
Gerring, Ziblatt, et al. correctly note that local elites often derive benefits from 
cooperative relationships with central rulers, usually through the preservation of 
political and economic privileges. In cases like the Baltics, where the dominant 
elites were Germans presiding over non-German populations, cooperation is an 
overwhelming imperative. However, the Polish-Lithuanian case indicates the 
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possibility that local elites may not choose cooperation even if it seems to be the 
most practical option. The reasons behind Polish-Lithuanian rejection of Tsarist 
rule may not be generalizable, but the sheer fact of that rejection is not such an 
oddity in the history of center-periphery relations. 
• Leadership choice in the dominant unit: Finally, it is necessary to take into 
consideration the disposition of central elites, especially in autocratic systems 
where relatively few individuals may be responsible for the broad outlines of state 
policy. Treating leadership choice as a serious variable does not mean 
psychologizing the internal thought processes of leaders, but it does mean treating 
official ideology and actual policy seriously as part of a general trend. This factor 
is especially salient in the Tsarist case, as there are clear oscillations in state 
policy across the different reigns with clear implications for borderland policy. An 
emphasis on leadership choice also helps to explain the deviant Polish-Lithuanian 
case, as Tsars like Nicholas I (and Tsarist elites more generally) were 
extraordinarily hostile to Polish autonomy, a hostility that would only deepen over 
the course of the 19th century. Conversely, Nicholas I and Alexander II defended 
the privileges of the Baltic Germans and Finnish elites, due largely to their history 
as loyal servitors of imperial rule. 
 
A crucial test of this theoretical contribution is the degree to which it can explain the 
cases used by Gerring, Ziblatt, et al. The Incan case provided by Covey does indicate the 
importance of institutionalization, but his emphasis on the importance of marriage 
contracts to bind local elites to the empire also indicates the importance of the orientation 
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of the local elites.115 Like other imperial units, the Incas gradually encroached on local 
institutions as the empire's rule became consolidated, but the persistence of indirect rule 
in some areas may indicate the role of local elites effectively resisting direct rule. 
Interestingly, Covey's analysis also indicates that there may be a threshold to 
institutionalization as a variable, as the Incas used indirect rule in "complex nonstate 
polities," but if local institutions were too developed the empire tended to opt for direct 
rule to undercut local authority.116 This dynamic could demonstrate another theoretical 
limitation in Gerring, Ziblatt, et al.'s model, or it may simply demonstrate the role of 
leadership choice in formulating imperial strategy. 
 While the Incan case is fascinating, the primary case used by Gerring, Ziblatt, et 
al. is that of the British Empire in its diverse colonial domains. The British Empire is 
often used as the model example of indirect rule (with the French being the standard 
alternative for direct rule), and Gerring, Ziblatt et al. make a strong case that the variation 
observed within the empire can be explained by their variable of stateness. However, as 
the sources they use demonstrate, there was also a robust role for local elite agency in the 
process of imperial rule that should not be minimized. As Newbury argues, the practice 
of 'indirect rule' in the British Empire served to mask the various ways that indirect rule 
was actually managed through local clients, ranging from cases where existing chiefs 
were co-opted versus others where they had to be 'invented' before they could be used as 
an instrument of rule. Moreover, in some cases clients had their positions strengthened by 
imperial rule while in others they became 'mere agents of local government'. In yet 
others, imperial administrators ruled more in the vein of direct rule than anything 
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approximating indirect rule.117 British imperial rule in India, alongside the purported use 
of 'indirect rule,' masks much the same multidimensionality that the imperial turn in 
Russian historiography has identified. The Indian subcontinent possessed hundreds of 
states and statelets and imperial rule varied significantly among them, as the British had 
to contend with a wide range of clients and brokers who were not always cooperative in 
the pursuit of imperial rule. In addition, rule-making in India reflected an equally 
complex set of conditions and demands, and led to different practices of rule from 
territory to territory.118 
  Much the same dynamic accompanied British rule in other parts of the empire. 
Low's study of British rule in Southern Uganda demonstrates that while 
institutionalization played a central role in strategies of rule, there was also a process of 
contestation between imperial agents and Ugandan elites that does not neatly conform to 
the expected cooperation of local elites. British imperial rule followed one of three 
models: supersession of existing institutions, hegemonic dominance over existing 
institutions, or the construction of institutions in 'stateless' societies. The pattern followed 
in the case of Southern Uganda was the second one.119 The sheer fact of that hegemony 
did not necessarily prevent recalcitrance or resistance on the part of Ugandan elites, 
making the process of rule more of an ongoing negotiation where the outcome was never 
really fixed. Likewise, Marshall makes a similar argument in his innovative comparison 
of British rule in India and in the thirteen American colonies during the same time 
periods of the 18th century. Marshall argues that the fate of imperial governance in the 
British Empire hinged largely on the response of local elites, in this case comparing the 
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outcomes of empire in America and in India. Local elites in the thirteen colonies were 
less amenable to upholding British rule than the elites in India during the mid-to-late 18th 
century, and these differing responses fundamentally altered the options available for 
imperial rule.120 This brief survey does not exhaustively cover all the cases considered by 
Gerring, Ziblatt, et al., but I do think that it illustrates that my theoretical contribution has 
merit and could be applied to a range of cases, even as institutionalization remains the 
putative starting point of analysis. 
 Finally, my contribution adds an important element that is mostly missing from 
Gerring, Ziblatt, et al.'s model. By focusing solely on institutionalization as the variable 
that explains the patterns of direct and indirect rule, their analysis acquires a deterministic 
feel. This assessment is partly rooted in their admitted limitations of the model, which 
does not preclude the interposition of other variables of the sort that I propose here. 
Nevertheless, by leaving the role of agency at the level of "mistakes" made in the 
calculations of central rulers, the analysis glosses over the important principal-agent 
interactions that are essential to the process of negotiation between dominant and 
subordinate units. The variables I add seek to address this deficiency, by taking into 
explicit consideration how local elites are oriented towards the dominant unit, and how 
central rulers make choices between different policy paths. I suspect that based on how 
this approach explains the Tsarist case and the cases presented by Gerring, Ziblatt, et al. 
that it could be employed to account for a broad range of cases. The consideration of 
future potential applications, however, will be left to the discussion in the conclusion of 
this study. 
 
                                                 
120
 Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires. 2-3. 
49 
 
Structure of the Study 
 
The presentation of my argument is structured both thematically and chronologically. It 
begins with a consideration of changes within core Russia from the 17th-19th centuries, 
to help provide context for the policies in the borderlands. These changes span from Peter 
I's state-building efforts up through the Great Reforms of Alexander II and detail the 
Tsarist state's efforts to respond to the external military and economic pressures coming 
from Europe. Beginning with core Russia is essential because it provides perspective on 
the goal of the Tsarist leadership to construct a "well-ordered police state" in response to 
administrative challenges. The chapters concerning the borderlands indicate how 
unrealistic this vision of a well-ordered police state was in the periphery of the empire. 
The process of incorporating the borderlands between the 17th and 19th centuries, 
detailed in the third chapter, illustrates the necessity of offering substantial concessions to 
borderland elites in return for loyalty and service. Incorporation occurred in a context of 
geopolitical rivalry, forcing the state to offer better terms to the regions than its rivals, 
while also limiting the availability of repression as an option to induce compliance. As a 
result, all of the Western borderlands were granted a degree of political autonomy 
alongside substantial economic and cultural autonomy. The fourth chapter, on the local 
elites in the borderlands, help to explain what leverage the regions had vis-a-vis the state, 
and how this leverage was translated into imperial influence. The local elites provided the 
Tsarist state with a preexisting stock of potential servitors who could reinforce Tsarist 
rule in the borderlands. The relative strength and coherence of the local elites (in the form 
of institutional structures that served their interests) helped to determine the degree of 
Tsarist concessions and their protection from future encroachment, while the disposition 
50 
 
of the elites (their willingness to be loyal to the state) helped dictate whether the Tsarist 
state opted for more direct rule. 
 The fifth chapter, the shift to greater centralization in imperial government, 
indicates the point at which considerations of state-building began to intrude upon 
traditional modes of imperial governance. Peter I represents the logical starting point to 
the discussion of increasing centralization, though the military revolution was already 
underway in Russia prior to his reign. However, Peter's record on state-building was 
mixed, as it demonstrated a tension between traditional rule and the logic of the modern 
state. Although he attempted to redesign much of Tsarist administration and quash 
Ukrainian autonomy under the pressure of external war with Sweden, he also reinforced 
traditional modes of rule by extending concessions of autonomy to the Baltic provinces to 
ensure their loyalty (as they had previously been part of Sweden's territory). After Peter, 
later efforts at state-building replicated this tension, with the scales increasingly shifting 
in favor of state-building and against decentralized imperial rule. The periods of 
increasing centralization demonstrate most clearly the importance of local elites to the 
patterns of imperial governance, as some of the Western Borderlands were affected far 
more than other. 
 The sixth chapter, concerning efforts of cultural Russification in the mid to late 
19th century, represents the conclusion of this movement towards the logic of the modern 
state. If the traditional imperial state was premised on de facto regional decentralization 
alongside a nominally centralized autocratic state, the modern state and its emphasis on 
constructing a nation militated against this logic of cultural and economic autonomy. The 
move towards a Great Russian nationalism that become more and more incorporated into 
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official policy in the 1860s and 1870s appears strategically unwise in the context of a 
multinational empire where fewer than half the subjects were ethnic Russians, but it was 
also an attempt to reconstruct the basis of loyalty after the disastrous defeat in the 
Crimean War. The Tsarist state's relatively weak hold on its territory and the resulting 
deficiency in resource extraction was shown to be wanting in the face of military 
challenge from more cohesive national states, and the decay of the manorial system and 
serfdom necessitated changes in imperial social structure. By abolishing serfdom, 
Alexander II removed the traditional basis of loyalty (gentry privilege and fixed 
populations for taxation) and attempted to move towards a system where the state derived 
support from the population as a whole. Subsequent Tsars only reinforced this 
commitment to Great Russian nationalism, with concomitant pressures placed on the 
borderlands due to their privileges. However, even during this period when traditional 
imperial rule was increasingly abandoned, some borderland territories defended their 
position more effectively than others, leading to large variations in the degree of direct 
rule, with the Baltics and Finland surviving without significant intrusion until the 1890s. 
Even after such intrusion happened, it was half-hearted due to the state's desire to retain 
the service of loyal servitors such as the Baltic Germans, who remained broadly loyal to 
the state up through World War I. 
52 
 
CHAPTER II 
BUILDING A “BEAUTIFUL AUTOCRACY” 
 
The 19th century was a period of wrenching social, economic, and political change in the 
Russian empire. The century started with great hopes of reform after the short but 
tumultuous reign of Paul I, but it ended with the state engaged in a series of ill-advised 
Russification measures to try and hold the disintegrating Empire together. These efforts 
failed, but they indicate the dramatic evolution of how the state sought to deal with the 
problem of internal cohesion, concerning not only the traditional Russian core, but also 
non-Russian borderlands. This evolution was premised on changes that had occurred in 
the 18th century, when Peter I and Catherine II had tried to direct Russia into the 
European mainstream. Peter strived to do this by reconstituting the institutional 
framework of the empire, while Catherine was more interested in establishing a public 
invested in the future of the state. The logic of these reforms was to transform Russia into 
a “well-ordered police state” that could manage the transition into modernity. 
The idea of the “well-ordered police state” was something that emerged during 
the 16th-17th centuries in Europe, as the power of the Church (the Roman Catholic 
Church) receded and was gradually replaced with expanding secular authority.121 A 
similar process was delayed in Russia until the time of Peter I, who then sought to 
transplant what he considered to be some of the more successful administrative 
accomplishments, notably from rival Sweden and Prussia. The concept of the well-
ordered police state was based on the idea that the expansion and formalization of 
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bureaucratic administration was an effective means to achieve the end of improving 
public order. This involved reconstructing public life around law, with a professionalized 
governing class tasked with the maintenance and direction of the polity. The idea that 
both state and society could be “perfected” by rational government action was a hallmark 
of this process.122 
This was the goal that was assumed by both the absolutist monarchies, and 
eventually, the republican governments of the time period following the French 
Revolution. A natural outgrowth of this project to shape public life was the use of police 
ordinances to change the "customs, ideas, and activities" of the average person. This was 
a logical conclusion of the intrusion of the well-ordered state into the private sphere to 
guarantee a productive society.123 It required firm bureaucratic structures, the predictable 
extraction of tax revenue from a compliant populace, and active policing agencies to 
ensure that deviations from the public order were not permitted. The efficacy of these 
measures, though eventually contributing to the discontent that roiled Europe during the 
19th century, was ensured by states that were relatively strong and capable of 
implementing such measures through the use of resources and manpower alike. As would 
be expected, Peter’s attempt to ‘copy’ such designs into a country where the state 
administration was comparatively weak and where the material and social conditions 
were different ran into serious problems that were never quite resolved by his successors. 
This chapter explores the different strategies that the Tsarist administration 
employed to construct a well-ordered state comparable to the states of Western and 
Central Europe. This exploration is important because it indicates the policy preferences 
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of the ruling elites and the way these preferences were translated into policies and 
institutions during the 18th and 19th centuries. These preferences broadly conform with 
the state-building and centralizing techniques discussed in the literature on state-building, 
especially Tilly's discussion of coercion-intensive trajectories of state-building.124 These 
evolving policy preferences also help to explain the general trajectory of centralization 
over time, even if this trajectory was inconsistent based on the preferences of individual 
Tsars. Given adequate state capacity, it is reasonable to assume that the Tsarist state 
would have extended many of the same policies to the imperial periphery, and the 
oscillations of centralization in the core do in fact generally correspond to similar efforts 
in the periphery. As a result, any discussion of the policies employed in the Western 
Borderlands must be considered in light of the policies employed in the imperial core. 
 
Constructing the Petrine State 
 
The empire that Peter inherited was one that was in dire need of reform. Militarily and 
economically, it lagged behind other European powers, most notably its rival, Sweden. 
Politically, the weakness of the state and the position of the boyar gentry undermined the 
efforts of the Tsar to administrate the far-flung territories of the empire. The disastrous 
defeat at Narva in 1700 merely reinforced the perception that there was a problem, and 
Peter used the respite provided after the battle to overhaul the Russian military, and 
construct a new capital at St. Petersburg (at great loss of human life). After emerging 
victorious against Sweden in the Battle of Poltava in 1709, Peter turned his efforts to 
reconstructing the rest of the state, so that it would become a more durable edifice to face 
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future challenges. Included among these efforts were reforms aimed at changing the 
culture of Russians (restrictions against having beards, reorganization of the patriarchate 
into the state-controlled Holy Synod), compulsory service and education for the higher 
classes (mainly in the form of scientific and technological training to further buttress the 
war machine), changes to taxation, and new judicial regulations and policing agencies, 
among others. Not all of these are directly relevant for our current consideration, but in 
sum total, the goal of Peter's institutional reforms was a highly centralized state. And 
although some of the superficial forms did not persist after his death (due to weak or 
beholden rulers), the basic direction of his reforms remained constant, and were 
eventually 'completed' in a sense by the reign of Catherine II.125 
 Newer methods of policing and punishment were some of the innovations that 
Peter tried to introduce to the Russian state, though even these hearkened back to older 
Tsarist practices. The tainyi prikaz, founded by Tsar Aleksei (Peter’s father), was one of 
the predecessors of the Third Section, and was modeled partly on Ivan IV's oprichnina. It 
was an informal part of the Tsar's private chancery, a model that Peter I mimicked when 
designing the Preobrazhensky prikaz. This was a political police of growing power, 
involved in espionage, interrogation, and general control over crimes of slovo y delo 
(word and deed).126 The Preobrazhenskii prikaz were one of the first attempts to establish 
a political police in the newly reconstituted state, as Peter concluded that relying on 
denunciations could not possibly address all political 'offences'. The prikaz's duties were 
ambiguously defined, which in effect enhanced its powers vis-à-vis other government 
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bodies (something that would similarly be the trademark for future policing agencies), 
and its funding and manpower increased in each year of its existence.127 
 Alongside these changes to political policing, there was also the intention to set 
up a justice system in Russia that was modeled on the Swedish court systems, but these 
efforts were inconsistent and undermined by Peter’s unwillingness to accept a full 
separation of powers. These judicial reforms, enacted in 1719 and reconfirmed in 1722, 
included a full array of provincial and aulic courts, overseen by a Senate tasked with the 
administration of justice, yet as Kutscheroff notes, these courts did not possess full 
judicial independence because a voevody (military governor) sat on them, and the Senate 
was also beholden to Peter.128 In any case, the court system did not survive Peter, as it 
was the victim of the reaction against the reform that set in after his death, with aulic 
courts abolished in decrees in 1727, and remaining judicial functions delegated to the sole 
discretion of voevody and governors.129 The punitive mechanisms remained (although in 
changing form as tsars reconstituted the political police on a regular basis), but 
mechanisms for justice intended to oversee those punitive measures were abandoned. 
Pipes explains that this was due to the fact that Russia lacked a legal tradition like that 
which was present in the West, relying on governance through Tsarist ukases, unwritten 
laws, and customs. There was little distinction between different types of laws until the 
reforms of the 1860s, and there was little provision for the average person to be protected 
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by laws. Laws were treated as something used by those in power to administrate and 
control, not as statutes that they themselves needed to conform to.130 
 Peter's reforms, unlike the German and Swedish ordinances, did not rely on 
collusion with elite strata to achieve their ends, but rather created an oppositional cast, 
with the state's interests counterpoised against a resentful and noncompliant population. 
As a result, the implementation of Peter's reforms required a high degree of coercion, and 
established a precedent for state predominance and repression. As Raeff puts it, 
Repression and compulsion were the only means available to the 
bureaucracy, and to a much greater degree than was the case in the 
West it had no overall control or direction, for there were no constituted 
bodies to limit its capricious tyranny or to make its abuses known to 
higher institutions. The vastness of territory, poor communications, and 
the technical backwardness and illiteracy of the empire's subjects only 
served to compound the difficulties.131 
 
 Alongside efforts towards modernization, older forms of punishment persisted, so 
that even after the death penalty was abolished to make progress towards a more 
enlightened, well-governed political system, punishment by the knout was a stark 
reminder of lingering brutality (a brutality that the gentry was not excluded from until 
Catherine II’s charter to the nobility, incidentally). As Schrader notes, up until the 19th 
century, “serious” crimes were punished by a severe knouting and banishment, with male 
convicts having their faces branded and their nostrils ripped out. Afterwards, the 
prisoners were placed in hospitals until they either recovered or died from their wounds, 
and if the former, they were exiled to Siberia for penal servitude.132 
 Pipes argues that the central tragedy of Russian history is that Peter sought to 
motivate the populace to work in the public interest, but without ceding any control over 
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public affairs to the population as a whole. This disjunction can be considered the root of 
the dissatisfaction of the broad populace in the efficacy of the state.133 This dissatisfaction 
was broader in scope than just the lower classes as well, who indeed were justified in 
viewing the state with resentment since changes introduced by Peter helped to deepen the 
condition of serfdom (the shift from a household tax to the capitation, or head tax, was 
the leading culprit). The gentry also occupied an uneasy position vis-à-vis the Tsar and 
his government, as the changes wrought by Peter simultaneously buttressed their 
economic position and undermined their political position. This perverse social contract 
robbed Russia of a corporate nobility able to act as a counterbalancing force to the 
interests of the Tsar, making Russian development in the 18th and 19th centuries 
dramatically different from its counterparts in the rest of Europe. 
 
The Evolution of the Gentry 
 
The Russian gentry of the 18th and 19th centuries, the dvorianstvo, were a social caste that 
enjoyed significant economic concessions at the same time as they lacked a coherent 
form of political power. This is not to say that the gentry was entirely sapped of political 
influence, as when their interests were threatened, they were able to take concerted action 
even against the Tsar, as evidenced by the coups and intrigues of the 18th century up until 
the murder of Paul I. Yet, despite these moments of political action, the Russian gentry 
was weak and disorganized when compared against their European counterparts, who 
were able to exercise considerable political authority vis-à-vis the crown. John Le Donne 
notes that the reason for this state of affairs can be traced back to the 17th century when 
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the gentry gave their support to the Romanov line, partly so they could secure their 
economic interests, in this case their domination over the serf subject population. The 
Ulozhenie of 1649 formalized this compact, producing a situation where the Tsar was 
given a relatively free hand in central administration while the gentry retained absolute 
predominance over their social inferiors.134 This was not in fact all that different from the 
arrangement that prevailed in Prussia after 1653, with the difference being the Prussian 
nobles being far more powerful than their Russian counterparts. 
There are a number of reasons for the discrepancy between the power of the 
Russian gentry versus the power of other European nobilities. In the material realm, the 
first reason has to do with the nature of gentry landholdings and wealth. Unlike other 
European nobles, who accumulated impressive latifundia and translated that landed 
wealth into political power, the landholdings of the Russian gentry were relatively 
dispersed and prone to fragmentation. The way in which land was granted to gentry, 
pomestia, is the source of this difference. The granting of pomestia to loyal servitors took 
the strange form of granting multiple blocs of land dramatically separate from one 
another to the same member of the gentry, thus guaranteeing that the gentry's power base 
was diffused throughout the country, rather than having the powerful traditional large 
landed estates of other European nobilities. These scattered holdings (along with the lack 
of profit due to lack of organization) were compounded by a lack of entail or 
primogeniture, which combined with the growth of the dvorianin as a class guaranteed 
the eventual destitution of the vast majority of the gentry. Thus, we have the archetypal 
image of the Rostovs in War and Peace as the representation of the lot of the average 
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gentry family in the 19th century, something that only became catastrophically worse 
after the emancipation of the 1860s.135 
The practice of pomestia and other economic concessions made to the gentry 
strengthened the class in the short-term, but made it vulnerable to disruption, which is 
exactly what happened with the introduction of the Petrine reforms. Peter’s interest in 
breaking the influence of the gentry led to the introduction of the Table of Ranks, which 
reoriented status away from powerful families and towards those who were willing to 
serve the state.136 In a political system where the gentry already had a precedent of 
abasement before the Tsar (the practice of referring to gentry as kholopy, or slaves, 
reinforced this hierarchy), the shocks of Peter’s reforms weakened and essentially 
destroyed corporate forms of gentry life, since the gentry was now entirely dependent on 
the state for their position, and tasked with carrying out the duties of the state.137 This 
situation only worsened over the course of the 18th century, as the Table of Ranks opened 
the gentry up to previously excluded members of other classes, swelling the ranks of the 
dvorianstvo and increasing the relative poverty of the class, while foreign nobles from 
newly acquired territories (such as the Polish szlachta) had a similar effect.138 Finally, the 
gentry voluntarily worsened their own position, as international revolutionary patterns, 
economic and social tensions, and lower class uprisings like those of Pugachev made the 
upper classes in Russia more willing to buttress and further concentrate the autocratic 
powers of the imperial government.139 Although this contributed to the creation of the 
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“imperial dynasty,” as Presniakov termed it, it also had the ironic effect of weakening the 
state itself, since it made it more difficult for the state to effectively penetrate and govern 
the countryside.140 The economic concessions made by the state to the gentry so that the 
gentry would support the central power actually served to undermine the vigor of that 
same central authority. 
 
Toward the End of the 18th Century 
 
After Peter’s death in 1725, Russia went through a succession of rulers that failed to 
leave much of an impact on Russian political life, at least compared to the achievements 
of Peter, and later, Catherine II. These reigns are important studies in Russian court 
politics and the influence of the so-called ‘German party,’ but outside of the fairly 
lengthy reign of Elizabeth I (1741-1762), they are of little relevance to this project. 
Elizabeth’s changes did have an important effect on Russian history, in that she started to 
introduce Western arts and culture to Russia (patronizing the polymath Mikhail 
Lomonosov, for one), and she also softened some of the requirements for gentry service 
to the Petrine state (shortening the duration of service and giving them more power in 
local government). Yet, despite these few areas, the period spanning from 1725 to 1762 
represents a regression from the efforts of Peter, a problem that would only be addressed 
anew once Catherine came to power. As Geoffrey Hosking notes when discussing the 
Russian state during this time period: 
It would be wrong, however, to overestimate the effectiveness of 
Russian state authority in the mid-eighteenth century. In most respects 
the 'state' (to use what may be too pretentious a word) was still like a 
rickety framework in a howling gale, subject to all the chance cross-
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winds of court intrigue and kinship feuding. It was a mere skeleton 
whose flesh and sinews consisted of the clannish interests of the great 
families who provided its continuity and its motive power. As for local 
government, it was notional only, feeble to the point of being non-
existent: for lack of suitable personnel to staff its offices, it lapsed back 
into the hands of the arbitrary and venal military governors from whom 
Peter had tried to rescue it.141 
 
This basic lack of state capacity was a problem that persisted into the 19th century, which 
made the wrenching changes of that century even more difficult to manage. There were 
only between 11-13 civil servants per 10000 people in the 19th century, which was 3-4 
times below the comparable amount in other European states. The amount spent on 
bureaucratic administration also lagged considerably behind other countries, so much so 
that tiny Livonia spent more on administration than Russia did for her entire empire (at 
the time when Livonia was absorbed into the empire)!142 
Catherine, upon gaining power in 1762 after the coup directed against her 
husband, Peter III, placed her on the throne, sought to address these problems in a couple 
ways. First, she tried to make government administration a reality in the empire as a 
whole, and not simply Moscow and Petersburg. And second, she tried to address the gulf 
that had opened up between the autocracy and the people it ruled (at least the educated) 
by patronizing a public press to open up a more responsive public sphere. Some of the 
changes, such as the Statute of the Provinces issued in 1775 and the Charter to the Towns 
issued in 1785, were intended to extend central administrative power into the country as a 
whole and reorganize local government. Only with Catherine's statute of the provinces 
did the Petrine state begin to penetrate into local administration in a consistent way, and 
even then it was certainly not omnipotent. Governor's boards and departments were 
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established in guberniia and uezdy, but these still enjoyed a great deal of local autonomy 
from central control.143 However, other changes produced cross-pressures against this 
direction, as the Charter to the Nobility issued in 1785 helped to shore up gentry support 
of Catherine at the cost of undermining state authority. The charter removed the 
requirement for state service and granted the gentry even further economic and political 
prerogatives in administering their estates. This also had the effect of deepening the 
institution of serfdom, which would prove to be the central political problem of the 19th 
century. 
Beyond institutional changes, Catherine also attempted to instill some Western 
cultural and ideological currents into Russian life, and it is during her reign that Russia 
really began to develop a public sphere. Famously, she corresponded with Voltaire and 
espoused Enlightenment ideals even in government documents, such as her “Instruction,” 
even if these ideals did not always translate into political practice. Progress was made in 
creating a more educated public, however, as Catherine implemented a Statute on 
National Education in 1786, and she actively patronized the publicist and Freemason 
Nikolai Novikov, who published several journals which featured satire and social 
commentary. Catherine herself established the first satirical journal, “Odds and Ends,” 
and personally contributed articles written in her hand. The outbreak of the French 
revolution soured Catherine to this kind of publicity however, and the criticism offered 
by individuals like Alexander Radishchev in his Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow 
ended the experiment in openness, as Novikov and Radishchev became some of the first 
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intelligentsia exiled by the Russian state, a practice that became common during the 
subsequent century.144 
 
The Era of Alexander 
 
The beginning of the 19th century and of Alexander I’s rule as the Russian Tsar was met 
by a great deal of enthusiasm among the Russian public. The last years of Catherine II’s 
reign and the short reign of Paul I were largely defined by reaction and repression, but the 
reformist mien of Alexander I inspired hope for the future of Russia. As Raeff puts it, the 
first decade of the 19th century thus became a period of “great intellectual ferment, of 
exhilarating optimism about Russia’s prospects for ‘modernization’” and “offered greater 
freedom, [and] more opportunities for the expression of ideas and hopes.”145 This 
optimism ended up being disappointed, as Alexander was never the principled liberal that 
many hoped he would be, and he easily fell under the sway of those uninterested in 
radically altering Russia’s political landscape. Alexander was a mercurial personality, 
guilty to some degree for complicity in the death of his father, and forever entertaining 
notions of abandoning public life and living a rural existence, he flitted between 
flirtations with reform and influence from the more conservative members of the 
government.146  
During the early part of his reign, when reformist aspirations were at their 
pinnacle, Alexander relied on the counsel of Mikhail Speransky and Nikolai Novosiltsev, 
reformers who were both part of his ‘Unofficial Committee.” This was during the point 
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when Alexander was still actively considered granting Russia a constitution, and both 
Speransky and Novosiltsev produced written constitutions (among others that were also 
produced during Alexander’s reformist stage). However, Alexander never definitively 
acted on their advice, and Speransky fell out of favor in 1812, due not only to domestic 
political reasons, but also to shore up support during the crucial stage of war against 
Napoleonic France. The fall of Speransky presaged the ultimate failure of reform, and 
gave the Decembrists yet more ammunition to conclude that the government itself would 
not pursue meaningful changes.147 The fall of Speransky also guaranteed the end of the 
constitutional projects, the last of which (Novosiltsev’s) was shelved even though it was a 
fundamentally conservative document (not all that different from the document produced 
by Nikolai Muraviev of the Northern Society).148 
After the reformist spirit waned in Alexander’s government, the latter half of his 
reign produced an ideology of reaction that served as a comprehensible bridge to the rule 
of his brother, Nicholas. After the end of reformism, the government of Alexander 
entered full-fledged reaction, which based itself on a quasi-mystical, backward-looking 
view of the world. Educational institutions were closely monitored by the obscurantist 
Mikhail Magnitsky, and censorship was tightened to snuff out the remaining support for 
reform.149 Additional signs of unrest both at home and abroad (with the international 
revolutionary movement) convinced Alexander that further precautions needed to be 
taken. The revolt in the Semenovsky regiment in 1820, prompted by the brutal rule of 
Colonel Schwartz, prompted Alexander to expand the functions of the political police, 
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thinking that the revolt was an augury of a larger political plot.150 Furthermore, 
Alexander, fearing the growth of Masonry and its connections to revolutionary or liberal 
thought, banned all Masonic lodges in 1822, driving those who wanted to continue their 
work underground. This is despite the fact that Alexander himself patronized Masonic 
lodges in the early years of his reign; with many of his early government personnel 
(including Speransky) being Masons themselves.151 The military colonies of Alexander 
Arakcheev were another visible facet of the later years of Alexander. The colonies were 
intended to help the government blunt the financial demands of the empire by setting up 
self-sufficient military colonies during peacetime, reducing the costs of keeping troops. 
The cruel discipline enforced by Arakcheev in these colonies made them a hated symbol 
of the state, and became one of the most potent recruitment sources for the Decembrist 
rebellion in 1825.152 
 Despite this period of reaction, it would be incorrect to conclude that Alexander 
developed a consistent approach to dealing with actual or potential political dissent. This 
becomes especially clear when one considers that the Decembrist rebellion could develop 
mostly unimpeded during his reign, and not due to a lack of detection. As P.S. Squire 
noted, political policing during Alexander’s reign proved to be inadequate in preventing 
the development of a major conspiracy mainly due to Alexander himself. Alexander 
never conferred full policing powers on any single organization, and these conflicting 
lines of authority made for a confused and ineffectual maintenance of public order. 
Moreover, Alexander proved to be unwilling to take action against political opponents 
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such as the Decembrists, even though he was informed about their existence well ahead 
of the events of 1825.153 Early in his reign Alexander demonstrated an interest in 
reorganizing the political police, convening multiple committees to address the problem 
between 1801 and 1807. These efforts were successful in form in 1810-1811 with the 
introduction of the Ministry of Police, but in practice Alexander did not trust those who 
he put in charge and constantly undermined their work (up to and including spying on the 
police chief himself).154 Alexander preferred to trust such things to close advisors, such 
as Arakcheev and the Military Governor of Petersburg, Count Miladorovich, and after the 
abolition of the Ministry of Police, the remainder of Alexander’s reign lacked even a 
nominal central impulse for internal policing.155 When Alexander died unexpectedly in 
November 1825, this disorder and dissatisfaction with the reactionary tendencies of his 
latter years made for a political situation ripe for conflict. 
 
The Decembrist Revolt 
 
One of the consequences of the reactionary period of Alexander’s rule was the emergence 
of the Decembrist conspiracy, until the 20th century the largest elite revolt against the 
established order. The Decembrists, separated into the moderate Northern Society and the 
more radical Southern Society, sought social and political reform of the type that had 
been hoped for at the beginning of Alexander’s reign, and indeed attempted to work in 
concert with the state during the years it was organized as the Union of Salvation.156 The 
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Union of Salvation and the Union of Welfare (after 1817) were organized along a 
Masonic model, emphasizing civic engagement and camaraderie. After political activism 
in Masonry became frowned upon and eventually banned, the political functions were 
reorganized in secret in the newly-established Union of Welfare.157 The direct causes for 
the turn towards revolutionary activity are many. The standard account has it that the 
Decembrists, after coming into contact with Western Europe during the Napoleonic 
campaigns, felt that their country had fallen behind politically and culturally, and only 
Western political forms could help Russia catch up. This seems a romantic 
embellishment, as it is far more likely that internal developments in Russia convinced the 
Decembrists, many of whom were members of the guard regiments and the minor gentry, 
that working within the existing political order was impossible. In particular, the advent 
of Arakcheev’s military colonies and the vigorous repression of the Semenovsky 
regiment served as a potent mobilizing tool for the organization. 
 Politically, nearly every member of the Decembrists opposed serfdom, despite 
many being landholders. They wanted reforms similar to the Borderland emancipations to 
occur in Russia, and were severely disappointed when they did not manifest.158 The fact 
that Poland was granted a fairly liberal constitution by the Tsar after the Congress of 
Vienna was also a bitter sticking point, even if the Tsar proved unwilling to fully abide 
by the letter and spirit of the 1815 Constitution. Yet, as Anatole Mazour notes, the 
grievances contained within the Decembrist rebellion predated the era of Alexander: 
The line of demarcation between Old and New Russia was clearly 
drawn in the reign of Catherine II, and, strangely enough, indirectly 
with her assistance. Beginning her reign with ambitious projects for 
reform, she inspired the hope that the situation might be remedied by 
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the government. The Legislative Assembly soon proved the inefficacy 
of this noble gesture, and the further enslavement of the peasants 
convinced many of the futility of expecting relief from above. The 
breach between the government and the masses widened, or, in the 
words of one of the Decembrists, the throne and the people drew 
apart.159 
 
 The Decembrist’s solution to this breach was not uniform; the Northern Society 
favored a constitutional monarchy that was not unlike Novosiltsev’s constitution, and the 
Southern Society, headed by the far more radical Pavel Pestel, favored a Jacobin-style 
republic. It is interesting to note that Pestel’s scheme for designing the political police in 
Russian Justice, his manifesto, is actually reminiscent of some of the measures taken 
after the rebellion failed, and could even be seen as a predecessor for Soviet-era 
practices.160 
 The rebellion itself was a disastrous failure. After Alexander died abruptly in 
Taganrog in November 1825, it was decided that the organization would undertake its 
revolt to exploit the confused interregnum, as neither Grand Duke Constantine nor 
Nicholas moved to assume the throne. However, Pestel was arrested a couple days before 
the planned insurrection, leaving the Southern Society leaderless, and the Northern 
Society proceeded in its own revolt in a haphazard way, largely due to a lack of 
leadership and indecision. An attempt was made to provoke mutiny among regiments in 
Petersburg, and those who joined assembled in Senate Square, but took no other action 
outside shouting slogans. Nicholas, seeking to regain control over the situation, had loyal 
forces that far outnumbered the confused rebels, and his primary consideration seems to 
have been avoiding bloodshed on his first day as Tsar, since the outcome of any conflict 
between the two forces was not in doubt. Eventually, after officials sent to negotiate with 
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the rebels were shot at or assassinated (including Governor Miladorovich), Nicholas 
decided to bring the standoff to an end by force. After the decision was made to disperse 
the revolt with cannons, the loyalist soldiers became indiscriminate in their use of force, 
especially down narrow side streets, and killed many spectators of the events while 
pursuing hapless Decembrists.161 The Southern Society followed with their own 
rebellion, which showed a great deal more heroism and sense than the Northern Society, 
but given the disparity in forces, the outcome was inevitable. 
 More interesting than the desultory rebellion was the government’s, and 
specifically the Tsar’s, approach to questioning and meting out punishment to the 
conspirators. Nicholas personally interrogated many of the jailed Decembrists, and 
decided upon what kinds of punishments would be inflicted on them. According to 
Mazour, the emperor used all forms of manipulation to extract confessions from the 
prisoners, in some cases acting the friend, and in others, the ruthless monarch.162 
Presniakov offers a similar account, but also provides the important observation that 
much of Nicholas’ approach to governance was affected by his initial experiences in 
dealing with the Decembrist rebellion. In particular, Nicholas had the tendency to obsess 
about the Decembrists and interpret all sedition during his reign as sprouting from the 
Decembrist example, or as he called them, mes amis de quatorze.163 This perception 
should not be underestimated, as it provides an important way to understand Nicholas’ 
approach to dealing with political dissent and his quest to construct a state authority that 
would not be prey to such conspiracies in the future. It can also help us understand the 
                                                 
161
 Mazour, The First Russian Revolution, 1825; the Decembrist Movement, Its Origins, Development, and 
Significance. 178-9. 
162
 Ibid. 204-5. 
163
 Presniakov, Emperor Nicholas I of Russia, the Apogee of Autocracy, 1825-1855. 15. 
71 
 
intense manner in which the state pursued different interrogation techniques, including 
midnight interrogations, sleep deprivation, bright lights, and promises of pardon in return 
for confession.164 The fact that the Russian state had proven to be incapable of stopping 
such a large-scale conspiracy, however disorganized, convinced Nicholas that the softer 
methods of his brother needed to be replaced with iron constancy and an organized police 
apparatus, a major motivation for the foundation of the Third Section. 
 The verdicts rendered in the case of the Decembrists were generally viewed as 
harsh by politically-aware Russians. Five Decembrists were ordered to be hanged 
(Miladorovich’s assassin Kahkovsky, Pestel, Kondraty Ryleyev, Sergey Muravyov-
Apostol, and Mikhail Betuzhev-Ryumin), 31 were sent to Siberia, and the rest were 
sentenced to various terms of labor or imprisonment. According to Mazour, verdicts were 
fairly arbitrary, with those deeply implicated being let off surprisingly lightly, while some 
who were barely connected to the revolt were confined to cruel conditions for 20 plus 
years.165 Monas shares this assessment about the arbitrariness of the sentences.166 While 
in Siberia, exiled Decembrists experienced a range of treatment, spanning from being 
kept chained 24 hours a day, to becoming a part of the local community as a teacher or 
quasi-government official.167 Most Decembrists who ended up being placed in 
settlements in Siberia had to bear 'wretched' conditions, including drafty domiciles, 
barely any means to sustain themselves, and constant supervision. Eventually, some were 
given 15 desiatin of land to provide for themselves, despite none of them being 
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farmers.168 One of the stranger circumstances that emerged from the fallout of the 
rebellion was a young man connected to the Decembrists was actually given a post in the 
Russian embassy in London, and dined almost every day with Nicholas Turgenev, one of 
the foremost Decembrists and condemned to death in absentia.169 The disparities in 
treatment and the fact that many Decembrists (and Decembrist wives) continued to have 
influence from Siberia indicates that the Russian state was not yet a well-oiled police 
state, a problem that Nicholas attempted to address throughout his reign. 
 The foundation of the Third Section (the political police during Nicholas’ reign) 
and the ideology of official nationality are two important consequences of the rebellion 
that will be addressed in-depth below. Yet Nicholas did not consider the control provided 
by these assets to be adequate to stem future Decembrist rebellions, so he took the step of 
taking the Decembrists grievances seriously. Nicholas ordered that all opinions about the 
internal affairs of Russia made by the Decembrists should be sent to the Commission of 
Inquiry headed by Aleksandr Borovkov, who was then to prepare a report. Borovkov 
concluded that it was necessary for “clear, positive laws” to be established to ensure 
justice, a step that Nicholas accomplished in 1833 when the Second Section (headed by 
Speransky, incidentally) published a complete collection of Russian laws.170 Yet, the laws 
codified in this project were very different from those sought by the Decembrists, and 
although Nicholas established multiple committees to address the serfdom issue, none of 
them were successful. Instead, the body of laws does not differ much from the police 
ordinances of other well-ordered police states, insofar as they specified political and 
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criminal codes, but did not provide laws binding on the authorities themselves. The reign 
of Nicholas, rather than being a sharp break with a more moderate Alexandrine past, was 
instead the culmination of the reaction begun in the last part of Alexander's reign. The 
Decembrists simply reinforced the will of the government to snuff out sedition once and 
for all.171 
 
Nicholas’ Reign to 1848 
 
In the aftermath of the Decembrist rebellion, the new Tsar undertook multiple changes to 
the political order. The beginning of Nicholas' reign coincides with a period of 
remarkable transformation in Russian and broader European social systems. Russia's 
economy experienced an increase in commercial and industrial activity, more extensive 
trade relationships with the West, and the growth of parts of the populace looking 
towards more modern economic relationships. This was counterpoised against a declining 
profitability of manors and serfdom, and an imperial autocracy that strove to preserve the 
status quo.172 In Pipes’ judgment, the manifold changes made under Nicholas - the 
foundation of the Third Section, the censorship statutes, and the criminal code instituted 
in 1832 - were all ways of putting into effect a proto-police state.173 Undergirding these 
practical changes was a new state ideology that Nicholas saw as necessary to combating 
the philosophy of revolution, an ideology that came to be called the ‘Official 
Nationality.’ Nicholas actually pursued changes to the status quo of serfdom, convoking 
numerous private committees to discuss the problem, but here he encountered the 
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lingering difficulty of state-gentry relations. The gentry, despite their poor position, were 
unwilling to consider any change to social relations, and Nicholas abandoned his attempts 
to preserve the support of this important class.174 Thus, the only major progressive aim of 
the state was abandoned, while the changes that buttressed the autocracy remained intact. 
 
The Third Section 
 
The most important development for Russian politics that came out of the Decembrist 
rebellion was the foundation of the Third Section, the section of the Tsar’s chancery that 
was tasked with acting as a political police. In forming the Third Section, Nicholas was 
attempting to address the weakness of political policing as inherited from Alexander by 
constructing a centralized agency answerable to the Tsar. He placed at its head Alexander 
Benckendorff, a Baltic German who had acquitted himself well by trying to warn the 
Tsar about the Decembrist conspiracy, and who had suggested something similar as a 
way to address problems of sedition in the empire. As P.S. Squire notes: 
[Nicholas] endowed [the Third Section] with unprecedented authority 
by allotting to it its own staff officers and troops in the shape of a corp 
of gendarmes and by placing at its head the most privileged of his 
generals-in-waiting. The third department was to be ubiquitous and 
omnipotent. It was to possess moral as well as physical authority. 
Above all, Nicholas saw it as the essential link between himself and his 
people, observing all that went on, righting wrongs and averting evil. 
Such were the purposes which may be said to have led to its creation.175 
 
 The functions enumerated in the 1826 edict that established the Third Section 
bears out this judgment, as the Third Section was tasked with overseeing a wide range of 
political concerns, including the activities of foreigners, economic crimes such as fraud 
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and counterfeiting, surveillance of criminals, and information concerning “sects” or 
“schisms” within the state. The eighth function, “Reports about all occurrences without 
exception,” established such vast parameters that it was inevitable that the Third Section 
would snake its way into multiple facets of Russian life.176 
 Also important to the operation of the Third Section was its effective 
independence from any kind of oversight aside from that of the Tsar himself. The reason 
Nicholas made the Third Section a part of his private chancery was to prevent it from 
developing a separate bureaucratic interest and independence, and the private chancery 
provided him the easiest means to maintain control over the gendarme.177 Although 
Nicholas favored a strong and centralized state, he also loathed working through official 
channels, relying instead on ad hoc committees and sections of his personal chancery to 
conduct day to day governance. This ironically contributed to the undermining of state 
authority.178 Nicholas believed that this state of affairs was justified since he considered 
the Third Section to be operating as his personal representatives, acting directly on his 
orders. To admit that such an arrangement was not possible smacked of constitutional 
restrictions on his authority, which would undermine the principle of autocracy, which 
was enshrined as the central principle of the state’s new ideology.179 In Presniakov’s 
judgment, Nicholas, leery of the bureaucracy and those in state service, actually caused 
the state apparatus to deteriorate by vesting his personal chanceries with most of the 
practical power to administer and conduct oversight. His reliance on agencies like the 
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Third Section over formal ministries like the interior ministry or education led to an 
informalization of government power, sapping the vigor of much of the autocracy.180 
In actual practice, the Third Section oscillated between vigilance and absurdity, a 
fact noticed by most contemporaneous commentators. Benckendorff was more concerned 
with standing on ceremony and social niceties, and his greatest quality seems to have 
been that he assiduously carried out the orders of the Tsar. Thus, we get the image of the 
incredibly apologetic gendarme chief nevertheless sending men to exile or confinement, 
the affable, yet hapless figure of Herzen's depiction. It was actually Leonty Dubelt, 
Benckendorff's deputy, who was the operational brain of the Third Section. He managed 
all of the informants and took care of the most sensitive police work, while Benckendorff 
assumed the public face of the chancery.181 The Marquis de Custine, who traveled 
throughout Russia in 1839 and penned a critical book of the autocracy, noted that the 
police took great care in questioning foreigners, and seizing suspicious articles (in 
Custine’s case, these articles ended up being all of his books, his traveling pistols, and his 
travel clock).182 After successfully entering the country, Custine concluded concerning 
the dire effects of policing, “[t]he Russian government is the discipline of the camp 
substituted for the civil order - it is a state of siege become the normal state of society.”183 
Herzen, the famous Russian dissident, experienced the operation of the Third Section 
firsthand, and during the occasion of his first arrest noted the empty observance of 
formalities, such as the provision of an impartial witness (a citizen woken to stand at the 
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door of the arrestee, witnessing nothing), with little information being given to the 
arrestee.184 
Yet, counterpoised against this menacing character of the Third Section as the 
guarantor of the autocracy is the farcical nature of much of the internal proceedings. 
Herzen relates this by displaying the naiveté of some of their methods of interrogation, 
with the accused being given a sheet of questions asking if they know of any secret 
societies or are a member of any secret societies (a continuing obsession in Russian 
policing, since Nicholas always assumed that a new society like the Decembrists would 
spring up again).185 At the time of Herzen’s second exile, he was punished for repeating a 
story that was being talked about all over Petersburg (his first exile was due to being 
present at a party where revolutionary songs were sung) concerning a common crime, 
since repeating such a ‘rumor’ indicated a desire to undermine public order.186 While in 
exile, he served in a government office in Novgorod, where he was actually responsible 
for signing off on reports concerning his own police surveillance!187 He was only able to 
escape this bizarre system by securing a passport, which was granted to him after 
different parts of the government and Third Section displayed absolute confusion about 
his status (he was given leave to present himself in Petersburg, at which point he was 
summoned to be told to leave since he was not allowed in Petersburg).188 Herzen’s 
experience was not an exception, either, as Monas details the similar experiences of a 
man named Selivanov, who was likewise condemned to exile for the crime of being 
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associated to an event where political crimes may have been committed.189 And, as 
Kutscheroff notes, the Third Section was often tasked with reducing the judicial caseload 
for local governments, which were resolved by arbitrarily going through the backlog of 
cases and adding “Reversed” or “Upheld” in an alternating pattern.190 
 Even if the actions of the Third Section sometimes bordered on the absurd, it 
would be inaccurate to conclude that the organization was ineffective or not a serious 
obstacle for Russians. Its vague powers conferred upon it the ability to conduct oversight 
on any part of the population that it saw fit. In 1836, a relatively quiet year, the Third 
Section kept 1631 people under police surveillance, with 1080 of them for political 
reasons.191 Those caught up in this net had to face stark consequences should the agency 
decide that correction was needed, with the lower classes being subjected to the worst 
treatment, due to their tenuous position in Russian life. As Herzen notes, there was an 
extensive use of torture in lower class cases, generally used to extract confessions. This 
despite the fact that torture was supposedly proscribed under Russian law: 
Peter III abolished torture and the Secret Chamber. 
Catherine II abolished torture. 
Alexander I abolished it again. 
Answers given 'under intimidation' are not recognized by law. The 
official who tortures an accused man renders himself liable to trial and 
severe punishment. 
And yet, all over Russia, from the Bering Strait to Taurogen, men are 
tortured; where it is dangerous to torture by flogging, they are tortured 
by insufferable heat, thirst, and salted food…192 
 
 Although higher class criminals were generally exempt from these cruder efforts, 
their situations usually resulted in imprisonment, administrative exile, or hard labor, as 
Herzen’s examples show. The offences that produced these sentences were often simple 
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cases of lese majeste, or a tawdry form of guilt by association, if a person’s actions were 
viewed as suspicious enough to justify a social prophylactic.193 The Third Section was 
also vested with the power to punish religious crimes, a carryover of the lasting effects of 
the Orthodox schism of the 17th century. Religious dissenters were categorized as either 
'most pernicious,' 'pernicious,' or 'least pernicious' based on their degree of acceptance of 
the state, with those in the first category having their gathering places closed, internally 
exiled, or otherwise harassed by government officials.194 
 
Censorship 
 
Alongside the Third Section inoculating the public against ‘dangerous’ people, 
censorship policies developed during Nicholas’ reign were designed to inoculate the 
public against ‘dangerous’ ideas. Until Alexander, preliminary censorship and state 
control of publishing precluded the development of an independent publishing public, but 
the freer regulations under his reign caused a remarkable growth in publishing. This only 
started winding down after 1817, when Alexander became more reactionary, and became 
most restrictive under Nicholas.195 Initially, the function of censorship was not confined 
to a single body, as the Ministry of Education, the police, and the Third Section all shared 
some responsibility for overseeing publishing. After 1828, the Third Section was 
entrusted with theatrical censorship, and this role expanded after 1829, when the Third 
Section became a primary censor and also a check on all other censorship agencies. This 
in fact is what produced complaints about the endless layers of censorship. Even until this 
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point, though, there was still some flexibility when it came to censorship, but this also 
tightened after 1830-1, when the Ministry of Education (which was considered more 
moderate) was neutered concerning censorship, and when Nicholas reaffirmed that the 
names of all "dangerous authors" should be handed over to the Third Section by other 
censorship agencies.196 As Riasanovsky points out, this overlordship by the Third Section 
created incentives for individual censors to err on the side of caution and harshness, as if 
they were later judged to be negligent, the Tsar was not shy about punishing censors with 
confinement.197 
 As could be expected, this perverse incentive structure created a stifling 
environment for Russian letters, a fact bemoaned not only by writers, but also by some of 
the more public-minded censors. Overzealous censorship was what led the critic Belinsky 
to complain about receiving his articles from the censors “dripping” with red ink. But the 
alternative, articles slipping through without preliminary censorship, could in fact be 
worse. This occurred in the case of Pyotr Chaadaev, upon the publication of his first 
“Philosophical Letter” in the journal Telescope in 1836. Chaadaev’s letters had circulated 
in manuscript form for awhile due to the unlikelihood of them being accepted by the 
censor, but the surprising acceptance of his first letter caused a firestorm of controversy, 
as it was very harsh in its criticism of Russian culture. As a result, the editor of Telescope 
was exiled to the Far North, the journal was closed down, and Chaadaev was declared 
insane by the Tsarist authorities and confined.198 Likewise, the effects of the censorship 
were seen as baleful for some censors as well, as the case of the censor Nikitenko 
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demonstrates. Nikitenko was an academic who was a moderate disposed towards 
sympathizing with the plight of writers. His life demonstrates how tenuous the position of  
the censors were, if they cared about literature, as leniency on Nikitenko's part got him 
imprisoned by the Tsar on a couple different occasions. His career left him extremely 
bitter about the role of censorship in Russian letters.199 
 There were limitations to the powers of censorship, however, much as there were 
broader limitations on police capabilities. For one, intellectuals and writers developed 
ways to avoid incurring the wrath of the censors and the authorities. Controversial works 
were either circulated in manuscript form, or writers developed a coded writing style that 
conveyed political commentary in an indirect manner. The critic Belinsky did this by 
converting literary criticism into a form of social criticism, with judgments on the 
political order available to those capable of reading between the lines. Fiction also 
became a venue for politics, as Nicholas’ reign coincided with the emergence of a robust 
literary tradition, featuring luminaries such as Pushkin, Gogol, and Lermontov. This 
tradition only deepened during the course of the 19th century, as major political disputes 
were played out on the pages of novels rather than in newspapers. Foreign and forbidden 
books also provided an outlet for those seeking alternative political ideas, as the 
authorities lacked the manpower and expertise to properly oversee the burgeoning book 
industry. Forbidden books were readily available in Russia, as booksellers stocked them 
and high class readers owned them in large numbers. Occasional efforts were made to 
seize stores of these books, but it was a futile effort, reinforced by the fact that 
booksellers had little way to determine if their stocks were illegal, as the state refused to 
allow the distribution of a banned book list for fear that sellers would actively seek out 
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the books included.200 Given these conditions, Richard Pipes’ conclusion that draconian 
laws were less-than-strictly enforced due to the primitive machinery of repression seems 
a fair assessment.201 
 
The Official Nationality 
 
Alongside these institutional measures meant to protect the status quo was the creation of 
an official state ideology, termed the “Official Nationality.” Developed in 1833 by 
Sergey Uvarov, the Minister of Education, the ideology was intended to combat political 
opposition in the realm of ideas, an area that was perceived as weak following the 
convulsions of the French Revolution. The traditional principles of the Petrine state, 
loyalty and service, were thus replaced by a triad of principles, Autocracy, Orthodoxy, 
and Nationality, which were intended to inspire the public and guide government action. 
One of the areas that the ideology had the greatest effect on was education, unsurprising 
given Uvarov’s role in developing it, and logical given the dramatic expansion in 
education (especially university education) during the first half of the 19th century. 
Breaking a European tradition of university autonomy, Nicholas pursued strict oversight 
of education, through Uvarov and through rigorous personal inspections (Nicholas often 
engaged in personal inspections in multiple areas of governance, and tended to favor 
harsh punishments for transgressions). This can be seen as a continuation of the 
restrictive policies of the late period of Alexander's reign, though it became more 
restrictive, especially after 1848.202 All three tenets of the Official Nationality became 
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increasingly problematic as the century progressed, as they worked against the grain of 
several trends in Russia’s political and economic development and hearkened back to a 
more immobile type of political system. This would prove to be especially difficult in the 
Borderlands, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters. 
  The first tenet of the Official Nationality, autocracy, was by far the most 
important. As expressed by its ideologists, the doctrine of autocracy assumed an 
extremely pessimistic, Hobbesian view of human nature, with people being such foul 
creatures that firm and severe guidance was necessary for the stability and health of the 
body politic.203 Nicholas was so concerned with preserving the autocracy and its ideology 
that he not only prevented constitutional views from surfacing, but he attempted to scrub 
the recent Russian past of constitutional schemes designed under his brother, such as 
Speransky's and Novosiltsev’s.204 However, the tenet of autocracy was little different 
than past justifications for the structure of Russian governance, and did little ideological 
work on its own. As such, it possessed relatively little in the way of substantive 
philosophical content and was instead used as a justification for measures of social 
prophylaxis taken against competing ideas of governance. The tenet of autocracy was 
also featured strongly in new educational curricula, as it was intended to combat liberal 
ideas in the domain where they had commonly been present. 
 Orthodoxy and nationality are both more complicated than the tenet of autocracy. 
Autocracy was something that was relevant to the shared experience of all citizens of the 
Russian empire, but substantial portions could not qualify as ‘Orthodox,’ and 
‘Nationality’ largely depended on how it was defined. The doctrine of nationality 
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possesses a conflict at its heart, between what Riasanovsky calls the "dynastic" and the 
"nationalistic". The first emphasized the traditional loyalty to the state regardless of 
nationality, while the latter presaged a more chauvinistic portrayal of Russianness, which 
started the ripples that eventually became the Russification campaigns of the late century 
and the Pan-Slav movement.205 The Baltic Germans epitomized this gulf, as the 
nationalistic side of the debate wanted to see their parasitic status diminished, while the 
dynastic side (which included the Tsar and most government ministers) believed that the 
position of the Baltics was satisfactory given their exemplary dedication to the state.206 
By the middle of the 19th century, and especially under Alexander III in the second half 
of the century, the tenet of Orthodoxy had become bound up with the tenet of Nationality, 
as Russification campaigns often incorporated conversions to the Russian Orthodox 
Church. This development obviously had an impact on the status of Borderland-Core 
relations, but that impact is beyond the purview of the current study. 
 
1848-1855: The “Long Night” 
 
Between 1848 and 1855, the use of repression deepened in Russia, mainly in response to 
the European revolutions of 1848, but also due to the domestic politics resulting from the 
onset of the Crimean War. As Pavel Annenkov noted upon returning to Russia in 1848, 
“[a]fter coming from Paris, in October 1848, the situation in Petersburg seems 
extraordinary: the government's fear of revolution, the terror within brought on by the 
fear itself, persecution of the press, the buildup of the police, the suspiciousness, the 
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repressive measures without need and without limit…”207 This period of time came to be 
referred to as the “Long Night,” and represented the height of Third Section activity and 
punishments that would have previously been unthinkable, even given the relative 
harshness of the first part of Nicholas’ reign. Included among the new repressive 
measures was a blanket ban on Russians traveling abroad, a reduction in the number of 
university scholarships (as the universities were seen as hotbeds of sedition), a reduction 
in university autonomy and academic freedom, the removal of law and philosophy from 
educational curricula, surveillance of questionable professors and students, and nearly the 
closure of the universities themselves.208 This period also marks the broadest 
interpretation of political crime used by the Third Section, and some of the agency’s 
more questionable uses, including Nicholas persecuting a woman who had spurned him 
romantically.209 
 The most important single incident of repression coming out of this period was 
the so-called Petrashevsty Affair. Mikhail Butashevich-Petrashevsky was an intellectual 
and socialist who identified himself as a follower of the French philosopher Fourier 
(Petrashevsky actually tried to implement a Fourier-style phalanstery on his estate, but 
skeptical peasants burned it down), and after 1844-1845, he sponsored weekly gatherings 
in his apartment to discuss political and social conditions. As the literary historian Joseph 
Frank points out, Petrashevsky possessed some fairly radical ideas, but sought to pursue 
them in a cautious manner through education rather than revolution, although subgroups 
within the circle disagreed with this approach (notably the Palm-Durov group that Fyodor 
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Dostoevsky was a part of).210 The punishment of the Petrashevsty, coming as it did after 
1848, was on a scale not seen since the Decembrists, and much more extreme taking into 
account the mostly harmless nature of the group. Before 1848, Petrashevsky's discussion 
groups had been under surveillance, but had been dismissed as harmless, but this 
estimation changed after 1848 after the scare of the European revolutions.211 Initially, 
after being arrested, most of the members of the Petrashevsky group assumed that they 
would receive relatively light sentences, as their transgressions were not all that serious. 
This was reinforced by the prisoners being treated relatively well by their captors, even if 
their imprisonment was uncomfortable and rather long while awaiting judgment.212 What 
happened next was therefore a shock, as they were taken to Semenovsky Square in the 
snow, were sentenced to execution (though the Tsar had already commuted their 
sentences to hard labor in Siberia), and then went through the macabre theater of a faked 
execution, after which they were shackled and trundled off to exile.213 As Pavel 
Annenkov notes, the public’s reaction to the Petrashevsty affair was one of shock and 
anxiety, as unlike the sentencing of the Decembrists, no reasonable person seriously 
expected such a cruel punishment for individuals who were largely viewed as misguided 
youths.214 
 More perplexing than the punishment of the Petrashevsty was the repression of 
the Slavophiles, who had traditionally been viewed as more favorable to the state than 
other intellectual groups. The Slavophiles were essentially conservative, and emphasized 
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a spiritual vision of Russia that drew on what they considered to be native traditions, 
while rejecting both socialism and capitalism (Aleksei Khomyakov, one of the most 
influential Slavophile thinkers, used the term sobornost to capture this idealized spiritual 
unity). However, after 1848, the Slavophiles joined other groups in being listed as an 
“antigovernment sect,” with several being arrested while others were forced to engage in 
humiliating displays of patriotic devotion (Mikhail Pogodin was forced to compose a 
song lauding the Tsar, and had it ‘corrected’ on several occasions by the Third Section). 
Khomyakov, the brothers Kireevsky, and Ivan Aksakov were all placed under personal 
surveillance by the Tsar himself.215 The Slavophiles’ biggest sin seems to have been 
supporting a vision of Russia not entirely in lockstep with the state, despite their 
continued loyalty to that state. The Slavophiles, religious anarchists as Riasanovsky calls 
them, had a strange relationship with the state, as they supported autocracy and opposed 
Western forms, but also sought the emancipation of the serfs and different religious 
policies on the part of the state. In the state's eyes, this often turned them into 
oppositionists not all that different from the Westerners.216 In the indiscriminate 
atmosphere prevailing between 1848 and 1855, this fact was intolerable. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Upon Nicholas’ death in 1855, the empire was left in a state of severe weakness, due both 
to the effects of Nicholas’ policies and due to the disastrous course of the Crimean War. 
Nicholas had been able to maintain a superficial calm during his reign due to the 
extensive use of repressive measures against enemies (real and imagined), but this had 
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come at great cost. Monas judges that it was due to the harshness of Nicholas' reign that 
the population was polarized and the revolutionary intelligentsia emerged, poisoning the 
political atmosphere to the point where even Alexander II’s great reforms of the early 
1860’s constitute a case of “too little, too late.”217 In this sense, the state-building 
enterprise of Nicholas (and by extension, of Peter) failed, as it could not rely solely on 
coercion and formal institutions to achieve the kind of order sought by European states; it 
also required vesting those institutions with meaningful power (something that Russian 
autocrats were loath to do) while depending on a loyal social base. The first requirement 
was undermined by the Tsar’s tendency to rely on informal means of political control 
(through agencies like the Third Section or through his personal surveillance) due to 
mistrust of the bureaucracy (which produced a seriously understaffed bureaucracy 
lacking in material resources). The second requirement was never met due to the 
comparative weakness and disorganization of the Russian gentry, which could not 
provide a consistent check on the state’s authority or act as a consistent partner. 
 Thus, the arc of state-building efforts in this period are inconsistent, but even 
given the limitations of the state constructed by Peter I, Catherine II, and Nicholas I, the 
general trend is still one of centralization. The rule of the Tsar was gradually 
supplemented by formalized government ministries, a system of civil service 
advancement, formal (if not always observed) law, and social control mechanisms such 
as a political police and censorship. Even if these institutions only imperfectly penetrated 
into the countryside, they nevertheless retained a strong grip over key population centers, 
chief among these being the dual capitals of Moscow and St. Petersburg. These processes 
conform to the expectations of the state-building literature, which assume that the 
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geopolitical spur of military competition drives internal state-formation, and that the 
degree of central control deepens over time as the state becomes consolidated. However, 
the changes taking place in the core did not always translate to changes taking place in 
the periphery, as Tsarist rule had to engage in negotiation processes with local elites. As a 
result, many of the institutions that were present (and highly important) in the core, such 
as the political police and censorship agencies, were usually only nominally present in 
borderland territories and in general exercised little authority compared to their activities 
in the core. The next two chapters consider the process of incorporation and bargaining 
in-depth. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE INCORPORATION OF THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS 
 
The origins of the Tsarist Empire can be traced back to a consistent contact with non-
Russian ethnic groups, whether in the form of relations with the Mongols during 
Moscow's vassalage to the Golden Horde or in the governance of regions not under the 
control of the Horde. During the period where Novgorod was the most important Russian 
city (12th-14th centuries) it was already a multiethnic state, with client societies, varieties 
of direct and indirect rule, and different approaches to territorial incorporation. This 
ended with the triumph of Muscovy, but the act of conquest conferred this same 
multiethnic character on Muscovy in embryo.218 This character was deepened with the 
conquest and incorporation of mainly Islamic communities, most importantly with the 
conquest of the Khanate of Kazan, and it forced the authorities to come to terms with 
incorporating different kinds of communities into the empire. Local elites were co-opted 
where it was prudent, with others being more vigorously incorporated if their way of life 
was deemed too alien to allow easy integration. Groups were often excluded from 
Russian institutions like serfdom and only gradually integrated; with integration policies 
being drawn back should resistance become too fierce.219 This approach to governance 
meshes well with Doyle’s observation that reliance on local clients was often the easiest 
path (in terms of resources used) for empires to consolidate their territories. In order for 
this cooptation to work effectively, though, it needs to be followed with some degree of 
political institutionalization and integration, lest the imperial units become too easy to 
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pull off of the core.220 This tension between the mode of incorporation and subsequent 
efforts at integration would become one of the persistent problems of the empire in the 
19th century. 
 Incorporation generally proceeded with the removal of military governors after 
Russian rule was solidified and their replacement with administrative units modeled on 
the rest of the empire. The local elites were entrusted with these administrative forms, 
indicating at least some degree of confidence on the part of the autocracy in their 
reliability in enforcing Russian rule.221 In the case of the Russian empire, the local elites 
also often ended up serving within the imperial bureaucracy, in some cases with 
distinction. As Roger Bartlett observes: 
Conciliation and integration of alien subject elites was a long-
established strategy in the integrationist policies of Muscovite and 
imperial governments, whether dealing (for example) with the Tatars of 
the Volga or the Cossack starshina of Ukraine. The Baltic German 
nobility found its way rapidly and easily into the service structure of 
the Russian Empire; but it was also very successful in maintaining its 
own identity and independence, right up to 1920, and, too, in its 
influence as a model for eighteenth-century Russian rulers concerned to 
reshape the organization, functions and status of their service elite.222 
 
 During the period when the empire was expanding in the 16th-18th centuries, the 
overriding concern was dynastic loyalty, not ethnic loyalty. Loyalty to the empire was 
determined more by the strategic support of local elites than by any sort of essentialist 
ties that we have come to take for granted in the age of nationalism. These ties were 
simply not as important.223 This expansion was intended as an extension of the territory 
of the empire, and pursued for reasons of prestige, economy, geopolitics, state-building, 
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and security. The actual maintenance of those territories gained differed based on what 
was viewed as necessary, whether that be vigorous top-down management, or hands-off 
autonomy.224 In the words of Boris Nol’de, the empire approached these different 
problems according to its own “idiosyncratic logic, thus leaving ‘little sense’ of what was 
created by the imperial state.”225 
 The incorporation of the Western Borderlands into the Tsarist Empire followed 
this idiosyncratic logic, but the process also serves to confirm the expectations of the 
literature on state and empire. The mode of incorporation was dictated by geopolitical 
pressures that are compatible with the role of military competition in driving the 
expansion of imperial territory and in buttressing the security capabilities of the state. In 
all cases, the Tsarist state pursued the goal of protecting the imperial heartland vis-a-vis 
external rivals, by accumulating buffer territories and by building working relationships 
with local elites.226 The method of achieving this goal, offering generous packages of 
political and economic autonomy to entrenched local elites, accords well with Michael 
Mann's observation that territorially-extensive empires were not able to rely on direct rule 
in regions far from the imperial center due to the difficulties in projecting state power 
into those regions.227 Some of these deficiencies of projecting state power would be 
addressed in the future (in some cases, not until the Soviet period), but at the time the 
most relevant considerations were the combination of geopolitical necessity and the 
state's incapacity to directly coerce lightly-held territories. The willingness of the local 
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elites, in most cases, to tolerate or even embrace Tsarist rule certainly abetted the process 
of imperial expansion, as it allowed the Tsarist state to keep the costs of rule low while 
still extracting clear security benefits. 
 Although the state pursued roughly the same strategy of cooptation in all the 
cases, it is still vital to note key differences in how incorporation proceeded in the 
different regions of the borderlands. As my subsequent sections will show, the disposition 
of the local elites led to important variations in Tsarist strategy, although nowhere near 
the level of variation that occurred later on during the process of administrative 
centralization and Russification. The strength and cohesion of the Baltic Germans and 
Finnish elites, in combination with their cooperative attitude towards the state, yielded an 
incorporation agreement similar to that of the Ukrainian Hetmanate but without the 
immediate revisions in favor of the Tsarist state. Likewise, Congress Poland received the 
most generous terms of incorporation in the 1815 constitution, but this was only after an 
earlier attempt to erase Poland without significant political concessions had failed. And 
even this generous grant was abrogated quickly, while the privileges granted by 
incorporation persisted in the Baltics and Finland. Tsarist involvement in Polish factional 
struggles in the 18th century and Tsarism's long-standing strategic rivalry with Poland-
Lithuania prevented the kind of amity that came to prevail in the northern regions of the 
borderlands. In all four regions the Tsarist state generally observed the basic compact that 
Jerome Blum identifies as the foundation of Eastern European political systems, the 
preservation of gentry economic privileges.228 But it is the grant, and preservation, of 
political privileges that is the most telling phenomenon in the Tsarist incorporation of the 
Western Borderlands. The stage of incorporation is also where we first see some 
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deviations from Gerring, Ziblatt, et al.'s model of direct and indirect rule, although these 
deviations only became more pronounced later.229 Poland-Lithuania possessed the most 
developed political institutions, but only enjoyed a brief period of autonomy after an 
attempt had already been made at more direct rule. The legacy of the Polish partitions had 
important downstream consequences for Tsarist governance strategies in Poland-
Lithuania. 
 
The Incorporation of the Ukrainian Hetmanate 
 
Of the regions being considered in this project, the area of Hetman Ukraine came under 
Tsarist dominance first and had been integrated into the administrative framework of the 
Tsarist Empire long before the other borderlands experienced extensive Russification. 
This can be partly attributed to a historical connection between the Muscovite state and 
the territory that came to be considered Ukraine, with the foundation of the Kievan Rus in 
the 9th century AD being seen as the initial birthplace of Russia until its separation from 
Muscovy under the pressure of Mongol invasion. However, it can also be attributed to 
contingency in that conflict between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (the 
Hetmanate's previous ruler) and what would become the Ukrainian Hetmanate in the 
mid-17th century gave Tsarist Russia a political opening to extend its control over the 
Hetmanate. The agreement that was reached between the Hetmanate and the Tsar proved 
to be an important model for how Russia would deal with its borderland areas, both in 
terms of the initial autonomy that was provided and how that autonomy evolved in 
response to events (largely in the form of the Tsarist government gradually encroaching 
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on the autonomy). Tsarist assimilation of the Hetmanate also proved to be more 
successful than in the other borderland areas, though this did not mitigate the coercive 
nature of that assimilation. The perceived historical connection between the inhabitants of 
Muscovy and the Hetmanate did not cause the Tsar to relent in the use of force to obtain 
the objectives of the empire. 
 Unlike the other regions in the borderlands, Ukraine was not a cohesive political 
entity with well-defined institutions and elites. After the 1648 Cossack rebellion under 
Bogdan Khmelnitsky this began to change, but these changes were mostly confined to the 
area that I refer to as Hetman Ukraine, and which is often referred to as Left-Bank 
Ukraine. After 1648, Ukraine was roughly divided between Hetman Ukraine under 
Russian suzerainty, Right-Bank Ukraine under continuing Polish control, and Sloboda 
Ukraine under Russian control (a thinly populated area of the Russian frontier that was 
home to Cossack groups). In addition, parts of historical Ukraine also shifted to Austrian 
control after the Polish partitions in the 18th century, making for dramatically different 
terms of governance in the different parts of Ukraine. Hetman Ukraine is a natural choice 
for the focus of this study, as it came the closest to acting like a sovereign state with 
indigenous institutions and a ruling elite (the Cossack officers, the starshyna, from which 
the Hetman was selected). These institutions were certainly underdeveloped when 
compared to the Baltic German Ritterschaften or the institutions of the Polish szlachta, 
but they were nevertheless a force that the Tsarist government had to deal with in 
exercising control over Ukraine. 
 The incorporation of Hetman Ukraine into the Tsarist sphere of influence was an 
event of great geopolitical importance for the empire. From the 14th century onward, the 
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lands that comprise contemporary Ukraine were under the domination of more powerful 
neighbors, primarily Poland and Lithuania, but also the Mongols in the East. Nearly all of 
the territory that would become contemporary Ukraine was eventually absorbed into 
Poland-Lithuania, partly because of the appeal of noble power and prestige to the 
Ukrainian Ruthenian gentry.230 The position of the Polish szlachta in comparison to the 
indigenous Ruthenian gentry made inclusion in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
extremely attractive for the Ruthenian gentry. The Ruthenian gentry were the largely 
Orthodox descendants of the boiars and gentry of the Kievan Rus, but the desire to secure 
their position led them to arrive at a modus vivendi with the Catholic Poles. Combined 
with the fact that these territories lacked well-articulated political institutions, the 
protections offered by a powerful state such as the Commonwealth promised greater 
stability in the face of other regional powers such as Muscovy and the Crimean Tatars. 
After absorption into Poland-Lithuania, these territories continued to be dominated by 
large landholdings and affluent towns operating under Madgeburg Law. However, new 
grants of land by and large went to Polish nobility, and the Ruthenian gentry eventually 
assimilated to be able to retain their economic and social privileges. During this time 
period, the peasantry's condition worsened as manorial estates were introduced to manage 
the grain trade.231 
 The material changes occurring in the lands that would become Ukraine during 
this time period, combined with the effective loss of the local elites (to be discussed in 
greater length in the subsequent chapter), acted as a catalyst for the creation of a new 
social class: the Cossacks. The Cossacks initially emerged as a condition of life in the 
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steppe-lands, acting as quasi-military groups that were capable of fending off raids into 
Ukrainian territory. Poland's political and economic ascendance in Ukraine contributed to 
the rapid growth of the Cossack group that would eventually form the core of the 
Hetmanate, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, since their ranks took in runaway peasants and 
others dissatisfied with Polish rule. The rise of the Cossacks posed both problems and 
opportunities for the Commonwealth. Given their military skills, Poland used the 
Cossacks as an irregular raiding force to strike out at Muscovy, the Ottoman Empire, and 
the Crimean Tatars.232 This convenient proxy force saved the Commonwealth resources 
and manpower, but also proved to be difficult to control during peacetime, as Cossack 
ranks continued to swell and often directed their ire towards the Commonwealth itself. 
The history leading up to the Great Uprising of 1648 under Bohdan Khmelnitsky is 
littered with abortive Cossack uprisings and clashes with Commonwealth troops. Despite 
the regular uprisings, Cossack unrest directed towards Poland-Lithuania failed until the 
1648 rising under Bohdan Khmelnitsky. The reasons that can be adduced for the failures 
relate to the abundance of ill-armed peasantry, the lack of organization among the 
Cossacks, and the spontaneous nature of the uprisings. The szlachta, regardless of their 
origin (either Polish or Lithuanian or Ruthenian), were able to quell the revolts (though 
often at a steep cost) and attempted to limit the Cossack registers, but the problem was 
never definitively dealt with.233 
 The history of the 1648 uprising, while fascinating, is beyond the bounds of this 
study. What is important is that when the Cossacks finally reached a level of organization 
capable of throwing off Polish rule under Bogdan Khmelnitsky and establishing the 
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Hetmanate, this represented a significant geopolitical opportunity for the Russian Empire. 
Previously, Ukraine had acted as a buffer zone from which Poland launched raids into the 
territories of regional rivals, including Muscovy. However, the removal of the Hetmanate 
from Poland-Lithuania's sphere of influence offered the Tsarist Empire a chance to shift 
the regional balance of power in its favor. The Hetmanate, for its part, recognized the 
need for protection from a larger power, and there were only three relevant options in the 
region: Poland-Lithuania, Muscovy, and the Ottoman Empire. Muscovy became the 
natural choice for Khmelnitsky, who framed the binding together of Ukraine and Russia 
as a reunification of Orthodox communities. The end result of this determination was the 
Treaty of Pereiaslav of 1654, where the Hetmanate recognized the supremacy of the Tsar 
in return for the promise of military protection and autonomy. Pereiaslav represented to 
some degree a misunderstanding between the Cossacks and the Tsar. The Cossacks 
sought the confirmation of privileges similar to the practices of Poland-Lithuania, 
whereas the Tsar was unwilling to permanently commit to privileges even if he was 
willing to grant them at the moment (the fact that the Tsar refused to swear an oath 
concerning the agreement indicates the lack of reciprocity inherent in the agreement). 
This misunderstanding fueled several conflicts in the late 17th century, as the Hetmanate 
attempted to switch patrons, only to have Muscovy intervene. The end result was the 
partition of the territories between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy.234 
 Religion played a significant role in the position of the Tsarist government with 
regard to the Hetmanate and its incorporation. As Paul Bushkovitch notes, Ukrainian 
religious writings entered Russia and influenced its views on Orthodoxy considerably in 
the 16th and 17th centuries, especially considering the 1596 Brest Union and the 
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subsequent conflicts between the Polish-Lithuanian state and Orthodox adherents.235 The 
Cossacks and Khmelnitsky largely framed their opposition to the Commonwealth in 
religious terms and their demands on the Polish state in the period between 1648 and 
1654 expanded to include the abolition of the Union and greater autonomy.236 In this 
position they found a strong potential ally in Tsar Aleksei, who was interested in uniting 
the Orthodox world. After 1648, Mohyla's Collegium enjoyed increasing influence as 
well, and in the latter half of the 17th century Ukrainian religious texts spread throughout 
the Russian branch of the Church.237 By the reign of Peter I, clergy from Kiev (and 
Lithuania) became increasingly prominent, changing the overall complexion of the 
empire's religious elite.238 As such, confession acted as an important variable in the 
incorporation of Ukraine, alongside the broader geopolitical concerns (and opportunities) 
of the empire, in much the same way that religion was employed to support the 
acquisition of Kazan and other territories.  
 The terms of the Treaty were relatively favorable for the Hetmanate, as the Tsarist 
government made a number of commitments to the privileges and autonomy of the 
Hetmanate. The Treaty guaranteed that Hetman Ukraine would retain its laws and 
customs, be able to carry on foreign relations with some powers (the most important were 
to be controlled by Moscow, mainly regional rivals like Poland-Lithuania, Crimea and 
the Ottomans), and preserved the status and privileges of local elites, in some cases 
expanding them such as with the Cossack registers. Internal policy was deemed as 
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outside of Moscow's jurisdiction.239 The autonomy offered by the original treaty was in 
keeping with Muscovy/Russia's general approach to dealing with the problem of 
incorporating non-Great Russian territories into the administrative fabric of the empire. 
During the phase of "gathering the Russian lands" in the 15th and 16th centuries, 
Muscovy extended its political rule and wiped out alternative forms of government, as in 
Pskov and Novgorod in the early 16th century. However, when Muscovy started 
expanding into non-Russian lands (Finno-Ugric, Turkic, etc.), these methods gradually 
changed to accommodate local differences so that rule was easier. The Tsar still ruled 
through a military governor (a voevoda), but local elites were permitted some latitude in 
governing their own affairs.240 Matthew Romaniello's recent illuminating book on the 
incorporation of the Khanate of Kazan demonstrates this tendency, with Kazan setting the 
example of how the Tsarist government would handle subsequent borderland 
incorporations. Although the official rhetoric of the Tsar and the Orthodox Church 
emphasized the destruction of an Islamic adversary, the actual method of governing 
Kazan approximated what Romaniello calls "layered sovereignty," with local non-
Russian and non-Orthodox groups enjoying significant areas of autonomy.241 These 
arrangements served Russian imperial interests for a couple reasons. First, they reduced 
the resources that the imperial center needed to expend to maintain the outlying areas of 
the empire while also reducing conflict with the inhabitants of those areas. Second, they 
helped to secure the primary strategic goal of the empire of using peripheral regions to 
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protect the imperial core, since geopolitical vulnerability was always a concern for 
Russian rulers.242 
 No matter how generous the initial provisions were, the Tsarist Empire did not 
view the arrangement in Pereiaslav as permanent and encroached on it repeatedly before 
the abolition of the Hetmanate in the late 18th century. This process repeated itself in the 
other borderland areas, as the Tsarist state frequently encroached on granted privileges 
and guarantees of autonomy when it served imperial interests. In the case of the 
Hetmanate, revision of Pereiaslav happened almost immediately. As Paul Robert 
Magocsi notes, after the death of Khmelnitsky, the new Hetman Ivan Vygovsky turned 
away from the Muscovite connection with the aim of getting more favorable terms to 
rejoin the Commonwealth. The abortive Union of Hadiach of 1658-1659 led to renewed 
conflict between Muscovy and the Commonwealth and resulted in the division of 
Cossack Ukraine into Muscovite and Polish-Lithuanian spheres of influence.243 Later the 
Tsarist Empire reached an agreement with Poland-Lithuania to formally partition Hetman 
Ukraine, creating the distinction between Right-Bank and Left-Bank Ukraine. The 
partition prompted an attempt on the part of Hetman Doroshenko to reunify Ukraine by 
seeking a relationship with the Ottoman Empire. However, the unpopularity associated 
with helping an infidel and the lack of strength of the Ukrainians to change the status quo 
doomed this project to failure and Doroshenko was forced into retirement and exile near 
Moscow.244  
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The empire also moved to redefine the legal relationship that was established in 
Pereiaslav, oftentimes using underhanded means to extract greater concessions from the 
Hetmanate. Subsequent articles and revisions of the Treaty eroded the Hetmanate's rights 
and privileges, especially under Khmelnitsky's son Yury, who was agreed to a different 
version of the Pereiaslav treaty in 1659. As Magocsi argues, the position of the 
Hetmanate deteriorated during the period of the "Ruin" (1657-1686) as a result of 
struggles between Muscovy, Poland-Lithuania, and the Ottoman Empire, with the 
Cossack state awkwardly attempting to shift alliances between these parties when the 
opportunity arose. By the time of the 'eternal' peace of 1686, the territory of the Cossack 
state was divided between the control of all three states, with the Hetmanate in a much 
weaker position vis-a-vis the Tsarist government.245 
 Although these changes established the juridical basis of Tsarist dominance in the 
Hetmanate, and although the Hetmanate often proved to be too divided to stand up to 
Tsarist intervention, it would be incorrect to conclude that the process of incorporating 
the Hetmanate was complete. The process of administrative centralization and the true 
abrogation of the Hetmanate's authority would not commence until Peter I's reign, and 
until that point the Hetmanate did possess some resources that made it able to resist some 
Tsarist encroachment. For one, the empire did not enjoy overwhelming superiority in the 
military realm, making it difficult if not impossible to implement policies by force. Until 
the 18th century, the Tsarist troops garrisoned in the Hetmanate were greatly 
outnumbered by armed Cossacks, and these troops were generally centered in towns 
under the voevody's control. As Orest Subtelny details, on several occasions in the 17th 
century clashes between Tsarist and Hetman troops ended with Cossack victory, such as 
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in the 1659 repulsion of a levy of 150,000 Tsarist soldiers at Konotop. Moreover, the 
Cossacks proved capable of limiting the Tsarist expansion of power through the voevody 
by forcibly expelling voevody and their troops from several towns in 1668, leading to a 
restriction of the voevody to five towns with fewer troops.246 Although the empire 
certainly possessed the military potential to violently subjugate the Hetmanate during this 
period, such a policy would have been extremely costly, increasing the incentives for the 
Tsarist government to seek other strategies for expanding its influence. 
 Other, less costly, strategies were indeed available to the Tsarist Empire. 
Although Cossack military potential prevented easy assimilation, the social divisions 
within the Hetmanate allowed the Tsarist Empire to use the classic imperial strategy of 
divide and conquer. The Hetmanate and the Cossacks as a social class were premised to 
some degree on the principle of egalitarianism, but in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
Cossackdom had manifested divisions between poorer, rank and file Cossacks and the 
Cossack officers, the starshyna. The Tsarist Empire exploited this division by preserving 
the economic privileges of the starshyna, while also preventing peasants from entering 
Cossack ranks as they frequently had under Polish-Lithuanian rule. These changes served 
the economic interests of the starshyna, who were the primary landholders in the 
Hetmanate, and made it likelier that they would align themselves with the Tsarist 
Empire.247 This dynamic will be explored in greater depth in the subsequent chapter. The 
Cossacks also tended to neglect urban areas and the emergent merchant class, and so 
urban governments tended to go to the empire rather than the Hetmanate for confirmation 
of Madgeburg Law privileges and other economic matters. Although urban areas 
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eventually began to participate more in Cossack politics, this division between town and 
countryside was crucial to the early weakness of the Hetmanate in the face of Tsarist 
rule.248 
 Overall, the incorporation of the Hetmanate into the Tsarist Empire proceeded 
inconsistently over the second half of the 17th century, and did not conclude until the 
Tsarist state began to exercise more administrative control over Ukraine during the 18th 
century. The incorporation of the Hetmanate was mostly driven by geopolitical concerns 
(Russian strategic positions vis-a-vis both Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire) 
and the newly-acquired territory performed a useful function as both a buffer zone and a 
base for launching raids against the Crimean Tatars. The initial effort to bring the 
Hetmanate into the imperial sphere of control followed the traditional Tsarist strategy of 
offering autonomy to non-Russian areas in return for loyalty to the Tsar. However, as 
with these other areas, the Tsarist state sought to redefine the relationship when it was 
expedient for the purpose of expanding Tsarist control and influence. As Marc Raeff 
notes in his article on Catherine the Great's nationalities policies in non-Russian 
territories, concessions were employed to native elites to make the process of 
incorporation easier. However, given the cameralist beliefs of the government (the idea 
that the state was a single unit to be managed in a uniform manner), these concessions 
were always to be directed to the purpose of drawing native elites into Tsarist institutions, 
so that they would become integrated into the empire and 'drag' the rest of their peoples 
with them.249 The case of the Hetmanate fits into this intellectual model well. Although 
the Hetmanate did possess some means of resisting this expansion of imperial control 
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(primarily in the domain of military power), Tsarist exploitation of divisions in the 
Hetmanate proved to be successful in the long-term. 
 
The Incorporation of the Baltic Provinces and Finland 
 
The de facto incorporation of the Baltic provinces of Livland and Estland into the Tsarist 
Empire was accomplished in 1710, when Peter I was successful in expelling Sweden 
from the territories, and was formalized in the 1721 Peace of Niestadt. Convincing the 
local elites, the Baltic Germans, to accept Tsarist overlordship was relatively easy, as the 
Baltic Germans had begun to feel dissatisfied with the rule of Sweden and Charles XI. 
The reason for this dissatisfaction lies with Charles’ administrative changes in the 
Swedish Empire during the 1690s, which included an effort to reclaim for the crown 
lands that had been granted to local gentry.250 The integration of the Baltics was 
accomplished in a simple manner: the Tsarist Empire offered to confirm rights and 
privileges dating back to the times of the Teutonic Order and to undo the Swedish 
reduktion in return for the Baltic Germans shifting their allegiance to Petersburg. 
Subsequently, the Baltic Germans were given many opportunities to occupy importance 
positions in the empire, which they took advantage of in order to gain influence over the 
imperial government.251 John Armstrong conceptualizes the Baltic Germans as a 
"mobilized diaspora" in the Tsarist Empire, seeking to influence the imperial government 
and protect their position by virtue of the expertise they offered Tsarist government. As 
Armstrong notes, the educational rates and representation in Tsarist governing 
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institutions (especially in the Foreign Ministry) of the Baltic Germans was significantly 
out of proportion to their actual numbers, and they remained an important (and loyal) 
group until the dissolution of the Empire.252 The Baltic capitulation was based on the 
1561 privileges granted by Sigismund Augustus and preserved linguistic, economic, and 
political rights for the Baltic German Ritterschaften. However, these privileges did not 
formally abridge the freedom of action by the Tsar, as Peter wanted to retain the ability to 
change policy should circumstances change. Thus, even though the Ritterschaften were 
able to incorporate with more rights than they had enjoyed under Sweden, the empire 
retained power to eventually revisit these rights and privileges.253 
 The generosity of the empire's concessions to the Baltic territories in the 
capitulation agreement reflects both geopolitical and administrative realities. Starting in 
the 13th century, the Baltics and Finland became an area for competition between 
principalities such as Novgorod and Sweden, and later on with the consolidation of 
Poland-Lithuania, this competition gained a new member and expanded to the territory 
that comprises contemporary Ukraine. In essence, these frontier zones for the empire 
acquired overriding strategic importance vis-à-vis regional rivals, even though those 
rivals began declining in the 18th century.254 As Thaden observes, at the time Tsarist 
officials saw the speedy integration (and thus rights and privileges) of the Baltic 
territories as a necessary move to consolidate Tsarism’s position vis-à-vis Sweden and 
Poland-Lithuania.255 John LeDonne argues that Tsarist "grand strategy" called for a ring 
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of clients and ‘friendly kingdoms’ around the periphery of the empire's "heartland." This 
manifested itself in declining powers increasingly under the empire's sway (Poland-
Lithuania and Sweden) and smaller client societies that became more fully integrated into 
the apparatus of the empire (the Baltics, Finland, Hetman Ukraine).256 The deployment of 
a couple dozen regiments in the Baltics made the area into a base of operations and 
staging ground for the empire's mobile military strategy of deep penetration into enemy 
territory. Without these bastions, it would have been difficult for the empire to manage 
some of its offensive drives into Central Europe and Scandinavia.257 After 1763, the 
Tsarist Empire staged troops in the Baltics to hedge against possible changes to the 
European order, since that provided the most flexibility in response to perceived 
threats.258 These foreign policy objectives provided the local elites with an important 
source of leverage over the empire, and the Baltic Germans employed this leverage to 
construct a quid pro quo arrangement with the imperial center such that they guaranteed 
their loyalty to the empire in return for the protection of their local prerogative.259 As will 
be discussed later, it also came to be based off of the influential role of many Baltic 
Germans in Tsarist imperial administration. 
 Framing the activities of the Tsarist Empire in the borderlands as constituting a 
"grand strategy" exaggerates a historical reality of contingency and ad hoc policy 
adjustment, but it does capture a basic motivating force of the empire. Although Tsars 
like Peter I largely reacted to international situations rather than operating from a 
conscious plan, their policies nevertheless demonstrated a general direction towards 
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territorial expansion and the creation of a fiscal-military state capable of pursuing said 
expansion. This remains true even in the period before Peter's reforms, as Ivan IV's 
efforts to expand the Muscovite state into the other Russian principalities and non-
Russian territories like Kazan served to reinforce geopolitical interests as well as 
religious and ideological interests.260 Additionally, as Michael Paul has noted, Muscovy 
began pursuing its "military revolution" in the 16th-17th centuries before Peter's reign, 
responding to the competitive pressures caused by advances in military technology.261 
The acquisition of the Western Borderlands was oftentimes opportunistic (as with the 
Hetmanate and Finland) rather than the product of long-term deliberate policy, but these 
opportunistic gains also served to buttress the empire's geopolitical position vis-a-vis its 
rivals. As such, the idea of a "grand strategy" can only be metaphorical, seeking to 
capture how the imperial government consistently responded to political and military 
pressures in the international arena, and must not be taken to imply the presence of a kind 
of "master plan" for imperial dominance and expansion. 
 In the late 18th and all of the 19th century, the Tsars sought to address the 
entrenched power of the Baltic Germans and the administrative deficiencies of the central 
Russian administration, starting with the policies of Catherine II. Until that time, the 
forward deployment of Tsarist troops in the region acted as a placeholder for imperial 
authority. Deployment not only served to help Russia project force in the case of 
aggression, but also allowed the empire to secure tranquility in the borderland client 
societies without committing too many policing resources. Thus, the borderlands were 
left relatively autonomous with the assumption that the basing of regiments would keep 
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them in line.262 After 1763, this deployment was increased to allow Russia greater 
capability to respond to changes in the European balance of power while also possessing 
internal flexibility.263 This policy was not intended to achieve true integration of the 
territories, however, and despite the superficial placement of Russian governing 
institutions over Baltic institutions, the Baltics remained administratively, culturally, and 
intellectually within the European orbit.264 
 The incorporation of Finland into the Russian Empire in 1808-1809 followed a 
similar pattern as the incorporation of the Baltics from a century before, though the 
geopolitical stakes were higher in the case of Finland. As with the Baltics, the proximate 
cause of the Tsarist Empire gaining the new territory was a successfully prosecuted war 
with Sweden, which commenced in 1808. Unlike the Baltics, Sweden was not the 
predominant concern of the empire as it had been during Peter’s time, as the Swedish 
empire had become disastrously weakened by this point in time, due to a feeble 
monarchy and extensive corruption and venality among its servitors.265 The incorporation 
of Finland was more a result of opportunity than long-term ambition. The war in 1808-9 
gave Russia the opportunity, and the pressures from Napoleon and Turkey gave the 
empire an incentive to shore up its strategic position. The Finns were granted much the 
same guarantee of rights as the other Baltic states, but in reality this went further in its 
new status as a Grand Duchy, along with a number of privileges that were not present in 
Estland, Livland, or Kurland.266 Even though Sweden was weak vis-à-vis the Tsarist 
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Empire, it was possible that it could take advantage of Russia’s position during a 
potential future conflict with Napoleon, and so a deep strike into Swedish territory and 
the gain of a buffer territory offered Russia the guarantee that Sweden would be in no 
position to resume conflict within the foreseeable future.267 Sweden’s internal weakness 
made this strategy relatively easy to achieve, as Swedish mismanagement of its own 
territories had cultivated dissatisfaction in Finland, making its separation from the empire 
less problematic. 
 Russia’s position vis-à-vis Napoleon and other external rivals can also help to 
explain why the privileges promised to the Grand Duchy were so generous. Finland did 
not possess an overweening gentry class like the Baltic Germans (though the Swedish 
gentry in Finland, the "Finlandish" elites, did wield considerable power both in the Grand 
Duchy and in Tsarist political and military institutions), but the Finnish peasantry was 
already free from serfdom and generally enjoyed higher education levels than in other 
parts of the borderlands.268 This made it more likely that forcible integration would be 
resisted, and indeed this did occur during parts of the 1808-1809 war, with Finnish 
guerilla groups striking out at Tsarist forces.269 The resources that would have been 
necessary to quell such resistance would have distracted Russia from its other continental 
goals, so Alexander I concluded that the easiest way to ensure the peaceful incorporation 
of the territory was by granting extensive concessions to the Finns, who could thereby be 
convinced that they would be better off under Russia than under Sweden. Towards this 
end, Alexander promised to convene a Finnish Diet (the Sejm), allow Finland to manage 
most of its own affairs, and to bypass Russian central administration in overseeing the 
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territory.270 The Porvoo Diet of 1809 was a kind of gentleman's agreement between the 
Tsar and the Grand Duchy, seeking to dispose of several issues including the armed 
forces, taxation, and other fiscal matters. However, it would take on a mythological status 
for subsequent generations of Finns, who sought to frame the Diet as the creation of a 
separate, constitutional Finnish state. This interpretation would prove problematic for the 
empire in the latter half of the century.271 The creation of a Finnish State Secretary and 
Finland's status as a direct subject of the Tsar (bypassing Tsarist administration), 
effectively ratified Finland's separate role in the empire in a manner unlike other regions 
besides Poland (which had these privileges revoked in 1830).272 
 Alongside the extensive administrative privileges conferred on Finland, 
separation between Finland and Russia also proceeded as a result of growing notions of 
Finnish identity. The concept of a separate Finnish identity was something that was 
reinforced by Petersburg shortly after incorporation. It was used as a tool to differentiate 
the Grand Duchy from Swedish rule and from the Swedish gentry within the Grand 
Duchy, while also positioning Russia as an ally and protector.273 This was tolerated at the 
time because it helped to buttress the loyalty of Finnish elites. The de facto autonomy 
granted to Finland by Russia was greater than that enjoyed under Sweden, and the 
reuniting of New Finland with Old Finland was viewed very positively. This 
arrangement, combined with the economic and cultural 'upsurge' experienced in Finland 
made the upper classes remarkably loyal to the empire.274 Finland's proximity to the 
imperial capital of Petersburg acted as an important source of economic growth, 
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especially in sectors like the timber industry. In addition, the same opportunities were 
opened up the Finnish elites that had previously been provided to the Baltic Germans – 
the opportunity to serve in the Tsarist government and enhance their own power and 
prestige. This was an offer that many Finnish officials embraced, and provided for an 
incentive for officials in Finland to act in the empire’s best interests while also working 
on behalf of Finland.275 
 
The Polish Partitions and the Congress Kingdom 
 
The incorporation of Poland into the Tsarist Empire posed different problems than the 
incorporation of Ukraine or the Baltics and Finland. Perhaps the most crucial problem 
was the fact that Poland had been a great power rival of the Tsarist state and had 
cultivated a distinct identity among the szlacta (Sarmatianism and the Golden Freedoms) 
unlike the corporate identity of the Baltic Germans or the Cossack starshyna. This made 
it less likely that the Polish szlachta would easily accede to Tsarist rule and come to an 
accommodation with the state. In addition, Poland's incorporation was comparatively 
messy, with the first attempt occurring over the span of three separate partitions (in 
conjunction with Prussia and Austria-Hungary) in the late 18th century, including an 
attempt at rebellion by the Poles before the Third Partition. This precedent would have 
been troublesome enough for the state, but it proved to be a brief arrangement as the 
Napoleonic Wars intervened and bounced control of Poland between France (as the 
Duchy of Warsaw) and eventually the partition powers (which led to the creation of the 
Congress Kingdom). Although the constitution granted to the Congress Kingdom 
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attempted to recreate the old imperial dynamic of offering substantial autonomy in return 
for dynastic loyalty, the situation simply did not match up with the easy incorporation 
experienced in the Baltics and Finland or the relative ease of suppressing the 
disorganized Ukrainian Cossacks. The case of Poland offers an interesting example of the 
traditional imperial logic clashing with the coherent corporate identity that was not 
amenable to submission. 
 The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a product of the 1569 Union of 
Lublin, where the last Jagiellonian monarch, Sigismund II Augustus, helped to construct 
the beginnings of the Commonwealth’s elective monarchy and its constitutional system. 
Lithuania's role in the commonwealth was mostly in name only, as most elites were 
thoroughly polonized and Lithuanian speakers comprised a relatively small percentage of 
the populace (mainly peasants). As a result, Lithuania was often subsumed within Polish 
interests and aims.276 It was during the 17th century that the Commonwealth reached the 
height of its power, briefly dominating Russia during the Time of Troubles and testing its 
power against Sweden and the Ottoman Empire. However, the Golden Age was relatively 
short-lived, as by the middle of the century, Poland-Lithuania’s position was buffeted by 
angry neighbors and internal uprisings (most notably the Cossack rebellion of Bogdan 
Khmelnitsky beginning in 1648). The internal problems of the Commonwealth by the 
17th century were largely due to a breakdown in the religious status quo due to the 
Counterreformation and the 1596 Union of Brest that eliminated the legal foundations of 
the Orthodox Church. As Paul Magocsi notes, the middle of the 16th century witnessed 
both an Orthodox revival in the Commonwealth and the stark religious polarization 
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brought on by the Counterreformation, which viewed Orthodox Christians as almost 
equally problematic as Protestants.277 The Catholic-oriented policies of King Sigismund 
III Vasa, and the influence of Jesuits served to alienate Orthodox Ruthenians, and the 
Union of Brest which was intended to reunite the Orthodox in the Commonwealth with 
Rome was largely rejected by both the Orthodox laity and the Cossacks.278 As Borys 
Gudziak argues, the Orthodox clergy in the Commonwealth largely supported the Union 
to try and eliminate religious disunity, but their assumption that the laity would follow 
their lead was false and ended up contributing to a heightened level of religious 
polarization that would help define the course of Commonwealth politics in the 17th 
century.279 The combination of the Commonwealth’s weakened position internationally 
and the chaos of its domestic politics made it a ripe target for predatory neighbors during 
the 18th century. 
 The Commonwealth’s decline coincided with the rise of its traditional rival, the 
Tsarist Empire, under Peter the Great. Although initially part of the same alliance as 
Russia during the Great Northern War, Poland-Lithuania suffered both politically and 
economically after Russia faltered and the Swedish Empire quickly dispatched of the 
Commonwealth. The use of Commonwealth soil as a battleground seriously damaged the 
economic base of the Commonwealth and the effects of the war only helped to convince 
the szlachta that reform could only lead to chaos and violence. Even after the tide turned 
against Sweden after Poltava, Poland-Lithuania did not extract much benefit. All of the 
                                                 
277
 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine. 168-176. 
278
 Daniel Stone, The Polish-Lithuanian State, 1386-1795, History of East Central Europe v. 4 (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2001). 136-9. 
279
 Borys Gudziak, Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Cambridge, 
MA: Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 
1998). 252-3. 
115 
 
Commonwealth's neighbors generally did well out of the peace settlement while the 
Commonwealth actually failed to produce a legal peace settlement with Sweden, further 
confirming Poland-Lithuania's slide into irrelevance as a major power.280 Poland-
Lithuania’s weakness alongside Tsarism’s strength granted Peter the luxury of dictating 
the Commonwealth’s position in Eastern European politics, and he opted to keep the 
Commonwealth weak and intervene in its domestic politics to guarantee that Poland-
Lithuania would act as a security buffer for the ascendant empire.281 This served to keep 
the empire's other neighbors adequately placated, as a formal incorporation of 
Commonwealth territory might indicate a dangerous desire for further imperial expansion 
and thereby destabilize the region’s politics, while still allowing Russia to manipulate 
Poland-Lithuania towards Russian interests. 
 With Poland-Lithuania weak vis-a-vis its neighbors, it proved relatively easy to 
maintain the status quo up until the reign of Catherine II. Zawadzki offers an extremely 
negative analysis of Poland-Lithuania's position in the 18th century, emphasizing its 
weakness vis-à-vis its neighbors, its economic stagnation, and cultural and intellectual 
torpor. The Commonwealth was a mostly passive recipient of the politics of the 18th 
century, with Russia, Sweden, and Prussia contesting for dominance, often within Polish 
territory itself (especially during the 7 Years War of 1756-1763, where neutral Poland-
Lithuania was often used as the battleground for Russia and Prussia).282 This weakness 
extended to the political institutions of the Commonwealth, as they discouraged policy 
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changes that would alter the status quo while also providing entry points for avaricious 
foreign powers. Polish law operated in a manner where treaties with foreign powers were 
incorporated into the domestic legal framework, making it easy for foreign powers to use 
such treaties to intervene in Polish politics. The presence of the liberum veto and the 
factionalism between the various magnates also made it easy for foreign powers to 
disrupt reforms or constitutional changes, as they needed to only get one client to break a 
Sejm through the use of the veto.283 The unwise persecution of Orthodoxy within the 
Commonwealth acted as a convenient pretext for Russia to seize more effective control, 
which was the case under the more ambitious policies of Catherine II.284 Altogether, it 
was the institutions that the so-called ‘Noble’s Republic’ took the most pride in that 
helped to prove the Commonwealth’s undoing, such as the elective monarchy, the 
‘Golden Freedoms’, the liberum veto, and the social and economic privileges of the 
szlachta. 
 With the death of King August III in 1763, the magnate families of the szlachta 
positioned themselves to benefit from the next elected monarch, and in some cases angled 
for assistance from Russia and Catherine II. The powerful Czartoryski family in fact 
invited Catherine to guarantee a favorable succession to the Polish throne, thinking that 
would put the ‘Family’ in the position to dominate Polish politics. However, it was 
Catherine who moved to seize the advantage. Stanislaw Poniatowski's election as Polish 
king was due to the interventions of Catherine, who wanted a pliant ruler in Poland-
Lithuania that could act as a minor partner in an expansive security buffer for the Russian 
empire. Poniatowski was selected since it was assumed he could be easily controlled 
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(since he had been a consort of Catherine in 1755), and along with Catherine's other 
clients, could help minimize reform measures that may threaten Russian interests in the 
kingdom.285 Efforts made by the Czartoryskis to reform the Commonwealth, such as by 
abolishing the liberum veto, were thwarted by the Russians. Russian interventions to 
guarantee the religious liberty of Orthodox in Poland-Lithuania also irked the Poles, and 
in this case brought matters to a head when the Confederation of the Bar formed to 
oppose Russian machinations. This was the series of events that eventually resulted in 
Russian intervention and the first partition of 1772.286 
 Poniatowski ended up being less compliant than envisioned, and after efforts were 
made by him and his allies to strengthen Polish central government, Catherine put even 
greater restrictions on Poniatowski through her agent Stackelberg, essentially rendering 
him as a figurehead rather than a real executive authority. The king was no longer 
capable of giving orders to government agencies without being countersigned by the 
highest level official in that agency, and the Sejm was effectively given control over 
those who were theoretically answerable to the king (the Sejm was more easily controlled 
via clients of the Russians).287 Despite these measures, however, the dissatisfaction with 
Russian interference and the weakness of the Commonwealth following the first partition 
produced a consensus among a segment of the szlachta (led by the Czartoryskis) that 
serious changes were necessary if the Commonwealth were to survive. Thus, 
paradoxically, it was during the time period leading up to the removal of Poland-
Lithuania from the European map that the Commonwealth experienced a cultural and 
political renaissance, aiming to sweep away the dysfunction of the old order. 
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 In 1791-2, the Czartoryskis and the king succeeded in finally bringing about 
much-needed reforms for Poland-Lithuania, but the reforms (and the May 3rd 
Constitution) produced immediate opposition from their neighbors, with Russia 
sponsoring the reactionary Targowica Confederacy to oppose the efforts, before finally 
invading once it was no longer occupied with revolutionary France.288 The May 3rd 
Constitution was viewed as an unacceptable strengthening of the Polish government and 
the possible spread of social revolution right next to Russia's borders.289 Although the 
constitution was a relatively conservative one that still retained most of the traditional 
privileges of the szlachta, Catherine had been spooked enough by the French Revolution 
that even moderate changes were seen as threatening to the traditional order. Moreover, 
should the May 3rd Constitution be allowed to stand, it was possible that Poland-
Lithuania could reassert its independence from Tsarist control, making a hash of 
Catherine’s plans to create her ‘Northern System’ security buffer in Europe. Given these 
perceptions, it is not surprising that Catherine opted to invade Poland-Lithuania to assert 
her authority, destroy the constitution, and initiate the second partition, formally granting 
yet more territory to Russia, Prussia, and Austria, leaving the Commonwealth as a small 
rump state. 
 The Third Partition in 1795 finally removed Poland-Lithuania as a political unit 
from the face of Europe, although only the most recalcitrant nobles lost their lands and 
fortunes. The cause behind the partition was the outbreak of a short-lived insurrection led 
by the Polish army officer, Tadeusz Kosciuszko, which sought to reclaim the 
Commonwealth's political autonomy. Although the insurrection enjoyed a couple minor 
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victories at the beginning of the campaign, it was eventually doomed by a combination of 
the overwhelming force of the Russians under Suvorov and divisions within its own 
ranks. Kosciuszko understood that to sustain a rebellion in the face of Russian power, 
Poland-Lithuania needed to mobilize a broad swath of its people, and above all else the 
peasantry. This necessitated the abolition of serfdom and the alleviation of exploitation, 
which Kosciuszko decreed, but which were ultimately blocked by conservative nobles 
concerned about the 'Jacobin' principles that Kosciuszko represented.290 This division 
between the forward-looking elements of the Commonwealth who acknowledged the 
necessity of reforms and the conservatives who distrusted all change as striking against 
their power base would plague Polish-Lithuanian politics in the 19th century as well, 
proving to be a particular problem during the 1830-1 insurrection. Regardless, 
Catherine’s actions firmly ended Peter’s policy of keeping Poland-Lithuania weak but 
independent, and the decision to incorporate Poland-Lithuania into the empire in such a 
way shaped the progression of Polish-Russian relations in the 19th century. It is a fitting 
symbol of the different paths to incorporation that it was actually a pair of Baltic 
Germans (Jakob von Sievers and Otto von Igelstrom) that helped to rule Poland-
Lithuania on Russia’s behalf after the last partition.291 
 In any discussion of Tsarist policies in Poland-Lithuania, the period ranging from 
the creation of the Duchy of Warsaw under Napoleon to the creation of the Congress 
Kingdom in 1815 demands close attention. Although the third partition was intended to 
permanently remove the name of Poland from the European map, a scant two decades 
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later a version of Poland reemerged under the auspices of Napoleon as the Duchy of 
Warsaw. Established in 1807 by the provision of formerly Prussian Polish lands in the 
Treaty of Tilsit, the Duchy offered Poles a chance to achieve national revival, which gave 
most prominent Poles ample reason to switch their allegiance to France rather than 
attempting to work out an alternate arrangement with the partition powers. This support 
was not unanimous, as some well-known families were skeptical of or hostile to 
Napoleon (the Czartoryskis are the best example, as Prince Adam Czartoryski evinced a 
great loathing of the French emperor). 
Once the tide turned against Napoleon, the legacy of the Duchy was one of the 
things that the victors had to contend with, Russia most of all. The other partition powers 
simply wanted a redivision of the lands of the Duchy and a return to the status quo of the 
partitions, but given the hopes inspired by the Duchy, this path offered the potential for 
continual unrest in the Polish lands. Czartoryski and other influential Poles wanted to 
preserve the independence of some Polish unit at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, but 
were faced with the opposition of key Russian officials, the opposition of Prussia and 
Austria, the ambivalence of Britain, the lingering commitment of some Poles to 
Napoleon's cause, and the persistent and strident opposition of Russian elites.292 
Alexander initially hedged on the Polish question, since articulating a definite policy 
could undermine relations with either the Poles or with allies during a critical stage of the 
war, but as the war wound down, he became increasingly solicitous of Polish aspirations 
and closer to Czartoryski’s position. The Tsar’s decision to pursue a semi-independent 
Poland at the Congress of Vienna perturbed Russia’s neighbors and found little support 
from other participants like Britain and France. Thackeray argues that in addition to 
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Alexander’s desire to separate the Poles from Napoleon by offering the regeneration of 
the Polish state, he was also seeking to improve Russia’s position by reasserting the 
traditional use of Poland as a weak buffer state and a potential springboard to future 
expansion. His advisers, Nesselrode in particular, saw this path as a folly that would 
eventually cost the empire great pain, and only serve to antagonize both allies and the 
Russian people.293 Despite these objections, Alexander pursued his stated policy sincerely 
and in one act of generosity to Poland, he decided to allow the Polish army that had 
remained loyal to Napoleon until the end to retain its arms and ranks, and be restored as 
the official army of the Congress Kingdom.294 
 The foundation of the Congress Kingdom of Poland, in perpetual union with the 
Russian Empire, was a watershed moment in Tsarist imperial practices. Although 
previous regions within the Empire had been granted a degree of political and cultural 
autonomy, the provisions of the Congress Kingdom went far beyond even the generous 
terms of incorporation for the Grand Duchy of Finland. The 1815 constitution was a 
liberal document that enshrined the rights of man, even as it confirmed the Tsar’s 
preeminent role in Polish politics. Had it been fully implemented and observed, it would 
have allowed for a relatively autonomous political system with a full range of rights, and 
the possibility of a more federal political structure for the empire as a whole.295 The 
motives for creating Congress Poland were manifold, and some conflicting with others. 
In the first place, Congress Poland was an attempted solution to the unique problem of 
integrating the szlachta - a means of controlling Poland while still affording the nobility 
political power and autonomy. Another motive, which is more questionable given 
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Alexander's hesitations about constitutional rule, was that Poland would become the 
vanguard for future reforms in the rest of the empire.296 The Tsar himself hinted at this 
motivation in public speeches, and some of the tinkering with constitutional reform 
during his reign seems to suggest that this was a sincere intention. However, most of his 
closest advisors saw the combination of imperial autocracy with constitutional monarchy 
as irreconcilable, and when Nicholas I became Tsar in 1825, he directed criticism at this 
kind of fusion, one of the only areas where he disagreed openly with his brother. Even 
then, Nicholas still formally observed the constitution until the 1830 insurrection 
provided the rationale for its elimination. 
 There is disagreement over what Alexander intended to accomplish by granting 
Poland a constitution and working towards a constitution for the empire as a whole. One 
school of thought, reflected by the analysis of Pienkos, argues that Alexander began his 
reign with a view of constitutionalism compatible with the precepts of the Enlightenment. 
This perspective separates Alexander’s reign into a liberal and a reactionary period, with 
the Tsar becoming increasingly disenchanted with the prospects of liberalism as he 
witnessed the outcomes of his policies. In the case of Poland, this argument suggests that 
his initial concessions in the 1815 constitution were sincere, but that he soured on 
constitutionalism in Poland due to the perception of ingratitude among the Poles and the 
machinations of his advisors who wished him to abandon liberalism.297 Unlike Pienkos, 
Thackeray assesses Alexander’s liberal and constitutionalist sentiments as being more in 
keeping with a Rechtstaat rather than a serious limitation on his autocratic power. 
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Constitutionalism was a means of administrative reform, producing a more efficient, law-
governed state, but one in which the tsar would still remain ascendant and unfettered. 
Insofar as this assessment is correct, it would dispel the notion that Alexander was liberal 
early in his reign and reactionary later, but instead it would frame him as a relatively 
consistent realist autocrat.298 Thus, the increasing conflict between Alexander and the 
Poles during the brief lifespan of the Congress Kingdom could be explain as a disjunction 
between different interpretations of constitutionalism, with notable members of the 
szlachta and the Sejm perceiving the 1815 document as an inherent limitation on 
Alexander’s prerogatives as a constitutional monarch. It is impossible to definitively 
resolve this problem as we cannot fully know Alexander’s mind to parse out his 
motivations, but his subsequent decisions in who was to administrate the Congress 
Kingdom seems to support Thackeray’s approach. Marc Raeff makes much the same 
argument in assessing Alexander's views on constitutionalism. Although Alexander 
continued to explore the notion of a constitution for the Tsarist Empire throughout his 
reign, in practice he rejected any plan that would at all circumscribe his autocratic 
power.299 Viewed in light of how he treated constitutionalism in the empire as a whole, 
his conduct with regards to the Congress Kingdom makes sense. 
 The most important appointment made by Alexander after the creation of the 
Congress Kingdom was undoubtedly the appointment of Grand Duke Constantine as the 
head of the Polish military. Constantine was not popular among the Poles, and 
Czartoryski pleaded with Alexander at several points to either reconsider his decision or 
to formally rein in Constantine's scope of power. However, Alexander confirmed his 
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brother's unbridled control over the Polish military, while also granting him considerable 
control over the civilian government, since Constantine was not accountable to the Sejm 
or government ministers and could personally dictate how much of the budget went 
towards the military. At the same time that Alexander made this decision, he also 
surprisingly decided not to appoint Czartoryski as the Governor-General of Poland, who 
had been widely assumed as the obvious person to hold that office.300 Instead, that 
position was granted to General Josef Zajaczek, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars and a 
reformed Jacobin radical. A man of mediocre administrative capability and newfound 
conservative sentiment, Zajaczek's appointment as Governor-General was a dispiriting 
move for Poland, as he clearly had little understanding of constitutionalism and was 
thoroughly subservient to Constantine (and thus willing to abrogate the constitution in his 
name). The troika of Constantine, Zajaczek, and Novosiltsev (who was named Imperial 
Commissioner) as the three most important appointments of early Congress Poland set a 
bad precedent for how the Kingdom was to be viewed and managed by the Tsar.301 
 Although less successful, the incorporation of Poland into the Tsarist empire 
matches closely with the imperial logic of expansion and indirect rule. The state had an 
interest in dismembering its erstwhile rival and using it as a buffer zone for the Russian 
heartland, a strategy that dated back to Peter I but only transitioned to formal territorial 
acquisition under Catherine II. Given the corporate strength of the Polish gentry, the 
szlachta, and the unlikelihood that the Tsarist state could adequately project 
administrative power over the entire territory, the traditional imperial strategy of co-
opting local elites through offering extensive political and economic concessions guided 
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Tsarist policy. Poland's path diverged from the other borderland regions in that its 
incorporation was messy and the szlachta were not as willing as other borderland elites to 
submit to an external ruler. However, Poland's path also diverged due to new ways of 
thinking about politics in the early 19th century, with a greater emphasis on nationality 
and the language of constitutionalism, which Alexander I employed in creating Congress 
Poland. The language of rights and constitutionalism complicated Poland's integration 
due to the heritage of Poland as a semi-constitutional commonwealth where the gentry 
enjoyed predominant power. Although Tsarist Russia would attempt to transition from 
the logic of empire to the logic of the national state over the course of the tumultuous 
19th century, Poland's incorporation offers a glimpse into the conflict of these two logics 
in embryo. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The incorporation of the Western Borderlands into the Tsarist Empire was consistent with 
the logic of state-building in a multiethnic empire, but the strength and disposition of the 
local elites in the borderlands explains the variation in incorporation settlements. 
Although there were other important factors present in each of the borderland cases, a 
significant motivation across all of the cases for the incorporation was geopolitical, with 
the Russian core acquiring a ring of buffer territories between itself and external rivals 
like Sweden, Prussia, and smaller groups like the Crimean Tatars. This motivation was 
regularly articulated as part of Tsarist foreign policy, with Peter's attempts to buttress his 
position in the Great Northern War and Catherine's desired "Northern League." However, 
pursuing this objective was not uncomplicated, as the Tsarist state rarely possessed 
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enough administrative capacity to project direct rule into these territories. Tsarist military 
predominance was not in question, as the Tsarist military generally overmatched local 
forces, but to do so would have required committing substantial resources to the 
subjection and control of these territories. Thus, the policy of seeking to co-opt local 
elites was borne out of a simple cost-benefit analysis where the costs of direct control 
were deemed to be too high when compared to the much lower costs of indirect rule. 
Indirect rule required coming to an understanding with the local elites, and offering 
concessions in the form of political, economic, and cultural autonomy. The objective was 
to acquire adequate loyalty to the state such that state interests could be secured, with 
military force sitting in the background to prevent defection. During times when the state 
enjoyed greater leverage (either through increased state power or favorable geopolitical 
conditions), it took the opportunity to revisit the original agreements and seek 
modifications that permitted greater control (though not so much as to provoke 
opposition from the local elites). 
 This strategy worked very well in the Baltics and Finland, reasonably well in 
Ukraine, and poorly in Poland. In the Baltics and Finland, the entrenched local elites 
were receptive to collaboration with the Tsarist government and in fact used the 
government to help reinforce their position. In Ukraine, incorporation was achieved, but 
not without provoking occasional conflicts with Cossack forces, culminating in the 
"treason" of Hetman Ivan Mazepa during Peter I's reign. In Poland, incorporation was 
almost a complete failure, and there are a few key reasons to explain this different 
outcome. For one, the Baltics, Finland and Ukraine were all peripheral territories to 
Eastern European geopolitics while Poland was itself a major player for a substantial 
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period of time. This was bound to create different political expectations among the local 
elites, the szlachta, which will in part be addressed in the next chapter. However, the 
incorporation of Poland was also complicated by the injection of notions of 
constitutionalism into what had previously been an issue of suzerainty - by granting 
Congress Poland a constitution, the Tsarist state created a different relationship between 
itself and Poland unlike the other borderlands. Finally, the Polish case was complicated 
by a greater disconnect between what was promised - a constitutional order - and what 
was actually imposed. The closely-managed administration under Grand Duke 
Constantine, General Josef Zajaczek and Commissioner Nikolai Novosiltsev did not 
match up with the "lighter touch" employed in the other regions. It created a situation 
where discontent was almost guaranteed to arise, which was heightened by the character 
of the Polish szlachta vis-a-vis the other local elites in the borderlands. 
 The disposition of the local elites towards the Tsarist state can therefore be seen 
as an important variable that helped to determine the character of incorporation. 
However, the strength of those elites must also be considered, with that strength being 
primarily measured through the political and economic power exercised by the elites and 
the presence of coherent corporate institutions. In the Baltics especially the Baltic 
Germans demonstrated the salience of gentry strength through their effective use of local 
government institutions and the Ritterschaften to secure and protect their privileges. The 
Swedish-influenced elite of Finland enjoyed a similar political position, although they did 
not possess the same degree of economic power as the Baltic Germans. Conversely, the 
absence of strength and working institutions helps to explain the inability of the Cossack 
Hetmanate to defend its political privileges. The Cossack starshyna were indisputably the 
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most powerful group in the Hetmanate, but they did not enjoy a long history of 
consolidating their privilege and the Hetmanate itself had relatively underdeveloped 
political institutions. The early defection of the Ruthenian gentry to Polish influence 
helped to create a situation where Ukraine lacked a strong, indigenous gentry that could 
carve out and defend a distinct sphere of influence. Thus, when it came time to bargain 
with the Tsarist state during and after formal incorporation, the Hetmanate was operating 
from a much weaker position than was the case in the Baltics or Finland. The role of local 
elites and their influence during the process of incorporation is the topic of the next 
chapter and will allow us to expand on this line of reasoning. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE INFLUENCE OF LOCAL ELITES IN THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS 
 
If the process of incorporating the Western Borderlands followed the imperial logic of 
providing substantial autonomy in return for state loyalty, the power and disposition of 
the local elites within the individual border territories dictated the character of the 
policies of incorporation. In seeking out reliable local clients willing to observe Tsarist 
interests, the state was interested in several qualities. First, it was seeking clients who 
possessed an adequate enough power base that they could credibly guarantee social 
stability within the border territories. Second, the state was interested in what the local 
elites offered in terms of political and economic expertise, so that they could act as 
effective servitors in Tsarist bureaucracy (thus saving the state from having to dispatch 
Russian officials to govern the territories). Third, the state was interested in consistent 
and predictable cooperation from the local elites, which required relatively minimal 
dissent and the absence of significant factions resisting Tsarist rule. All of these qualities 
were essential to fulfilling the primary objectives of the Tsarist state: the reliable 
extraction of resources in the form of taxation and the provision of enhanced geopolitical 
security. If these basic objectives were met, then the state was willing to countenance a 
substantial degree of political and economic autonomy as payment to the local elites, not 
out of any idealistic motive of self-government, but as a means of avoiding incurring the 
costs of directly governing those territories. 
 Out of all the borderland territories, the Baltic Germans (and the Finnish elites to 
a lesser extent) met these criteria for being effective state clients. The Baltic German 
Ritterschaften had a vested interest in using Tsarist rule to solidify their own political and 
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economic position (since the Baltic Germans were a small minority among the Baltic 
populations of Latvians and Estonians), and they also offered a substantial reserve of 
expertise that the state could tap into (especially compared to the Russian dvorianstvo, at 
least until part way through the 19th century). Their close collaboration with the state is 
demonstrated by the sheer number of Baltic Germans that appeared in high ranked 
positions within the Tsarist bureaucracy. The Finnish elites offered a comparable amount 
of local experience that was essential to Tsarist management of the Grand Duchy of 
Finland, but their smaller numbers meant that they did not penetrate Tsarist bureaucracy 
to the same extent, although they were well-represented in Tsarist military institutions. In 
contrast, the Ukrainian starshyna possessed the same willingness to aid and abet Tsarist 
rule, but as a group they did not possess the same power base or expertise as the Baltic 
Germans. Starshyna incapacity to control the Cossack rank-and-file led to increasingly 
direct control on the part of the Tsarist state, and they were eventually absorbed into the 
Russian dvorianstvo as a lesser partner. Ukrainian names show up among high Tsarist 
officials, but in the secular realm they made less of an impact than the Baltic Germans. 
Instead, as Bushkovitch notes, Ukrainians achieved prominence in the Tsarist Empire in 
the religious realm, extensively influencing the character of Orthodoxy through religious 
writings and supplying a significant portion of the clergy and religious elites.302 Finally, 
the Polish szlachta had the sufficient power base, both politically and economically, to 
act as effective clients of Tsarist rule, but the szlachta were also riven by factions and 
lingering resistance to Tsarist rule. Perceptions of Polish unreliability led to more direct 
efforts on the part of the state to control Polish territory, which only increased the 
resistance among influential parts of the szlachta. This culminated in the ultimate failure 
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of Tsarist incorporation policy when Congress Poland descended into open revolt in 
1830-1. 
 The relationship between the local elites and the Tsarist state mirrors the logic 
that Margaret Levi lays out in explaining the bargaining process conducted between the 
state and internal rivals.303 Although cooperative elites acted in a manner that ended up 
buttressing Tsarist rule, they nevertheless represented the kinds of side-payments that the 
state needed to make to avoid costlier measures of direct rule. Even in the cases where 
Tsarist concessions proved unnecessary or unsuccessful, the state operated under the 
assumption that the extraction of resources to support the state (in the case of the Tsarist 
state, the resources extracted at this early moment were geopolitical advantage and not 
the typical modes of taxation or manpower, though those would come later) justified 
lenient and flexible policies that could be tightened later rather than beginning with strict 
policies that were then loosened. The state made this calculation due to the calculation of 
its own administrative potential for direct rule, what Mann calls 'infrastructural power' 
and what Migdal is talking about when he discusses the process of the state penetrating 
society.304 Although the Tsarist state existed on the high end of the scale of coercion 
presented by Tilly, it had little capitalization that it could use as a tool in ruling peripheral 
territories.305 Since this imbalance between coercion and capital had helped to produce 
the traditional landed estates in Eastern Europe as a way to promote loyalty, it made 
sense for the Tsarist state to extend this socioeconomic bargain to the newly-acquired 
borderlands and their elites, as well as providing limited political rights that were not 
afforded to the gentry of the imperial core. This also corresponds to Gerring, Ziblatt, et 
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al.'s general argument that institutionalization played an important role in deciding 
between direct and indirect rule, although this logic broke down in the Polish-Lithuanian 
case due to the intervening factor of elite orientations in both the imperial center and 
Poland-Lithuania. 
 This process of offering side-payments to internal elite groups to buttress the state 
is also broadly congruent with the role that local elites play in the empire literature, but 
with some important qualifications that are pertinent to the case of the Western 
Borderlands of the Tsarist Empire. As Giddens points out, the bargaining process that 
occurred in Western Europe between states and internal elites eventually acquired a sense 
of equal participation, with the internal elites extracting political concessions from the 
state in return for their loyalty and compliance.306 However, as Eisenstadt (and Giddens) 
identify, there was no such equality in Eastern Europe (or more broadly, territorially-
extensive empires), as states generally avoided making political concessions and instead 
emphasized economic privileges.307 The goal of the imperial state was to weaken internal 
elites and then wed them to the state in a clearly subordinate role, and this was indeed 
what transpired in the Russian core between the imperial state and the dvorianstvo. The 
grant of serfdom and economic autonomy was what the Russian gentry received to 
counterbalance their relative political impotence. But this was not strictly the case in the 
Western Borderlands, as the state offered extensive political concessions alongside the 
traditional economic concessions. These concessions can be understood as an admission 
of the imperial state's weakness at the time of incorporation, and the fact that the state 
sought to revise the agreements in its favor in the future also indicates its political 
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prudence. Nevertheless, by abandoning to at least some extent its traditional overweening 
role, the Tsarist government acknowledged the crucial importance of the borderlands and 
the cooperation of their elites. It is at this point that the strength and cohesion of these 
elites played the most determinative role in carving out and defending a political niche 
within the broader Tsarist Empire. 
 
The Starshyna of Cossack Ukraine 
 
The role of local elites in the lands that would become Ukraine in the period preceding 
and following its incorporation into the Tsarist Empire has notable differences when 
compared to the elites in the Baltics and Poland. The Ruthenian gentry and later the 
Cossack starshyna had fewer and more poorly-developed institutions of representation 
than the Polish szlachta or the Baltic Germans, and their socioeconomic position was 
generally weaker than each of the other reference groups. The Ruthenian gentry during 
the 14th-15th centuries were headed by the princely families that could trace themselves 
back to the Riurikid dynasty, as well as lesser gentry that were similar to the Polish 
szlachta. At this point, noble lineage was still predominantly tied to military service.308 
The Ruthenian gentry lagged behind its Polish brethren in terms of political influence and 
wealth, and one of the major reasons why union with Poland was supported was due to 
the hope that union would lead to the extension of these rights and privileges. Most 
Ruthenian gentry could still be dispossessed of their land by the Grand Prince, and there 
were few constraints on royal power similar to the various bargains between the Polish 
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szlachta and their kings.309 The Ruthenian gentry still controlled most of the landed 
wealth of the territory and had several notable families that mirrored the magnates of 
Poland-Lithuania, but their level of political influence prior to joining the Commonwealth 
was limited by the lack of corporate or estate institutions similar to the Polish Sejm or the 
Baltic German Ritterschaften. 
 Rather than move to develop institutions along these lines, the Ruthenian gentry 
instead sought to align itself with the Polish szlachta. This process accelerated after 
Poland successfully absorbed the territories that would become the basis of Ukraine, 
offering the Ruthenian gentry a common political framework under which they could 
pursue their aspirations. The appeal of the Polish nobility and their culture caused a 
general trend towards the Polonization of the Ruthenian nobility, with the adoption of 
Roman Catholicism, extensive intermarriage, and the desire to shrug off the reputation of 
an 'inferior' culture, as Orthodox culture was considered by its Polish peers. The loss of 
the Ruthenian gentry to assimilation removed the largest potential source of leadership 
for the territories, and opened the way to the emergence of the Cossacks.310 There 
remained a significant number of influential Orthodox gentry, but they had also become 
largely integrated into the institutions of Poland-Lithuania. The ruling elites of Poland-
Lithuania, for their part, did not discourage this attempt at social mobility, and 
successfully assimilated Ruthenian gentry did end up enjoying privileges similar to the 
Golden Freedoms. However, the ruling elites of the Commonwealth also used these 
aspirations to their advantage by frequently offering up tracts of land in the territories of 
Ukraine to the Polish szlachta, undermining the economic base of the indigenous 
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Ruthenian gentry. In Right-Bank Ukraine, where this process was able to proceed more 
extensively, Polish szlachta ended up controlling most land and became a target of hatred 
for the the local peasantry (a fact that the Tsarist government would exploit when it 
gained control over Right-Bank Ukraine following the partitions of Poland-Lithuania). 
 The Cossacks came to prominence as a social estate during the late 16th and early 
17th centuries in the territories that would comprise Ukraine. The Cossacks, free men, 
were tasked with protecting the border against Tatar raids, and provided a ready source of 
manpower for Poland-Lithuania during wartime. However, they also proved difficult to 
control and regularly rebelled against Polish-Lithuanian rule, leading to attempts to make 
registers for the Cossacks to restrain their numbers. Most of these efforts were 
unsuccessful.311 Since the primary recruiting grounds for the Cossack host was the 
peasantry, the Cossacks possessed a hostile attitude towards the Poland-Lithuania and the 
szlachta. In addition to this socioeconomic hostility, the Cossacks also arrayed 
themselves against Poland-Lithuania in religious terms, seeking to defend the Orthodox 
faith and to eliminate or escape the Union of Brest of 1596 that had destroyed the basis of 
Catholic-Orthodox coexistence in the Commonwealth.312 This disposition made the 
Cossacks less amenable to inducements similar to those given to the Ruthenian gentry, 
although Cossack rights and privileges did gradually expand in the 16th and 17th 
centuries due to their important military role in the frontier-lands. Despite these attempts 
to either gain the loyalty of the Cossacks or restrict their growth as a social estate, 
tensions remained and helped to contribute to a series of insurrections and uprisings 
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within Ukraine during the first half of the 17th century.313 The unsteady relationship 
between the Cossacks and the szlacta and the conflicts that arose from that relationship 
act as a preamble to the great uprising of 1648 that led to the creation of the Hetmanate. 
 The 1648 uprising and the subsequent separation from Poland-Lithuania and 
union with Muscovy fundamentally changed the Ukrainian lands, although some 
remnants of the old order were able to find a place in the Hetmanate. After the great 
revolt of Khmelnitsky, two different paths emerged for the Hetmanate. The first path was 
represented by the mass of Cossackdom, which represented as many of half of adult 
males in the Hetmanate during the time period. The egalitarian traditions of the Cossacks, 
the freeing of peasant laborers and the removal of labor obligations fundamentally 
changed social relations. The second path was the elitist direction represented by the 
starshyna, the Cossack officers, who sought to aggrandize their own power and become a 
new Ukrainian elite. Over time, the elitist strain won out since Hetmans were drawn from 
the officer corps and saw little reason to rein in the power creep.314 The new elite formed 
after the 1648 rebellion fused the old Ukrainian szlachta with the new Cossack officer 
elites. In the Hetmanate, the locus of gentry power could be found in Cossack 
organizations, including the Society of Notable Military Fellows, which was split into 
three branches (Fellows of the Standard, Military Fellows, and Fellows of the Banner in 
order of hierarchical importance). Government positions in the Hetmanate were generally 
filled by selecting candidates from within this grouping.315 Ruthenian gentry who styled 
themselves after the Polish szlachta did poorly in the new Hetmanate unless they had 
sided with the Cossacks, and even then their privileges were under threat by the new 
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Cossack elite. Moreover, the Ruthenian szlachta were very small in number (especially 
compared to Poland's szlachta), making them a less important client group.316 
 The emergence of the starshyna as a new social elite in the Hetmanate had 
important consequences both for the Hetmanate and for relations between the Hetmanate 
and the Tsarist Empire. Within the Hetmanate, the starshyna evolved in a direction 
similar to the Ruthenian szlachta, through the gradual accumulation of landholdings and 
economic power over poorer Cossacks and peasants. To reward 'loyal' Cossack officers, 
the Hetmanate often resorted to the practice of rewarding officers with extensive land 
grants. As part and parcel of these grants, the Hetmanate also obligated peasants residing 
on these lands to engage in 'habitual' service to their new landlords, essentially 
reconstructing the old lord-peasant relationship present before the 1648 uprising.317 
According to Orest Subtelny, by the 18th century this privileged economic position had 
been firmly cemented, with roughly 1% of the Hetmanate's population (the starshyna) 
controlling over 50% of privately-owned land.318 This economic realignment also 
resurrected the presence of a magnate class, with influential Cossack families owning 
quantities of land that dwarfed the rest of the elite. This position was simultaneously 
secured by the fact that the starshyna monopolized political power by controlling nearly 
all the posts in the Hetmanate and the Society of Notable Military Fellows, from which 
Hetmans were selected. By dominating in both the political and economic realm, the 
starshyna became the only important client group for the Tsarist Empire, which led to 
policies intended to placate the starshyna to guarantee their acquiescence to Russian 
dominance. 
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 Despite their preponderance of power within the Hetmanate, the starshyna did not 
possess adequate institutional leverage to resist the expansion of Muscovite control, and 
in many circumstances they welcomed it. Although the institutions of the Zaporozhian 
Host and the Hetmanate approximated the institutions of a sovereign state, the starshyna 
themselves lacked the specialization necessary to develop these institutions, especially 
when compared to the fully developed corporate institutions found in the Baltics, Finland, 
and Poland-Lithuania. The starshyna fulfilled military, administrative, and judicial 
functions, but these functions all resided within the fraternal framework of the Cossack 
Host and did not develop into independent bureaucratic structures (although efforts 
towards this end were expended under the Hetmanate of Ivan Mazepa in the early 18th 
century).319 Combined with the fact that the Hetmanate lacked formal sovereignty, the 
starshyna tended to look towards the Tsarist Empire and the Tsar for the preservation of 
their privileges. Changes in the 18th century, primarily under Catherine II, reinforced this 
tendency as the prerogatives of the Hetmanate were attacked in the name of imperial 
unity. The only group that could have offered a source of resistance to imperial expansion 
had little interest in sincerely defending the autonomy of the Hetmanate. 
 Catherine II's reforms in the 1770s and 1780s, paired with the abolition of the 
Hetmanate itself, cemented the defection of the starshyna. The 1775 Statute of the 
Provinces opened the way for Cossack elites to be included in the Russian dvorianstvo, 
posing them with a fairly straightforward choice between autonomy and imperial favor. 
The autonomist movement was relatively weak, so the only secure path available for 
most of the gentry was to seek dvorianin status and enter into state service.320 The final 
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1783 enserfment of the Ukrainian peasantry and the 1785 Charter to the Nobility 
consolidated the starshyna's new position within the empire, granting them rights similar 
to the dvorianstvo. Careers in the imperial government also opened up, and many 
Ukrainians (though not nearly as many as the Baltic Germans) reached high levels in 
Tsarist government in the 18th and 19th century.321 As Velychenko notes, it can be 
difficult to get accurate numbers for Ukrainians serving in the government due to the 
inconsistency of reporting on ethnic or national groups, at least until the 1897 census, and 
due to the fact that many "Little Russians" did not identify as being distinct from 
Russians, leading to a blurring of lines between the groups.322 However, based on a 
variety of records, Velychenko finds that Ukrainians represented a substantial portion of 
Tsarist officials in regions that formerly comprised the Hetmanate, although Russians 
remained the dominant group and increased their dominance over the course of the 19th 
century (additionally, non-trivial numbers of Germans and Poles also served as 
administrators in Ukrainian regions, reaffirming the heterogeneous character of the 
Tsarist bureaucracy).323 The changes were not universally positive for the starshyna, 
however. The most influential and powerful benefited from the new arrangement with the 
Tsarist government, but a large number of the poorer gentry lost their status, while a 
number of groups were reduced to the category of state peasants. Towns in the 
Hetmanate and clergy were also affected, as the provincial reforms undercut the 
Madgeburg Law that had prevailed in the towns, and the Ukrainian clergy lost the right to 
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own land.324 The effect of these changes was to make the Hetman social system conform 
to imperial Russia's own social structure, undermining the idiosyncratic position of the 
Cossacks, who lost most of their old power and influence. This same process also 
occurred in Right Bank Ukraine in the late 18th-early 19th century, with the attack being 
directed at the economic and political power base of the Polish szlachta. In Right Bank 
Ukraine, over 70,000 Polish nobles out of 410,000 were reduced in status by the imperial 
government in the early 19th century. This number expanded in subsequent years as the 
Tsarist government sought to root out noblemen who had used a variety of methods to 
protect their status from the revision. This was a crucial step in undermining local elites 
in Right Bank Ukraine and extending imperial influence.325 
 Rather than act as a bulwark for an autonomous Hetmanate, the starshyna instead 
acted in a manner that made assimilation and expansion easier for the Tsarist 
government. Zenon Kohut attributes this outcome to several factors present in the 
starshyna that differentiated them from other borderland elites. Arguably the most 
important was the underdeveloped nature of the starshyna, which lacked the long gentry 
traditions and corporate institutions of the szlachta and the Baltic Germans. However, 
cultural and linguistic similarities between the starshyna and Russians also played a role, 
as the starshyna were not as clearly different as the Baltic Germans with their German 
language and Protestantism or the szlachta with their Polish language and Catholicism.326 
These points of commonality made assimilation easier, as many starshyna did not even 
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identify as being distinct from Russians (hence the term Malorussian, or Little Russian, to 
refer to Ukrainians in the 19th century). This should not lead to the conclusion that 
assimilation and integration occurred without resistance, as the Hetmanate did indeed 
resist the expansion of imperial control up until its abolition. But it does help explain why 
a consistent opposition group did not really emerge from the starshyna, leaving 
individual Hetmans without a consistent source of support for resisting imperial control. 
As we will see in exploring the process of administrative centralization in Hetman 
Ukraine, this was to be a key factor during the absorption of the Hetmanate into the rest 
of the empire. 
 
The Baltic Germans and Finnish Elites 
 
The Baltic German gentry of Livland and Estland (contemporary Latvia and Estonia) 
originated as the German-speaking vassals of the Catholic Church and the Livonian 
Order (which was connected to the Teutonic Knights).327 With the success of Christian 
conversion efforts in the Baltics and the decline of the Knights, the Baltic Germans 
became the landholding estate that exercised both political and economic control in the 
Baltic territories. When the Baltics came under Swedish control, this arrangement did not 
change significantly, as the Swedish monarchy confirmed Baltic German estate privileges 
in several charters during the course of the 17th century, which provided for the 
continuation of the Baltic Landtag as the primary decision-making body in the 
territories.328 Swedish control over the Baltic territories relied upon the cooperation of the 
Livonian elites, who had the tendency to resist crown dictates and frustrate royal 
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interests. The monarchy could not push too hard, however, as it feared that the Baltic 
Germans could easily shift their loyalties to a competing power such as Poland-Lithuania 
or Tsarist Russia.329 Until the reduktion (Sweden's effort to regain some control over the 
landed property of the Baltics by assessing proper ownership and extracting financial 
compensation to sell the land back to the original owners), the monarchy had a difficult 
time asserting administrative control over the Baltics, since the number of Swedish 
administrators was limited and were heavily reliant on local, German officials, for their 
day-to-day operations.330 
 When the Baltics passed to de facto Russian control in 1710, the terms of Baltic 
capitulation provided the Baltic Germans with a guarantee of continued control alongside 
a removal of the hated reduktion. As the previous chapter detailed, the terms of 
incorporation were largely driven by Tsarist Russia's geopolitical interests, but the Baltic 
Germans and their organizations can also help to explain Peter's willingness to provide 
extensive concessions. In his efforts to reform the empire to be able to compete more 
effectively with external rivals, Peter saw Baltic German (and Swedish) administrative 
structures as an attractive model for the reorganization of the imperial bureaucracy. He 
attempted to translate the urban guilds present in the Baltics into the Russian context 
(mostly unsuccessfully) and saw the potential for extending Baltic structures to provincial 
administration.331 And given the administrative skills of the Baltic Germans themselves, 
Peter was willing to provide the flexibility so that the Baltic territories could act as a 
model for later reforms.332 The Baltic Germans were well-organized, but it was also 
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unlikely they could pose a serious threat to the empire if given a significant amount of 
autonomy. By the end of the 18th century, there were 4,700 landed estates in the Baltics, 
though not all were owned by the members of the Ritterschaften and most of them were 
rather modest in size. In contrast to Lithuania and Poland, there were no magnates with 
enormous estates, but rather a larger number of gentry with significant holdings.333 
 The administrative reality underlying the capitulation agreement was that it would 
have been too costly for the empire to impose its will on the Baltics, mainly due to the 
corporate strength of the Baltic German gentry. As Bartlett puts it, by gaining control 
over the Baltics, Russia acquired territories with a “strongly-developed, self-conscious 
and well-organized political system of local administrative and judicial autonomy, and 
privileged landholding.”334 The Ritterschaften and the provincial Diets were effective and 
long-lived institutions designed to assert Baltic German control over the economic and 
political life of the peasants.335 The Baltic Germans stood as the only effective guarantors 
of order in the newly-acquired territories, and had Russia sought to supplant them, it 
would have required substantial resource expenditure, which was not possible in the 
context of a continuing war against Sweden. Peter recognized this state of affairs and 
made the Baltic privileges contingent on confirmation by each successive ruler of the 
empire, presumably with the thought that the terms of incorporation could eventually be 
revisited and amended in the empire’s favor. The Baltic Germans tried to have the 
privileges codified into permanent law, establishing influential lobbies in Petersburg and 
making alliances with political figures in the imperial center, but they were ultimately 
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unsuccessful in this venture.336 In the near term, however, this effort proved to be 
unnecessary, as Baltic privileges would not be seriously threatened until the reign of 
Catherine II. After Peter I, the Baltics were able to consolidate their position due to a 
succession of weak rulers in Petersburg, even though some (such as Anne) were not 
sympathetic to their position.337 
 The relative corporate strength of the Baltic Germans was mirrored by the relative 
inability of the Tsarist bureaucracy to assert control over the imperial periphery. The 
condition of 'maloliude' (dearth of people) was what led Russia to rely on non-Russians 
to administer borderland territories more so than any principled commitment to autonomy 
and traditional privileges. Tsarist Russia simply lacked the educated expert classes 
necessary to administrate a far-flung empire, at least until the last decades of the 
empire.338 Dating from the reign of Ivan III, Tsarist bureaucracy relied at least tacitly on 
the participation of non-Russians, though the particular identity of the non-Russians 
shifted over time (Germans remained prominent throughout, but Ukrainians, Finns, and 
Poles all played a part as well).339 Baltic Germans took advantage of this situation more 
thoroughly than other subject populations in the empire, and used their service to the state 
as a means to build a bulwark against the revocation of the privileges granted in the 1710 
incorporation. This is demonstrated by the number of notable Baltic Germans that served 
with distinction in the Russian government and military, including Lievens, Pahlens, 
Third Section head Alexander Benckendorff, Kleinmichels, etc. This service, and the 
privileged position of the Baltic Germans in the empire also eventually provoked 
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resentment among ethnic Russians, as evidenced by General Ermolov's potentially 
apocryphal request to Alexander I to be promoted to the rank of German.340 Beyond 
prominent Baltic Germans, the sheer number of servitors is also impressive, as Hosking 
remarks that government documents from the 19th century indicate that around 18% of 
Tsarist administrators were of German origin, with the vast majority of those coming 
from the Baltic region.341 It is hard to know how accurate this figure is due to the nature 
of Tsarist records, though. As John Armstrong notes, the Baltic Germans enjoyed 
influence and success in disproportion to their numbers, but this does not mitigate the 
influence of non-Baltic Russian Germans who also served in significant numbers.342 
Moreover, it does not necessarily record the presence of non-Baltic Germans who were 
granted title in the Baltic gentry by the Imperial government.343 
 The Baltic Germans took advantage of Peter's flexibility during incorporation to 
turn themselves into a closed estate to help consolidate their political and economic 
power. The formal register of gentry status, the Matrikul, was established in 1728, and 
only gradually expanded over the course of the 18th century (in contrast to the rapid 
growth of the Russian dvorianstvo). The Baltics were nominally governed by Tsarist 
Governors-General, but in practice the Gov-Gens spent little time in the territories and 
administration was left to local officials and conducted in German, the language of the 
elite. The Baltic Germans took advantage of their protected position to formalize many 
aspects of their control over the peasantry, generally by increasing labor obligations and 
reducing any sort of protections the peasants may have vis-a-vis their lords. Tsarist 
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officials still conducted inspection tours, but these were infrequent and made little 
impact. As Plakans judges, the Tsarist government would not have been able to alter the 
status quo substantially at this point short of flooding the territories with Russian 
administrators.344 Furthermore, as Bartlett notes, the Baltic Germans also occupied a 
guiding role in church and educational administration, giving them another source of 
control over life in the Baltic territories. The Tsarist government left intact Baltic Church 
laws until 1832, and the Baltic Germans exercised strong influence over Lutheran church 
organizations due to the role of the Landtag in selecting local pastors. Baltic lobbying 
also secured the reestablishment of the University of Dorpat in 1801, providing additional 
opportunities for gentry youth.345 
 Catherine’s efforts at administrative Russification were modeled on reforms 
undertaken throughout the empire, and which were designed to strengthen central rule 
within the Russian provinces. As such, the efforts were hardly a singling out of Baltic 
privileges, but instead part of a larger program of asserting tighter imperial control over 
the territory of the empire. Following the provincial reforms of 1775, Catherine 
cautiously moved to extend these reforms to the Baltics, but did so in a way to minimize 
the opposition of the Ritterschaften. The Ritterschaften proved intransigent, so Catherine 
opted for a more rapid reform, also implementing versions of the Charters to the Towns 
and Nobility, which struck at the political power base of the Baltic Germans.346 As in the 
Russian provinces, the reforms were designed to establish provincial government 
administrations that were more responsive to the central government, while also making 
the local elites more accountable. In both Russia and the Baltics, this threatened the 
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traditional assumption that the landholders and aristocracy were free to administer their 
domains as they saw fit, so long as they complied with Tsarist law. The reforms in the 
Baltics were premature however, as the empire did little to codify law and introduce more 
civil servants to oversee the transition, making the reforms vulnerable to reversal, which 
duly occurred when Paul I ascended to power, though Paul did include the traditional 
provision that such privileges could be revoked by future Tsars.347 As mentioned in the 
second chapter, the reforms also failed in the Russian provinces for much the same 
reason, as inadequate resources and manpower were allotted to the task of overseeing 
government reform, leaving local elites free to disregard or skirt the provisions of the 
law. However, this problem was amplified further in the case of the Baltic Germans, as 
the gentry and landholders in the interior of the empire could not compare to the 
organizational resources or political activism of the Baltic Germans.348 In fact, it is 
notable that the Russian gentry only achieved a roughly comparable level of privilege as 
the Baltic Germans when Catherine promulgated the Charter to the Nobility in 1785, as 
the document firmly established property rights and created protections for the gentry 
against the autocracy, such as the proscription of corporal punishment.349 
 Although Finland received similar (in fact, more generous) grants of autonomy, 
and was added to the empire after a successful war with Sweden, the Finnish elites 
differed significantly from the Baltic Germans. Although there was a gentry in Finland, it 
was relatively weaker and less organized, and did not have the benefit of the institution of 
serfdom. As a result, the character of the gentry was more fluid, as it did not make an 
effort similar to the Baltic Matrikul to create a closed elite. By the end of the 18th 
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century, there were roughly 15,000 "persons of quality" in Finland, according to Kirby. 
Included in this ambiguous classification were the gentry (only around 2,000 persons), 
military officers, clergy and spiritual leaders, and the educated. Service to the state was 
essential to retain social standing.350 Like the Baltics, however, the Finnish elite were 
generally held in low esteem by the Finnish peasantry, and so the elite benefited from a 
patron willing to protect their interests. The gentry were distrusted by the common 
people, who generally supported the Swedish monarchy and opposed Russian designs on 
the region. During the outbreak of Russian attacks, there were fears of gentry treachery 
and collaboration with the Russians, since the gentry were far more ambivalent about the 
Swedish connection.351 As Andreas Kappeler notes, this distrust was warranted given the 
fact that Russophilism became prevalent among younger elites near the end of the 18th 
century, making a section of the gentry open to the possibility of a Russian connection.352 
 During the time period when Finland became part of the Tsarist Empire, 
Alexander I made a conscious effort to conciliate Finnish elites, including allowing 
Finnish officers to retain their salaries and position despite the dissolution of the Finnish 
regiments, and by guaranteeing the preservation of traditional rights and privileges. 
Finnish insecurity with the arrangement also led to the successful lobbying for the 
creation of a Committee for Finnish Affairs that would advise imperial officials and 
guarantee a direct channel of influence to the crown.353 The majority of the Finnish elite 
were satisfied with the autonomy provided to the Grand Duchy by Russia, especially 
since it greatly exceeded the autonomy that had been possessed under Sweden. There 
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were attempts to extend this autonomy by portraying the 1809 Porvoo Diet as a kind of 
constitutional moment, but these efforts were restricted to Fennoman activists until the 
end of the 19th century.354 Moreover, while Baltic Germans served in the civilian 
bureaucracy in large numbers, for Finnish elites the military bureaucracy was the more 
common path. As part of the effort to provide the Finnish elite with an avenue of service 
to the crown, Alexander I established the Finnish Cadet Corps, which provided 
educational and career opportunities for gentry youth, many of whom ended up serving as 
officers in the imperial army.355 The upshot of these efforts was that the Tsarist 
government effectively entrenched a local elite in Finland much like in the Baltics. The 
native officials that were empowered by St. Petersburg comprised a small, almost 
familial, network of elites which sought to jealously guard against any changes to the 
status quo. Their conservatism acted as a convenient bulwark against social change that 
may have disrupted stability in Finland, but also served to frustrate Tsarist efforts at 
reform, since the bureaucrats were generally in a position to stymie such efforts despite 
the opposition of the Governor General, the State Secretary, or even the Tsar himself.356 
 This ‘honeymoon’ period of autonomy lasted far longer in Finland than in other 
parts of the empire, and consequently Finland avoided most serious Russification efforts 
until 1899 when Petersburg had already decided to embark on a generalized policy of 
Russification. Part of the reason why the honeymoon period lasted as long as it did was 
due to the adept political management of Finnish officials, who sought to prevent 
developments that could provoke the Tsarist government’s ire. Another important 
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component was the Governor-General appointed to Finland as the Tsar’s representative, 
but that will be covered more in-depth in the next chapter. The most likely source of 
conflict between Finland and the empire was the perception that Finland existed apart 
from the rest of the empire (a fact that nationalists pointed out not only in the case of the 
Baltics, as with Yuri Samarin, but also in the case of Finland). Since learning Russian 
was not made mandatory for Finns, few bothered to learn the language in favor of the 
more common Finnish or Swedish, and a similar difficulty attended harmonizing Finnish 
laws with those of the empire, as the empire simply didn't have the requisite number of 
officials to base in Finland to oversee such a process.357 Finnish elites, sensing the 
unpopularity of their position, took pragmatic steps to improve Finland's image, including 
teaching Russian in Finnish schools, and strengthening economic ties between Finland 
and Russia. They also kept close control over domestic dissent or agitation, viewing such 
provocations as potentially damaging to Finland's position within the empire.358 This 
strategy of attempting to keep conflicts under wraps proved successful during the early 
decades of Finland’s incorporation in the empire, though it would become increasingly 
untenable as the same process of national consciousness that occurred in the Baltics also 
occurred in Finland. However, at least for the period ranging from the 1830s (when some 
of the first threats of Russification emerged due to the Polish revolt) to the 1870s, these 
tactics helped to consolidate Finland’s separate status and an emergent sense of Finnish 
national identity. When Petersburg finally turned to Russify Finland, it would find that 
this separation had cultivated a greater potential for resistance and unrest in the small 
Grand Duchy. 
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 Unlike Ukraine, where the local gentry proved incapable of maintaining political 
autonomy and were instead eventually absorbed into the Russian dvorianstvo, the Baltic 
Germans and Finnish elites proved more adept at carving out and defending their own 
niche in the imperial structure. A large part of this was due to the superior administrative 
organizations and skills of these elites, versus the ill-defined structures of the Cossack 
Hetmanate, providing the Baltic Germans and Finnish elites with more entrenched social 
positions while simultaneously offering an attractive skill set for imperial service. This is 
not meant to imply that their position was unassailable, however, as Russian tsars 
reserved the right to revisit the incorporation agreements and the elites relied on the 
Tsarist government to a large extent to secure their local position vis-a-vis distrusting or 
discontented peasants. However, as Bartlett argues in the Baltic case, this weakness was 
mitigated by Baltic German loyalty to the crown, the willingness to serve in the Tsarist 
bureaucracy, and Baltic control over local affairs.359 The experience in Finland was 
similar, with a conservative bureaucratic elite ensuring social stability, providing quality 
military service to the empire, and offering substantial local expertise to Tsarist 
administrators. As such, the character of the Baltic German and Finnish gentry 
fundamentally shaped the terms of incorporation into the empire, and led these territories 
down a different path than Hetman Ukraine. 
 
The Polish Szlachta 
 
One of the most remarkable elements of Poland-Lithuania that differentiated it from the 
other borderlands was the character of its gentry. Like the Baltic Germans, the Polish 
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szlachta enjoyed extensive political and economic privileges, but unlike the Baltic 
Germans, they enjoyed these privileges within the context of independence from 
overweening imperial or monarchical institutions. The szlachta were also unique in terms 
of numbers. The szlachta constituted between 8-10% of Poland, which was several times 
more than the aristocracies of other European states. This size was the result of the loose 
record-keeping done by the Commonwealth, allowing individuals to claim noble 
background on shaky grounds. It was reinforced by the legal tradition of equality between 
nobles, even if in practice there were large socioeconomic divides between the poorer, 
landless nobles and the wealthy magnates.360 Throughout Poland-Lithuania, it was the 
magnates who dominated politics, making up around 5-10% of the szlachta. Nearly 90% 
of nobles either owned only their own demesne or little to no land, with unreliable 
incomes. The magnates could rely on large, diversified estates that consistently brought 
in high incomes, even during times of war.361 Fully 40% of the szlachta owned no land 
whatsoever, and were consigned to relative poverty, even at the same time they still 
nominally had access to the ‘golden freedoms’ so cherished by the nobility of the 
Commonwealth. The privileges enjoyed by the szlachta provided them with a position of 
dominance over not only the peasantry, but over ethnic and religious minorities within 
the territory of the Commonwealth (as most szlachta were Catholic Poles). As such, 
Polish landlords administered territories populated by Poles, Jews, Lithuanians, 
Belorussians, and Ukrainians. These ethnic inequalities contributed to tensions between 
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the Poles and other groups, especially in the case of the Cossacks, who rebelled against 
szlachta rule on several occasions.362 
 The political position of the szlachta was also unlike that of other European 
nobilities, in that they had been successful in binding the kings of Poland to the will of 
the nobility. This position of dominance extended far back into Polish history, and had 
been considerably deepened by Poland’s conflicts with its neighbors in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. After 1374, the nobility gained many freedoms, including freedom from 
taxation, the understanding that no major legislation would be enacted without their 
consent, the placing of judicial institutions under their influence, as well as countless 
economic benefits including tying the peasants to the land and forbidding townsmen to 
purchase landed property. After 1572, the Henrician Articles which established the 
constitutional order of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and each subsequent pacta 
conventa helped to extend and entrench these 'golden freedoms'.363 Also enshrined within 
the ‘golden freedoms’ was the understanding that if any monarch should break the pacta 
conventa, then the szlachta were empowered to form a confederation to oppose that 
monarch and even capable of dethroning the king to guarantee a more pliant successor.364 
The ideology that the szlachta used to assert and defend their superiority was 
Sarmatianism - a mythos of cultural and racial superiority developed in the 16-17th 
centuries that traced the roots of the szlachta back to Sarmatian steppe peoples that 
migrated from the lower Volga to populate the area that would become Poland during the 
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first centuries of the Christian era.365 As Janusz Tazbir notes, Sarmatianism performed an 
important integrating function for the szlachta, who were able to legitimize their position 
in the Commonwealth by reference to a glorious past, a past that conveniently 
disassociated the szlachta from the peasantry.366 Sarmatianism complicated the ability of 
the szlachta to respond to political problems in the Commonwealth and to reform 
dysfunctional institutions and acted as a significant counterweight to the Polish 
Enlightenment that emerged shortly before the partitions.367 
 The end result of the position of the szlachta and their golden freedoms was that 
while they were effectively unchallenged by other segments of the population, they were 
nevertheless fractured in competition with one another. This especially marked the 
powerful magnate families, as it was almost unheard of to achieve unanimity among the 
upper nobility on any issue. Inevitably, when a conflict emerged between magnates, it 
would generally end with one side or another invoking the liberum veto and forcing the 
dissolution of the Sejm. Pressing political issues could sometimes be handled through the 
convocation of a confederation, since it avoided the veto rules of the Sejm, but this did 
not ameliorate the dysfunction of the system as a whole. The magnates could articulate 
political positions based on their self-interest, but a regard for the Commonwealth as a 
whole was a mostly foreign concept.368 The wealthy szlachta were also unchallenged in 
the economic sphere, as the economic privileges they enjoyed guaranteed that no other 
segment of the population could adequately compete with them. While in other European 
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societies towns and merchants had begun to challenge the economic dominance of the 
traditional landed gentry, restrictions placed on town dwellers ensured this would not be 
the case in Poland. Moreover, the landed szlachta also experienced fewer peasant revolts 
than in other systems, mainly due to the small and scattered nature of peasant villages 
within szlachta estates. Expressions of discontent were more common on larger estates, 
but the resources of the magnates made it relatively easy to suppress outward 
manifestations of peasant dissent.369 
 These were the political and economic conditions that the Tsarist authorities faced 
when Poland was incorporated into the empire during and after the partitions, and the 
different circumstances of the szlachta undermined the effectiveness of Tsarist policies. 
Imperial officials faced the same problems in integrating Poland-Lithuania that they had 
in integrating other borderland regions - namely, reaching a 'modus vivendi' with the 
local elites so that favorable terms of governance could be established. However, unlike 
other local elites, the szlachta had possessed substantial political power, and as Kappeler 
argues, were unwilling to completely abandon their past independence and potency.370 
Pursuing their traditional strategy of co-opting local elites, the Tsarist authorities met 
with success in peripheral areas like Courland, but experienced considerable difficulties 
in the Polish core. The Courland gentry ended up following the Baltic model and when 
the empire gained control over Courland, Catherine II appointed a Governor-General and 
punished those members of the Courland gentry that had opposed submission. Despite 
this assertion of imperial prerogative, however, the order in Courland remained for the 
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most part unchanged from previous arrangements.371 However, the divisions in Poland-
Lithuania between the szlachta and the lower classes guaranteed that while the Poles 
would not accept Russian rule as in the other borderlands, they could also not manage to 
shake it off. Hosking explains that this was the reason why Poland became the 'festering 
sore' on the Tsarist body politic.372 
 After the partitions, Tsarist policy under Paul I and Alexander I largely followed 
the traditional policy of conciliating local elites in the borderlands, although this policy 
was interrupted by the emergence of Napoleonic France and the eventual creation of the 
Duchy of Warsaw in 1807. Paul reversed the attempted centralization of his mother, 
Catherine II, in the borderlands and had allowed the Polish and Lithuanian legal system 
to remain intact while also preserving szlachta dominance in local government. 
Alexander I continued and deepened this approach, partly due to his friendship with the 
Polish magnate Adam Czartoryski, and allowed Poland to retain its cultural dominance in 
Lithuania and Belorussia through the establishment of the Vilna educational district in 
1802.373 In his memoirs, Czartoryski praises Alexander's educational reforms as 
fundamentally changing the basis of education in the Empire, while his own experience 
as curator of the Vilna district demonstrated the freedom of action that he enjoyed in 
making appointments and structuring the new institutions.374 Through these policies, 
Russia emerged as the most tolerant and flexible of the partition powers and earned some 
esteem among the szlachta. However, this esteem was challenged by the Napoleonic 
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creation of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807, because although the szlachta were not 
necessarily happy with the terms of its creation, it still provided for the possibility of the 
rebirth of a Polish state.375 Alexander could have countered this splitting of Polish 
loyalties by making further concessions to the szlachta still under Russian control, but he 
vacillated despite Czartoryski's constant urgings and only made an offer of reuniting the 
Polish state in 1811 (which the leader of the Duchy, Jozef Poniatowski, duly reported to 
Napoleon).376 When Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, the szlachta were mainly 
ambivalent and adopted a wait-and-see attitude.377 
This support was not surprising given the position that the Polish nobility enjoyed 
under the Duchy. The szlachta benefited under Napoleonic rule, as despite the principles 
of the French revolution, Napoleonic policy actually helped to reinforce traditional noble 
dominance. This was encapsulated by the special privileges provided to the nobility 
through the Duchy's constitution and the continued noble predominance in the Sejm and 
Senate.378 The implementation of the Code Napoleon would also seem to be a threat to 
szlachta dominance, given its abolition of serfdom and the principle of meritocracy in 
determining who held government office, but even this threat was illusory. The abolition 
of serfdom was a mostly nominal change that still allowed landholders to exploit peasant 
labor, a fact of life that would only change when the Polish peasantry was emancipated 
by the Tsarist government in 1863 to undermine support for the Polish insurrection. 
Moreover, the privileged position of the szlachta gave them an advantage over other 
sectors of the population, making their continued monopoly over government offices an 
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easy proposition.379 Finally, the Duchy, and the 19th century in general, worked to 
reinforce the power of the magnates since their estates were diversified and possessed 
more resources, while the ravages of war and partition damaged smaller landholders the 
most of all (due to market disruptions and peasant deaths, mainly). This caused the 
magnates to persist as politically-relevant variables far beyond the point where the shocks 
of the age should have broken noble power.380 
 When Napoleon's power was broken and Alexander finally made a commitment 
to the revival of Poland, his strategy for appeasing the szlachta followed the same 
guidelines as the Duchy of Warsaw. In addition to the remarkable grants of liberal rights 
and autonomy enshrined in the 1815 Constitution, Alexander was careful to ensure the 
continued economic and social dominance of the szlachta. Towards this end, the Code 
Napoleon was largely retained, and the position of the szlachta vis-a-vis the peasantry 
was even strengthened. The 1818 establishment of the post of mayor of the rural 
commune further imbued landholders with powers over the peasantry, by providing them 
with the capability to restrict peasant movements.381 Even as political autonomy was 
frequently violated in practice by Tsarist officials, the economic position of the szlachta 
was unthreatened between 1815 and 1830. These economic privileges and the expectation 
that they would continue indefinitely even affected the policies undertaken by the 
insurgent government in 1830-1, which rejected any attempt to revisit the status quo on 
landholding.382 Szlachta unwillingness to countenance any kind of land reform is in fact 
one of the most compelling explanations for why Poland was unable to muster the 
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consistent force to throw off Tsarist rule, as the szlachta gentry were essentially 
expecting the bulk of the fighting forces (i.e. peasants) to fight for an independent Poland 
that offered them little in the way of socioeconomic improvement. 
 The arc of time from the foundation of the Congress Kingdom in 1815 to the 
eruption of the 1830 November insurrection was ultimately an unstable arrangement 
between a Tsar unwilling to brook real opposition and a Polish elite strata that assumed 
that the 1815 constitution conferred real liberal rights. The szlachta viewed it as a 
potential rebirth of the golden freedoms they had enjoyed under the Nobles' Republic and 
looked forward to the time when Poland would be politically reunited with the Lithuanian 
lands. At the height of this period of optimism, Alexander himself mooted the possibility 
that such a constitutional design may be extended to the empire as a whole, instructing 
Novosiltsev to construct the 'Charter for the Fundamental Law of the Russian Empire,' 
which borrowed liberally from the 1815 document.383 Although the szlachta were 
unhappy with the conduct of individuals like Constantine, Zajaczek, and Novosiltsev in 
how they managed the Congress Kingdom, they still generally supported the Russian 
connection and saw it as the path to the realization of Polish goals. Even after Alexander 
demonstrated he was not interested in a truly liberal political outcome, many of the 
szlachta came to support Constantine as he became more protective of Polish autonomy 
in the mid-1820s. However, it seems that Alexander's advisors were correct in viewing 
the Polish experiment as an inevitable failure, as it barely outlived Alexander himself and 
created a situation that would eventually end in its termination after the insurrection of 
1830-1. 
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 As in the Baltics, the szlachta were the most consequential power-holders in 
Poland-Lithuania, and the Tsarist government needed their compliance to successfully 
integrate Poland-Lithuania into the empire. The szlachta were more numerous than their 
Baltic German equivalents (and indeed, more numerous than most European nobilities), 
but as Lukowski notes these numbers masked the dominance of only about a dozen 
magnate families, who controlled most of Poland's economic wealth and by extension the 
political affairs of the commonwealth (notably, the magnates were referred to as "little 
kings," indicating the extent of their power and influence).384 Magnate dominance of 
political and economic life in Poland-Lithuania would begin to change in the 19th 
century as other groups in the population expanded their influence, but at the time of 
incorporation they remained the most important political players. The political privileges 
of the szlachta, the "golden freedoms," were entrenched in both law and custom, but this 
did not prevent external rivals from interfering in Poland's domestic politics. The 
divisions among the magnates opened Poland-Lithuania up to external influence, and as a 
result of the waning political fortunes of the commonwealth, found itself increasingly 
within Russia's sphere of influence after 1709.385 Rival magnates would routinely petition 
the Tsarist throne for support and protection against competitors, thus undermining the 
sovereignty and capabilities of the commonwealth up until its dissolution in the 
partitions. However, this successful tactic of divide-and-conquer did not guarantee that 
the szlachta would act as loyal, local clients of Tsarist power. Unlike the other 
borderlands, Poland's history as a great power and the expectations of political privilege 
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possessed by the szlachta made it virtually impossible for the Tsarist government to 
conciliate the szlachta. The interruption of the Napoleonic era and the failed promises of 
the Congress Kingdom only helped to solidify the increasingly oppositionist character of 
the szlachta. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The incorporation of the Western Borderlands into the Tsarist Empire occurred in a 
context of geopolitical competition with external powers, but the character of 
incorporation was largely dependent on the cohesion and organization of local elites and 
their willingness (or unwillingness) to cooperate with Tsarist authorities. This helps to 
account for the dramatically different arcs that each part of the borderlands followed 
despite similar starting points (broad grants of autonomy from the Tsarist government 
and attempts to conciliate the local elites). In the Baltics and Finland, the Tsarist strategy 
met with general success, as the Baltic Germans and the Swedish-speaking Finnish 
gentry were open to a collaborative relationship with the state and sought to preserve 
their positions vis-a-vis the peasantry. The willingness of these elites to serve the empire 
(the Baltic Germans mainly in the civilian bureaucracy, the Finnish elites as officers in 
the military bureaucracy) gave little reason for the state to revise these privileges, and 
Tsarist reliance on local administrators would have limited the capability for such a 
revision in the first place. The cooperative relationship between the autocracy and the 
Baltic and Finnish elites will also help to account for these regions' ability to weather 
centralization efforts, which will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. Baltic and 
Finnish privileges would remain largely intact until the reign of Alexander III. 
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 In contrast, Tsarist incorporation strategy was much less successful in Hetman 
Ukraine and Poland, if success is defined as cultivating effective local clients. In Ukraine, 
the Cossack starshyna failed to play this intermediary role, because although they 
controlled the governing institutions of the Hetmanate, those governing institutions did 
not have enough practical reach over the whole of Cossackdom. As we will see in the 
next chapter, Tsarist imposition of pro-government Hetmans further undermined Cossack 
unity until Catherine II simply decided that the institutions of the Hetmanate were 
unnecessary for Tsarist control of Ukraine. The starshyna were willing to act as Tsarist 
clients, but lacked the numbers and capacity to actually deliver stability and control over 
their territory. Conversely, Poland had a large and well-organized gentry in the szlachta, 
but that gentry was ill-disposed towards cooperation with the Tsarist government. The 
partitions of Poland in the late 18th century had embittered many of the szlachta towards 
the partition powers, and had short-circuited Polish efforts to reinvigorate the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth through political reform. Moreover, the szlachta's long 
tradition of noble liberty and governance made it less likely that they would submit to 
autocratic authority than the other elites of the borderlands. The incorporation of 
Congress Poland tried to strike a balance between Polish expectations and the 
preservation of Tsarist supremacy, but it failed abysmally and produced lingering 
conflict. 
 In all four border regions, the Tsarist government operated according to the logic 
of offering side-payments to secure reliable compliance and loyalty from internal elites. 
In order to achieve this compliance, the state offered more substantial concessions than 
those which were given to the native Russian gentry, the dvorianstvo, primarily by 
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expanding the concessions from strictly economic privileges into the realm of political 
rights and privileges. This did not represent any high-minded approach to dealing with 
governance problems in the borderlands, but was instead a tacit acknowledgment of the 
state's incapacity to directly rule those territories through central administrative 
structures. Given this opportunity, the strength and cohesion of the local elites, as well as 
their general orientation towards the Tsarist state, dictated how successfully the regions 
were at entrenching and defending these privileges. In the case of Hetman Ukraine, the 
elites were too weak; in the case of Poland, too divided and hostile. The Baltics and 
Finland conversely offered relatively cohesive and skilled elites that were able to defend 
their political position through native institutions. As such, Tsarist political strategy 
combined with the strength of the local elite dictated the character of the early stages of 
incorporation and set the stage for the later struggles that would define Tsarist efforts to 
centralize the empire. The next chapter explores these dynamics in-depth, focusing on 
how the ratchet effect caused by external events (oftentimes military conflicts) put 
pressure on the borderland regions and their elites to defend their niche in the empire.  
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CHAPTER V 
CENTRALIZATION AND REPRESSION IN THE BORDERLANDS 
 
The process of incorporating the Western Borderlands into the Tsarist Empire reflected 
the logic of a decentralized, multi-ethnic political system. Although nominally centralized 
and autocratic, in practice the Tsarist state tolerated a high degree of regional autonomy 
so long as local elites pledged imperial loyalty and were able to deliver social stability. 
This policy carried over from the past of Muscovy, as cultivating local clients proved to 
be less costly than imposing direct administrative rule, and the state in most cases would 
not have been able to muster the resources and personnel for such rule in the first place. 
The policy also served a specific geopolitical purpose, as expansion allowed the state to 
create a ring of buffer territories to provide some breathing space from external rivals 
such as Sweden, Prussia, or the Ottoman Empire. However, shifting geopolitical 
pressures guaranteed that this arrangement could not be a permanent one. While the 
Tsarist government pursued its traditional policy of co-opting local elites and indirectly 
managing territories, European rivals were moving towards a more centralized, 
bureaucratic form of rule that proved more adept at extracting resources from their 
populations. As a result, the Tsarist state was faced with increasing military demands that 
sparked a gradual, yet inconsistent, process of adaptation where the Tsarist state was 
reformed to more closely approximate centralized, well-ordered nation states. 
 In the borderlands, this political transformation proceeded over the course of a 
couple centuries, with its point of origin actually predating the incorporation of later 
territories (such as Poland or Finland). The effort to centralize control over the 
borderlands commenced with Peter I's and Catherine II's policies in Ukraine. The Great 
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Northern War with Sweden helped to instigate a restructuring of Tsarist governance, as 
Peter sought to emulate the political structures of Sweden, Prussia, and other European 
states. This newfound notion of the state's interest reoriented the state's relationship with 
Hetman Ukraine, which had previously been founded on a traditional, reciprocal 
suzerainty, and undermined the political autonomy of the Hetmanate (until its eventual 
dissolution under Catherine II). In contrast, the centralization of the Baltics and Finland 
was less successful and only ambivalently pursued by St. Petersburg. The local elites in 
these regions proved more powerful and adept than the Cossack starshyna in protecting 
their interests, and Tsarist institutions (such as the Governor-General) often reinforced 
this autonomy. There is clear evidence of increasing administrative centralization in these 
regions from Catherine II to Alexander II, but it falls significantly short of the absorption 
of the Hetmanate into the imperial core. Finally, the case of Poland-Lithuania occupies an 
uneasy time frame, as it was incorporated when the state had already begun to pivot from 
the traditional imperial mode of governance to a state-centered mode of governance. 
Thus, efforts to co-opt the Polish szlachta through concessions of autonomy occurred at 
the same time as efforts to limit or undermine that autonomy, breeding a divisive conflict 
in the Congress Kingdom. After the Tsarist balancing act in Poland failed, the state 
resolutely moved towards an aggressive policy of centralization that did little to 
ameliorate the conflict with the Polish populace. 
 The process of centralization that occurred in the Tsarist Empire mirrors the 
general dynamic identified by Hintze, Tilly, and others.386 In response to external military 
threats, the state attempted to extend its social control with the purpose of more 
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efficiently extracting resources from its population. This process was complicated by the 
state's reliance on traditional landed estates, which could not offer the kind of internal 
cohesion and efficient delivery of resources that characterized a complex, articulated 
bureaucracy.387 This complication was the most salient in the Western Borderlands, 
where the state had to rely on local expertise and management due to its own incapacity 
for direct rule. The state remained the most potent force when it came to bargaining with 
the local elites in the borderlands, but it only accrued the power to extend its domination 
gradually and unevenly, leaving the borderland elites with substantial leverage when 
bargaining with the state.388 The greatest opportunities to extend direct rule 
characteristically emerged during periods of military conflict or rivalry, where the state's 
capacity for centralization mirrors the 'ratchet effect' that Thies discusses with reference 
to modern Latin American states.389 As such, the most important moments of 
centralization in the late Tsarist Empire were during events like the Great Northern War, 
regular conflicts with the Ottoman Empire, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Crimean War. 
As this chapter details, however, these shocks were often insufficient to completely 
remake borderland arrangements, and the ability of the local elites to fend off the 
consequences of the 'ratchet effect' generally came down to the constellation of elite 
power discussed previously. 
 The differing constellations of elite power help to explain the different borderland 
policies at specific moments in time. The most striking feature of the state-borderland 
relationship was not the fact that the state sought to extend its power (which was to be 
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expected), but that at the same moment in time it was often abridging one region's power 
while it reinforced another. Thus, at the same moment Ukrainian autonomy was being 
smashed by Peter I during the Great Northern War, the Baltic regions of Livland and 
Estland were first receiving their generous incorporation agreements. As the Baltics were 
forced to produce reforms of serfdom under Alexander I, Finland was achieving its 
separate status and Congress Poland would shortly be granted a fairly liberal constitution. 
During the two Polish insurrections of the 19th century, the other borderland regions 
were also subjected to some centralizing impulses, but these impulses were very mild in 
the cases of the Baltics and Finland, and in the latter case autonomy was even extended 
following the second Polish insurrection of 1863-4. The fact that treatment of the 
borderlands differed is not surprising, but the fact that they were treated so differently at 
exactly the same moment in time indicates the presence of an intervening variable that 
served to modify or influence Tsarist policies. I posit here that the intervening variable 
continued to be the strength and orientation of the local elites, and that this variable was 
strong enough to moderate the 'ratchet effect' observed during periods of military conflict. 
 The developments detailed in this chapter offer a strong test of my theoretical 
contribution to theories of direct and indirect rule, and in general these developments 
vindicate my modifications to the theory offered by Gerring, Ziblatt, et al. Although the 
power and orientation of local elites in the borderlands were crucial to the incorporation 
agreements discussed in chapter three, the Tsarist state offered relatively similar 
concessions in all the cases, with important exceptions during the Polish-Lithuanian 
partitions. However, the geopolitical pressures that sparked processes of centralization 
and state-building offered the first major challenge to borderland elite privilege, and the 
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power and orientation of those elites provides the most compelling explanation for the 
unevenness of Tsarist policies. These variables also serve to explain the Polish-
Lithuanian case, which is otherwise an outlier in the model offered by Gerring, Ziblatt, et 
al. 
 
The Dissolution of Hetman Ukraine 
 
If the 17th century was the century of incorporation for the Hetmanate, the 18th century 
was the century of administrative centralization on the part of the Tsarist state. As Orest 
Subtelny argues, during the 17th century there were real limitations on the Tsar's power, 
and so in the case of Ukraine the empire had to resort to reciprocal arrangements and 
compromises with the local elites.390 Even though the Tsarist state sought to revise these 
agreements to its benefit when it had the opportunity to do so, this was limited by the 
geopolitical importance of Hetman Ukraine and the relative parity of military power 
between the Cossacks and the imperial forces. After the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654, the 
work of coordinating Tsarist rule with the Hetmanate was entrusted to the Malorossikii 
Prikaz, which existed until its abolition in 1717. The Prikaz's function was mostly 
restricted to communication, information gathering, supervision of Russian military 
garrisons, and consular activity. Given its small staff, it was not able to play a more 
aggressive role in bringing Ukraine into the imperial orbit and indeed that was not its 
purpose. The existence of the Prikaz actually served to reinforce the distinction between 
the imperial government and the institutions of the Hetmanate, in a manner consistent 
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with the guarantee of Ukrainian autonomy.391 It was only in the 18th century, with 
Hetman Ivan Mazepa's "treason" and Peter I's response, that this basic relationship would 
be transformed. 
 The precipitating event for the changes in the Russia-Ukraine relationship was the 
Great Northern War fought between the Tsarist Empire and Sweden. The pressures 
brought on by the war acted as a major stimulus for changes in the structure of the Tsarist 
state under Peter I (mainly so that the Tsar possessed greater leverage to extract resources 
and manpower from the population to go towards war efforts), but it also had a 
centralizing effect on the relationship between the imperial center and the peripheral 
borderlands. For the Cossacks, the war brought on demands that struck at the core of the 
reciprocal relationship between the Hetmanate and the empire. The Cossack military 
units were expected to fight beyond Ukraine's borders for the first time, submit 
themselves to Russian and German commanders, and conform to a mode of military 
discipline that clashed with Cossack traditions. There was also the possibility that the 
traditional Cossack military formations would be disbanded and reorganized along 
traditional regimental lines.392 However disquieting these changes were to the Cossacks, 
they were not the cause of the rupture between the Hetmanate and the empire. The event 
that triggered Mazepa's defection to the Swedes was Peter I's refusal to aid the Ukrainians 
against the hated Poles. Since the Hetman viewed the relationship between Moscow and 
the Hetmanate as a relationship based on protection, the removal of this promise of 
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protection was seen as ample reason to withdraw from the relationship and seek new 
allies.393 
 Peter's response was predictable, and once again emphasized the different 
interpretations that each side attributed to the original agreement at Pereiaslav. Peter 
justified the command for the Hetmanate to leave itself defenseless in order to aid the war 
effort as a product of the "common interests" of the empire, a justification that 
represented a shift to the logic of the state commanding the loyalty of all of its 
inhabitants.394 Conversely, Mazepa still viewed the compact between the Tsar and the 
Hetmanate as a submission to Russian suzerainty in return for territorial protection, as a 
reciprocal arrangement even if one of the parties was a senior partner and the other a 
junior, so to speak. Based on this understanding, it is actually surprising that Mazepa did 
not break with Russia sooner, which may be explained by the Hetman's attempt to come 
to some sort of understanding with the Tsar.395 In any case, reprisal from the imperial 
center was swift, as Russian military regiments conducted a "reign of terror" in the 
Hetmanate to root out "Mazepists," using the methods of property seizure, exile, and even 
execution.396 Peter also used the "treason" as a pretext to undermine Ukrainian autonomy, 
replacing Mazepa with the more pliant Ivan Skoropadsky and making the confirmation of 
Ukrainian privileges contingent upon loyalty to the Tsarist state.397 With this new 
hierarchy in place, Peter moved to extract as much as he could from the Hetmanate and 
limit its autonomy. This included the introduction of regulations on trade routes, state 
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monopolies, tariffs, and import-export taxes. Cossacks were conscripted not for military 
service but to serve on public works projects in the imperial core, including the 
construction of the new capital of St. Petersburg. Administratively, the Malorossiskaya 
Kollegia (MK) was tasked with overseeing the governing functions of the Hetmanate.398 
 The MK replaced the Malorossikii Prikaz (MP) and brought greater resources to 
bear on the supervision of governmental activity in the Hetmanate. While the MP had 
restricted itself to information gathering and oversight of Russian regiments, the MK was 
able to bypass the governmental institutions of the Hetmanate (which in turn had to have 
its orders countersigned by the MK), and it could overturn virtually any decision taken by 
the Hetmanate.399 The Cossacks Officers Council, which had begun to transform itself 
into an organ of interest representation in the Hetmanate under Mazepa, was firmly 
neutered and placed under the guidance of Russia.400 To guarantee the reliability of the 
Hetman himself (to prevent the emergence of another Mazepa), the Hetman's residence 
was moved to Hlukhiv, which was both closer to the Russian border and the base of the 
MK, making oversight of the Hetman easier.401 Finally, even before the formal abolition 
of the Hetmanate by Catherine II, the election of a new Hetman was contingent on 
Russian approval, and the office was often left vacant during the 18th century. Even 
when there was an acting Hetman, he was answerable to a Russian bureaucrat tasked with 
approving his decisions, and many government functions were in fact rerouted to Russian 
and not Ukrainian jurisdiction.402 
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 These changes assured control over the hierarchy of the Hetmanate, but it was still 
necessary to extend control over the Cossack rank and file which had provided the base 
of support for Mazepa. Towards this end, Peter implemented the reorganization of the 
Cossack regiments and placed them under the control of a Russian commander. 
Traditional methods of electing Cossack officers were altered to incorporate Tsarist 
approval, and the Tsarist government took the opportunity to install Russian or foreign 
officers that were considered more likely to be loyal to imperial interests.403 To bleed 
more resources out of the Hetmanate, responsibility for the upkeep of regiments based on 
Ukrainian soil (mostly Russian) passed to the Hetmanate, seriously straining the budget 
of the government. During the 18th century, but before the abolition of the Hetmanate, 
Russia had as many as 17 regiments (plus auxiliaries) deployed within Ukraine, under the 
command of the Governor-General. This represented a fairly significant threat to the 
Ukrainian client, and an increase over the number of soldiers based there during the 17th 
century (when the Cossacks in fact won several skirmishes with Russian troops).404 In 
addition, Cossacks were used as a labor source for the enterprising Peter, helping to 
construct not only the new capital of St. Petersburg, but also thousands of men to the 
construction of the Don-Volga canal in 1716, military fortifications in the Caucasus in 
1718, the Ladoga canal in 1721-2. The mortality rate for these labor regiments averaged 
around 30% and was as high as 50% in some.405 
 After 1727, the Hetmanate enjoyed a period of renewed autonomy, though not 
without some losses. Control over the Hetmanate's finances was passed to Petersburg and 
there were instances of interference in Hetman affairs, but until Catherine II, the Tsars in 
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Petersburg were ambivalent or vacillated when it came to supervising Ukraine. Ukraine 
enjoyed the height of its autonomy under Tsarina Elizabeth. This would cease for good 
with the accession of Catherine II in 1762.406 When Catherine came to power, Hetman 
Rozumovsky was the head of the Hetmanate and had been since 1750, though in reality 
his rule was compromised by the MK and an appointed Russian resident. Despite 
Rozumovsky's previously close relationship with Catherine, this did not translate into 
more autonomy for the Hetmanate, although this was the goal of both Rozumovsky and 
the Ukrainian Hlukhiv Council. The clash between Russian centralization and Ukrainian 
autonomy came to its conclusion in the different programs sought by the Hlukhiv Council 
and Catherine's goals for the empire. Where the Council sought to restore traditional 
prerogatives in fiscal and political government for the Hetmanate, Catherine wanted to 
see rule over the territory of the empire standardized. This contradiction in goals in part 
prompted the resignation of the Hetman and the ultimate dissolution of the Hetmanate.407 
 The final destruction of the Hetmanate proceeded in several steps. The first was 
the abolition of the office of the Hetman in 1764, when Rozumovsky resigned and was 
replaced by Governor-General Rumiantsev so that Ukraine was administered in a way 
comparable to other border territories. Rumiantsev was tasked with bringing order to the 
Cossacks and bringing Ukraine in line with Catherine's goals for the empire as a whole. 
As part of these changes, Rumiantsev abrogated the traditional Cossack right to elect 
their own officers, introduced Russian military discipline into the ranks, and punished 
those who violated this discipline with either whippings or the stripping of Cossack rank 
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and being reduced to a peasant.408 During the height of Rumiantsev's power (1765-1769), 
he was very successful in furthering Catherine's centralist goals, although he failed to 
remain in her favor beyond this period. The Cossack Host was finally integrated into the 
rest of the Russian military infrastructure, a goal that had been long resisted by the 
independent traditions of the Cossacks, and free Cossacks outside of the Host were 
gradually reduced to the status of state peasants. This full introduction of Russian-style 
serfdom served as a sop to the Ukrainian elites, who were at this time attempting to gain 
all the rights and privileges of the Russian dvorianstvo, which would later be extended by 
the Charter to the Nobility (see previous chapter).409 
 The next step was to bring the more recalcitrant Cossacks hosts into line (in 
addition to the Zaporozhian Host, Russia had several other Cossack hosts in greater 
Ukraine and the Black Sea area). In the latter half of the 18th century, Cossack uprisings 
and mutinies were common throughout the Ukrainian lands, including both the 
Hetmanate and the land of the Zaporozhian Sich (the stronghold of the Cossack host). 
Russian troops were often necessary for violently quashing these risings, which sought to 
reclaim Cossack privileges and strike out against the perceived oppressors, the Russians. 
The unrest in the Zaporozhian Host especially was problematic, as it threatened Russian 
security during a war with Turkey. Catherine waited to deal with the problem until the 
Turkish War was over, at which point the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed at her order 
and the Host dispersed.410 The Pugachev rebellion, which was either outwardly or 
implicitly supported by various groups of Cossacks within the empire, was a key trigger 
for the change in Tsarist policy towards the Cossack hosts, leading to more restrictions on 
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Cossack military formations, Russian supervision, and the dissolution and punishment of 
the more recalcitrant groups.411 The reason behind Russia's willingness to take firm 
action against the Cossack hosts had to do with the shifting geopolitical interests in the 
region. Between the absorption of Poland during the Polish partitions (which shifted the 
imperial borders) and the decline of the Tatar threat (the Crimean Tatars were defeated 
and incorporated by 1783), the Cossacks were no longer needed by the Tsarist state to 
serve as a military buffer against hostile neighbors. Between the removal of these threats 
and the deterioration of the Cossack hosts (due to the defection of the starshyna), these 
traditional Cossack military formations became a liability for the empire and were 
therefore expendable.412 The end of the war with Turkey and the outbreak of the 
Pugachev rebellion simply provided a convenient pretext to carry out the changes. 
 The final step was the dissolution of the institutions of the Hetmanate itself, 
abrogating the agreement in the Treaty of Pereiaslav. The institutions of the Hetmanate 
stood in the way of Catherine's goals of creating a standardized, well-ordered imperial 
state, so they became the logical targets of the government before the restructuring of 
regional governments in the early 1780s. Hetman officials attempted to prevent this 
outcome by petitioning for the restoration of the office of the Hetman as a hereditary 
office (since this was seen as a way to guarantee more stability in the Hetmanate), but 
Catherine predictably rejected this request before the Hetmanate's abolition in 1781.413 
After the abolition, reforms enacted in St. Petersburg sought to replace the function of the 
institutions without reinforcing Ukrainian autonomy. The Statute of the Provinces 
promulgated under Catherine II was intended to implement the goals of a well-ordered 
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state by fundamentally restructuring regional and local government. It divided the empire 
into standardized regions under a governor-general, a Treasury Board that oversaw 
finances, and urban and rural police forces that were tasked with implementing the Police 
Ordinance of 1782.414 The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was also absorbed into the 
broader Russian Orthodox Church, despite initially possessing autonomy from the 
spiritual regulations under Peter I. Church officials became "virtual state employees" and 
the number of those employed in church structures, as well as financial administration, 
were strictly controlled by the imperial center.415 For all intents and purposes, the more 
extensive autonomy that the Hetmanate had enjoyed ceased to exist, as the goals of 
Tsarist centralization were achieved more thoroughly in Ukraine than in the other 
borderland regions. 
 At the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, Tsarist imperial 
bureaucracy introduced military discipline to Ukraine as a means of controlling the 
region. Conscription was enacted in 1797 and some of Arakcheev's military colonies 
were based on Ukrainian soil. The division among civilian bureaucrats mirrored this 
martial hierarchy and this extended to the Third Section once Nicholas I established the 
organization. However, the state could ill-afford extensive personnel in Ukraine, so 
despite this outward appearance of discipline, the relatively small number of officials 
could not adequately oversee all government operations in Ukraine.416 The government's 
centralist views were not restricted to reactionaries, and in fact found an echo in the 
political program of the radical Decembrist Pestel, who thought that Ukraine should not 
have an independent existence from Russia (though Poland was afforded autonomy in his 
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plans).417 The lack of Tsarist personnel in Ukraine did limit the government's ability to 
impose policies, however. Up until the mid-19th century, Ukraine retained some of its 
sources of autonomy, however minor. Under Paul I, some government functions were 
restored, but his brief reign guaranteed that these policies did not have a chance to 
consolidate. Ukrainian law was not entirely superseded by Russian law until 1842, and 
Madgeburg Law operated in some towns until 1835.418 After this point, however, Ukraine 
was essentially another part of the imperial core. 
 
Inconsistent Centralization in the Baltics and Finland 
 
One of the first efforts to change the status quo in the Baltic territories came during the 
reign of Catherine II, when the Tsarist government pursued mild administrative 
Russification in the borderlands. Here the distinction between types of Russification is 
important, as Russification efforts in the late 19th century possessed a dramatically 
different character than Catherine’s reforms. As Thaden and others postulate, there were 
three different types of Russification present during the period of Tsarist rule: unplanned 
or voluntary Russification, administrative Russification, and cultural Russification.419 
The first is not important for our purposes, but the latter two types indicate a 
fundamentally different philosophy of governance, with the more vigorous cultural 
Russification of the 19th century threatening the traditional imperial foundation of 
dynastic loyalty. The object of Catherine’s reforms was to harmonize peripheral 
territories into the administrative structure of the empire, while still leaving most cultural 
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rights and privileges (such as religion or language) untouched.420 The closest that 
Catherine came to cultural Russification was in her efforts to integrate the native elites 
more tightly into the Tsarist administration and inject a set of mores more conducive to 
the empire, but as Marc Raeff notes, this can be considered consistent with the objective 
of enhancing dynastic loyalty at the expense of ethnic ties.421 
 The pressures exerted on the Baltic territories by Alexander I assumed a different 
character than the provincial reforms sought by Catherine II. Rather than attempting to 
force the Baltics to integrate with the rest of the empire, Alexander sought progressive 
reforms in these territories in the hopes that such reforms could serve as a foundation for 
similar reforms throughout the empire. Alexander was mainly interested in achieving 
agrarian reforms and peasant emancipation, as he considered serfdom to be a serious 
potential problem for the empire, and success in Livland and Estland could provide useful 
experience and feedback for Russian officials interested in progressive reform.422 The 
beginning of agrarian reforms in the Baltics, in 1802, were intended to preempt and 
prevent wider-reaching reforms, and targeted some of the most egregious abuses of the 
system, such as the uncontrolled power of the landlords and the lack of protection for serf 
families.423 Subsequent measures attempted to further chip away at the edifice of 
landholder power in the Baltics, but predictably the Baltic Germans staunchly resisted 
such changes, as they challenged the precarious position of the borderland elite situated 
between the imperial authority and a potentially hostile peasantry. After the Napoleonic 
Wars and additional measures in 1804 and 1809, Baltic landowners concluded that some 
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form of emancipation was inevitable and sought to limit the extent of its economic impact 
by approving modest emancipation laws before more stringent ones emerged from the 
Tsar himself.424 
 Alexander’s preferred solution to the emancipation problem was to conduct an 
official inventory of landholdings in the Baltics, assess the quality of the holdings, and 
come to an arrangement where the traditional customary and legal land rights would be 
retained by both the gentry and the peasantry.425 This approach was central to the 1809 
Livland proposal and was largely modeled on the manner in which landlord-tenant 
relations had been managed in Poland, the idea being that peasants would be adequately 
protected under the terms of such an arrangement. Given their traditional predominance 
(which was in fact more absolute than among Russian landholders), the Baltic Germans 
fiercely opposed such a resolution and instead proposed their own emancipation 
programs during a time when Alexander’s thoughts were more concerned with foreign 
policy than governance of the borderlands. As a result, the Baltic Germans effectively 
controlled the terms of peasant emancipation in Livland and Estland (and eventually 
Kurland), leading to a state of affairs highly favorable to their own interests and 
damaging to peasant interests.426 Unlike later emancipations in the empire, the Baltic 
emancipations reverted all land back to the control of the landowner, making the former 
serfs dependent on the landowner for continued tenancy. They became autonomous and 
free subjects, but at great economic cost.427 Alexander deplored this outcome, and efforts 
were made to revive some of the protections inherent in the 1804 legislation and to 
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promote hereditary tenure for the peasants, but he nevertheless accepted the fait accompli 
offered to him and even attempted to make the best use possible of the example.428 When 
Kurland modeled its own emancipation on the terms of the Livland emancipation, 
Alexander ratified the change despite his dissatisfaction. Agrarian reform would be 
revisited in the Baltics under later Tsars, such as when available tracts of land were 
granted to peasants under measures in 1849 and 1856, but for the moment at least the 
position of the Baltic Germans remained ascendant.429 
 During the same period, Alexander also considered broader reforms within the 
empire that would produce significant regional autonomy, modeled closely to that offered 
to the newly acquired Finland and Congress Poland.430 These ideas were mooted in a 
context where Alexander had been exploring the possibility of constructing a 
constitutional order for the empire as a whole, and would have represented a withdrawal 
from the traditional autocracy. Men like Speransky and Novosiltsev favored a federal 
solution to the empire’s problem of governance, a preference that would also be shared 
by later dissidents such as the Decembrists (though not Pestel, given the Jacobin republic 
he envisioned as Russia’s future). These ideas, however, came into conflict with those in 
the government who held a more conservative position concerning royal authority (and 
indeed the conflict was present in Alexander himself), and the plans were never acted 
upon. They were rejected absolutely by Nicholas after he came to power in 1825, since 
the new Tsar saw them as militating against the unity of the empire’s administration and 
the authority of the monarchy. The monarchic centralism preferred by Nicholas and his 
advisors served as a counterstroke to the experimentation with reform during the 
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Alexandrine period, though the extent of this centralism is often overstated given the 
limited resources available to the state. The gendarmes put into place throughout Russia 
in the wake of the Napoleonic War offered a foundation for some of Nicholas’ schemes 
of governance, and these were later converted into branches of the Third Department, but 
the manpower available was inadequate given the tasks at hand.431 
 The government of Nicholas I is paradoxical insofar as the Baltics are concerned. 
As indicated in a previous chapter, Nicholas’ reign was baptized by the convulsion of the 
Decembrist rebellion and its subsequent suppression, and this created in Nicholas a 
tendency towards conservatism, control over dissent, and stricter imperial oversight. In 
the atmosphere of Petersburg, the policies of the new Tsar proved stifling, as members of 
the intelligentsia were harassed by the Third Section and frequently subjected to 
needlessly harsh punishment. However, at least until the European revolutions of 1848, 
Nicholas was also tentatively interested in the possibility of gradual reforms as being a 
potential long-term solution to the problems that gave rise to the Decembrist revolt. As 
such, Nicholas sought legal reforms (employing Speransky to produce an empire-wide 
legal code), educational reforms under the ministry of Uvarov, and frequently tried to 
address the festering problem of serfdom with countless unofficial committees.432 This 
duality also manifested itself in the administration of the borderland territories. A 
centralizer at heart (the amount of oversight that Nicholas personally participated in is 
testament to this fact), Nicholas was inconsistent in his treatment of the Baltics. On one 
hand, some administrative Russification was attempted, as the unity of the imperial 
administration was consistent with the ideology of the Official Nationality promoted by 
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the Tsar. On the other hand, Nicholas was inclined to protect the traditional privileges of 
the Baltic Germans out of the same conservatism that infused his administration of the 
Russian core, but also because the Baltics proved to be loyal where the Russian gentry 
proved to be treacherous. Dynastic loyalty remained a value of central importance during 
Nicholas’ reign. 
 Whatever momentum had been established for Russification in the early and 
middle years of Nicholas’ rule waned during his last decade in power. Between 1845 and 
1865, imperial influence in the Baltic territories was at a relative low point, which helped 
the local elites to carve out more autonomy. The source of this declining influence can be 
traced to the policies coming from Nicholas, which oscillated between strict Russification 
and lenience, and the inability or even unwillingness of imperial officials to enforce said 
policies.433 Nicholas himself was torn on the issue, as he saw the Baltic Germans as loyal 
servitors to the Tsar (with many prominent Baltic Germans serving as high officials, 
including the chief of the gendarme and the Third Section, Alexander Benckendorff), and 
was unwilling to take his ruling ideology to its logical conclusion. This can be seen by 
Nicholas’ treatment of the Stackelberg-Khanykov commission. The commission, 
convened between 1845-8, sought to challenge the administrative autonomy of the 
Baltics. Nicholas disbanded it when he thought it was too one-sided and its 
recommendations were shelved until they were rendered redundant by the municipal 
reforms of the 1870s.434 In fact, Nicholas anticipated what would become one of the 
primary schisms between Russian publicists who favored a more robust ethnic 
nationalism and those who still adhered to the traditional respect for dynastic loyalty 
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when he ordered the publicist Yuri Samarin to be jailed after Samarin published a 
polemic against Baltic German privileges. Nicholas’ reasoning for the punishment was 
that Samarin had acted unwisely in besmirching a group that had so well-served the 
interests of the empire.435 Nicholas was not unique in defending the position of the Baltic 
Germans. Alexander II was similarly critical of polemics against the Baltics in the press 
in the 1860s, especially ones that compared their position to that of the Poles. Alexander 
thought that their service clearly distinguished them from the Poles.436 
 Finland followed an arc similar to the Baltic territories, although it enjoyed even 
greater autonomy than the Baltic Germans and faced fewer attempts to circumscribe that 
autonomy before the late 19th century. When Finland was incorporated into the empire in 
1809, it was granted concessions similar to the Baltics, though it did not receive a 
constitution like Poland would in 1815. Finnish insecurity regarding the lack of a written 
constitution led to lobbying efforts that were rewarded with more favorable local 
governing institutions (under the control of Finns rather than Russians) and Russia also 
made the significant concession of appending Old Finland (under Russian control before 
the incorporation of Finland) to the Grand Duchy.437 As will be discussed in greater detail 
below, the Russian political institutions tasked to administrative control over Finland 
(primarily the Governor-General) oftentimes worked to reinforce local autonomy, or 
were otherwise ineffectual. During Nicholas I's reign, there were a couple efforts to 
expand Tsarist control over the Grand Duchy, such as the appointment of Arsenii 
Zakrevsky as Governor-General and tighter political control during the 1848 European 
revolutions and the Crimean War, but these efforts were temporary and generally 
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reverted back to the status quo after the situation became settled.438 As such, Finland was 
never subjected to the kind of centralization that was employed in Ukraine or Poland, at 
least until the accession of Alexander III and the rise of Russian nationalism, and by 
extension, Russification. 
 During the 1860s, Finland’s position in the empire seesawed in response to events 
outside of its control, whether the second Polish revolt of 1863 or the attempted 
assassination of Alexander II in 1866. However, unlike the Baltics, Alexander was 
generally more tolerant of Finnish autonomy and willing to consider additional reforms, 
although these reforms were delayed by the onset of the Polish revolt. In the early 1860s, 
Finnish public opinion became restive towards the empire over the Tsar's dithering about 
reforms. Some protests broke out, including a street demonstration in Helsinki by 
university students, and the Tsar capitulated by promising to convene the Diet (which did 
not happen until the 1880s). Alexander II was reputedly worried that repression might 
cause Finland to head down a road similar to Poland.439 This concession proved to be 
tenuous, as proposed administrative reforms in the mid-1860s that may have further 
reinforced Finnish autonomy (explicitly recognizing constitutional and administrative 
rights) were shelved after the atmosphere in Petersburg became reactionary following the 
attempted assassination of Alexander II in 1866.440 The hesitation concerning Finnish 
reforms was mostly driven by domestic events, but the Tsarist government was also 
concerned about the international climate prevailing after Russia’s ignominious defeat in 
the Crimean War. One specific concern that Russia had to deal with during the latter half 
of the 19th century was the possibly of Swedish alignment with powers that had designs 
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on Russia. Though Sweden was no longer a real power, if it aligned itself with Germany 
or Britain, it could provide a dangerous base of operations against Russian territory and 
interests.441 
 These reversals were temporary, and in the late 1860s and 1870s, Finland 
achieved a substantial expansion of its political and economic autonomy. In the late 
1860s, Alexander confirmed the 'fundamental law' of Finland (a reference to the now 
mythic Porvoo Diet), guaranteeing the authority of the estates, the Diet, and Finnish 
political privileges.442 Furthermore, the Parliament Act of 1869 helped to reinforce the 
sense that Finnish institutions existed apart from the rest of the empire. The Parliament 
Act of 1869 was intended to fulfill the promise made by Alexander II concerning the 
regular convocation of the Diet, but the law itself was intended to be conservative, and in 
actual practice, the Diet was delayed until 1886. Although the law was intended to only 
establish a framework for the Diet and a closer relationship between Finland and the 
imperial administration, by this time Finland had already started developing a more 
liberal civil society that interpreted the change as yet another indication of the growing 
separation between Russia and Finland.443 Other changes also served to reinforce this 
separation, including an army reform in 1878 that allowed Finland to create a regiment 
manned and staffed by only Finns, and monetary reforms that in essence placed Finland 
outside of the monetary sphere of the empire. Although changes made were supposed to 
be harmonized with imperial laws, the actual effect was to create additional layers of 
difference between Finland and the imperial core.444 By the time Alexander III moved to 
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reverse these reforms in the 1880s, it proved to be more difficult than in other parts of the 
borderlands, making Finland into a powder keg during the last couple decades of the 
existence of the Tsarist Empire. 
 The imperial institutions that carried the most importance in the Baltics and 
Finland were the Governors-General and branches of policing institutions like the Third 
Section and the gendarme. Of these two, the Governors-General generally set the tone for 
relations between the borderlands and Petersburg and helped to influence the level of 
autonomy present in the territories. The origins of the office of the Governor-General can 
be traced back to the reforms of Peter I, and the provincial or district voevoda that 
preceded his rule. Until the latter years of Peter’s reign, substate governance in the Tsarist 
Empire took the form of voevoda, or military governors, appointed by government 
chanceries to oversee individual districts. There were no regional levels of governance, 
making central control over the provinces questionable. The 1719 reform that separated 
Russia into administrative regions, both on a province and sub-province level, was 
intended to address this deficiency of governance, with each region headed by a voevoda 
appointed by and accountable to the Tsarist Senate.445 The retreat from the 
implementation of Peter’s reforms after his death complicated this plan, and it wasn’t 
until the reign of Catherine II that the imperial government once again took up the 
question of governance in the borderlands. Dissatisfied with the operation of regional 
governance, Catherine’s reforms aimed to transfer many administrative tasks to the 
regions, and make the renamed Governors-General directly accountable to the Tsar 
herself (though they continued to report to the Senate concerning some administrative 
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matters). The abolition of a substantial portion of the governing infrastructure in the 
imperial center and its shift in focus to the regions gave the Governors-General 
tremendous flexibility in how they approached their job.446 
 The newly-refurbished post of Governor-General was granted a wide scope of 
powers and jurisdiction in the administration and oversight of the borderlands. As John 
Le Donne notes, Governors-General were expected to act as an “agent of supervision” to 
ensure that all imperial laws and regulations were followed, to guarantee the domestic 
security of their region, and to oversee all other civil governors within the region.447 The 
practical effect of this wide latitude was that each administrative region was ruled in a 
different way, with particular patterns becoming evident. The Governors-General of 
Moscow and Petersburg were relatively minor officials, as their authority was superseded 
by the Tsarist government itself, while Governors-General in regions like Belorussia, 
Ukraine, and the Caucasus were ruled more rigidly according to the Organic Statute of 
1775.448 On the opposite end of the spectrum, Governors-General in the Baltics and later 
Finland tended to preserve the autonomy of their regions, as the relatively powerful 
indigenous elites provided both assistance in governing the territories while resisting 
changes to the status quo. Although Governors-General in the Baltics were empowered to 
govern these regions, they were often absent, leaving Baltic assistants and collegia to 
follow through on provincial administration. The continued use of German as the 
language of administration solidified this tendency, and the Baltic Germans formed 
informal lobbies in Petersburg to ensure against precipitous changes to the status quo 
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(this was further reinforced by the many prominent Baltic Germans already serving in the 
imperial capital).449 In fact, Thaden identifies Governors-General as one of the biggest 
stumbling blocks for imposing closer imperial rule on the borderlands, as the Governors-
General came to view their territories as their domain, and consequently defended their 
prerogatives against what they viewed as imperial intrusions.450 
 Even Governors-General who were interested in subjecting the Baltics more 
firmly under imperial control were forced to cooperate with those same gentry due to the 
absence of Russian civilian bureaucracy in the Borderlands. This was especially the case 
for Governor-General Browne, who served as the Governor-General in Livland between 
1762 and 1792 and as Governor-General of Estland from 1775 to 1792. Browne was 
tasked by Catherine II to bring the Baltics into closer harmony with the rest of the 
empire, but this proved to be fruitless as the imperial government did not establish the 
kinds of governing institutions or provide for the number of personnel necessary to 
accomplish this goal. As a result, Baltic autonomy was barely scratched by Browne’s 
efforts, and was in many ways reinforced.451 Filipo Paulucci, who was the Governor-
General from 1812 to 1830, was more successful in bringing administrative Russification 
to the Baltic territories, but his most wide-reaching efforts were mostly confined to the 
period of 1818-1823, when he had a personal rivalry with one of the more important 
Baltic government officials. Besides this five-year period, Paulucci enjoyed remarkably 
good relations with the Baltic German gentry and did not make any serious efforts to 
abridge their political or economic autonomy.452 
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 Finland is even more striking in the degree to which Governors-General actively 
appeared to protect and extend Finland’s political autonomy. It was difficult for the 
imperial government to reverse this trend, as under Paul I the office of Governor-General 
had been abolished (and restored under Alexander I) with the intent of allowing the Tsar 
to directly manage the empire’s territories. In reality, this meant that the imperial 
government was robbed of its administrative capacity in Finland right at the time of its 
incorporation into the empire. When the first Governor-General (Count Sprengtporten) 
was appointed to Finland in 1809, he was to act as the Tsar’s representative in the region 
and command the local military, while relaying administrative issues back to the imperial 
center (generally handled by the private secretary for Finnish Affairs, which was filled by 
Mikhail Speransky until 1811 when that function was replaced by a council of Finnish 
officials). Finland itself was managed by a governing council that became the Senate in 
1816, with all members being Finns appointed by the emperor.453 The Finnish 
government council was originally intended to advise the Governor-General, but it 
evolved such that civil matters came under the control of the council, and the Gov-Gen 
was bound to those decisions. This regulation was unique in the empire and gave Finland 
a source of its separate status.454 The practical effect of this governing structure was that 
the Governor-General needed to cooperate with Finnish council members on a regular 
basis, while another council that was also interested in maintaining Finnish autonomy 
was responsible for maintaining communication with the emperor. The fact that it was 
official imperial policy to allow the Finns autonomy during Alexander’s reign, it was 
relatively easy to establish and expand on this core autonomy. And as Jussila notes, all of 
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the early Governors-General until Arseni Zakrevsky took over the office in 1824 helped 
to aid and abet this accumulation of political autonomy.455 
 By the end of Alexander I’s reign, there was a retreat from regional autonomy and 
an attempted reassertion of central authority that Nicholas I would also pursue. The 
dissatisfaction with Alexander’s flirtation with a more regionally-structured empire 
stemmed from the concern that reproducing the kinds of rights granted to Finland and 
Poland (in the 1815 constitution) in other regions could serve to undermine the unity of 
the empire as a whole. It was hoped that the office of the Governor-General could help 
arrest this regional drift and integrate borderland territories more closely with imperial 
administration.456 Starting after 1823, and intensifying under Nicholas I, there was an 
effort to Russify Finnish administration under Governor-General Zakrevsky. This 
included the abolition of the Committee of Finnish Affairs, but also had the unintended 
side effect of strengthening the Finnish Senate. Likewise, Nicholas' crackdown after the 
Decembrist rebellion included the extension of the Third Section to Finland and other 
borderland regions, tightened censorship, and other predictable repression, but it also 
caused the delay of more ambitious Russification efforts in Finnish administration.457 
Nicholas was well disposed to critiques of borderland privileges (though as mentioned 
above, he also eventually defended borderland elites who he viewed as loyal to the 
empire) upon his accession, and interpreted Decembrist critiques of central 
administration as evidence that the central government needed to reinforce its authority 
and better utilize Governors-General.458 However, Nicholas’ instinct to centralize more 
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power in his personal chancery rather than in broader Tsarist administration helped to sap 
these efforts, as a personalized administration proved less adept at managing political 
problems in such a vast territory. Although Nicholas emphasized centralization and 
administrative Russification upon becoming Tsar, and although he tried to expand the 
numbers of the civil service, the limitations of the Russian government made it so that 
there was not adequate police, cultural, social services, or local administration in the 
provinces, making efforts at centralization rather mild.459 
 Nicholas’ goals of bringing Finland closer to the imperial administration was also 
hampered by an ineffectual Governor-General, Prince Alexander Menshikov, who served 
for almost the entirety of Nicholas’ reign from 1831 to 1855. Menshikov would 
eventually demonstrate his incompetence during the Crimean War, but for the time he 
was trusted by the Tsar to properly administrate his territory. In reality, Menshikov relied 
on men like Lars Gabriel von Haartman and Gustaf Armfelt (himself a previous 
Governor-General of Finland), who while not interested in breaking Finland away from 
the empire, were certainly interested in maintaining Finland’s autonomy. Menshikov’s 
strong reliance on Finnish gentry and his tendency to ward off imperial intrusions to 
protect his domain helped to stymie Russification efforts in the Grand Duchy, leaving 
Finland relatively untouched when compared to the other borderlands.460 After 
Menshikov left office and the new reign of Alexander II commenced, Finland followed 
an arc similar to the other borderlands: initial reforms providing greater autonomy 
followed by increasingly stringent restrictions as Alexander’s reign became more 
reactionary. Although concessions made by Alexander II strengthened Finnish autonomy 
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initially, the goal of unifying the empire's administrative structures carried the seeds of a 
deeper conflict. This included heightened activity by the gendarme and the conversion of 
the Governor-General into a militarized office that also commanded the local military 
districts. These changes, among others, laid the groundwork for the more thorough going 
Russification efforts of Alexander III.461 Even given this, however, the Governor-General 
did not truly become a tool of Russification until the 1890s, and by that point the national 
awakening of Finland made such efforts ever more destabilizing.462 
 Beyond the Governors-General, other important institutions that existed within 
the borderlands were the army, the gendarme, and the Third Section. Unlike in the core 
cities of Moscow and Petersburg, the Third Section did not exercise substantial power in 
the borderland territories, both due to a lack of resources and a lack of freedom of 
movement vis-à-vis other institutions. Members of the gendarme tasked with keeping the 
borderlands under control enjoyed some autonomy from the central gendarme and the 
Third Section, but had to contend with regional Governors-General, local institutions, the 
military, etc, which limited their range of influence. One, A. Lomachevsky, exercised his 
power as a gendarme in Vilna district discreetly, being careful to confirm accusations, 
challenge flawed investigations, and even doing favors for local families and notables. 
The operation of the gendarme varied radically across the regions.463 During times of 
heightened political stress, such as the period following the Decembrist rebellion, either 
of the Polish rebellions, and the European revolutions of 1848, the Third Section and the 
gendarme attained higher levels of influence due to the implementation of repressive 
policies in the borderlands, but in the case of the Baltics and Finland, this influence 
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ultimately ebbed since these territories were seen as more reliable and quiescent than 
territories such as the Kingdom of Poland. Even so, it was usually the army that acted as 
the Tsar’s guarantors of order and stability. After the 1848 revolutions, suspicion of the 
borderlands was high and the empire moved hundreds of thousands of troops into the 
regions, declaring martial law. However, the gentry generally cooperated, as they feared 
mutiny among the peasants. The cooperation with military officials during this period 
actually led Nicholas to reward the Baltics with a more flexible Governor-General.464 
 If Hetman Ukraine offers a strong example of the shift from the imperial logic to 
a more state-centered logic, then the Baltics and Finland offer an ambiguous alternative. 
During the 19th century, Tsarist rhetoric increasingly emphasized the need for 
centralization in the borderlands, but in practice Tsarist officials proved unwilling to 
completely abrogate traditional privileges, especially in territories where the local elites 
demonstrated exemplary loyalty and delivered effective social control. The Baltics and 
Finland offer just such an example of effective local clients, as the conservative elites 
(the Baltic Germans and the Swedish-oriented Finnish officials) served the state 
effectively while keeping a lid on dissent. This service did not completely insulate these 
territories from the creeping centralization of the Tsarist state, but the centralization that 
was pursued often occurred with the collaboration of the local elites (as in the abolition of 
serfdom in the Baltics) or served the interests of those elites (as with the suppression of 
more radical Finnish dissenters in the universities). The example of the Baltics and 
Finland demonstrates that while the Tsarist state was interested in administrative 
centralization as a response to the challenges of geopolitics, this centralization was 
usually directed against territories that failed to satisfy traditional imperial arrangements 
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(such as the weakness of the Ukrainian starshyna or the oppositionist tendencies of the 
Polish szlachta). 
 
Repression and Control in Poland-Lithuania 
 
The time that elapsed between accommodation and assertion of centralized control was 
shorter in the Congress Kingdom than in the other borderlands of the empire. With the 
adoption of the 1815 Constitution, the Polish elite hoped that the Congress Kingdom 
would have real political autonomy from the Tsarist state. However, Alexander's decision 
to appoint either Russians or subservient Polish figures to the most important posts in the 
Kingdom challenged these hopes. The appointment of his brother, Grand Duke 
Constantine, as Commander-in-Chief was undoubtedly the most important appointment, 
but the decision to appoint General Jozef Zajaczek as the Governor-General of Poland  
was equally problematic since the Zajaczek did not demonstrate much respect for 
government in Poland and oftentimes unilaterally imposed his decisions on the Kingdom. 
It did not help that it was widely expected that Prince Adam Czartoryski, a staunch 
defender of Polish autonomy, would be appointed to the position, but was instead passed 
over. Finally, the appointment of Nikolai Novosiltsev as imperial commisioner installed 
another individual hostile to Polish privileges, and he took advantage of his position on 
numerous occasions to warn the Tsar of the dangers of subversion or disloyalty among 
the Polish population. Novosiltsev had been more reformist earlier in Alexander's reign, 
but that tendency had died out by the time he was appointed to his Polish position. In 
much the same way as Tsarist appointments set the tone for preserved autonomy in the 
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Baltics and Finland, the appointments made in the Congress Kingdom set the tone for 
Tsarist interference.  
 Constantine proved to be a bad selection for such an important position within the 
Congress Kingdom, as he demonstrated open contempt for the constitution and showed 
little willingness to observe the rule of law. An early incident displayed this lack of 
regard, as Constantine attempted to subordinate the Ministry of War under General 
Wielhorski to his control, even though the ministry was supposed to report to both the 
Sejm and the State Council. Constantine forbade Wielhorski from responding to requests 
from the State Council concerning War Ministry plans, claiming that the Council had no 
jurisdiction over the military and that it was Constantine's prerogative to decide when to 
communicate with the Council. Wielhorski ended up not being as pliant as Constantine 
had hoped and complied with the State Council, in that he viewed Constantine's assertion 
of control over the ministry of war as a violation of the constitution. Constantine sought 
to have Wielhorski sacked, but Alexander ultimately opted to allow Wielhorski to retain 
his position, though to little effect until Wielhorski was finally allowed to resign and be 
replaced with a more subservient official.465 Moreover, Constantine thought that the 
needs of the civilian government were so unimportant vis-à-vis the military that for the 
early years of the Congress Kingdom, the military received roughly half of the 
Kingdom's annual budget. Considering that this was during a period of recovery from 
serious and disruptive warfare, this severely handicapped the ability of the civilian 
government to administrate the territory of the Kingdom or address lingering problems. 
 While Constantine was uncooperative and domineering in his relations with the 
Kingdom's civilian government, his administration of the Polish military was arguably 
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worse. Like his brothers and his father, Paul I, Constantine favored the strict military 
discipline and formality of the Prussian military tradition, and he applied this doctrine 
rigidly to the Polish military. He pursued this goal vigorously, since he personally loathed 
the freer and more flexible traditions of the Polish military, which in part reflected the 
'golden freedoms' of the szlachta. He found such freedom as being destructive of military 
effectiveness and discipline.466 Constantine’s petty tyrannies over the Polish military 
were extensive. He effectively forced generals and officers he disliked to resign, and 
impressed on recruits the extreme view of submission and obedience that he viewed as 
essential to soldiery. To guarantee that his men were presentable, Constantine would have 
the army march for hours to grueling perfection for parade ground spectacles, but did not 
emphasize battlefield prowess. Soldiers were forced to wear tight-fitting and 
uncomfortable clothes and boots for their appearance, not their function.467 Constantine 
also favored the use of a secret police to keep himself apprised of individual units in the 
military, with spies informing him of virtually every goings-on among the troops. This 
had a crippling effect on morale and unit cohesion. Moreover, Constantine himself 
preferred to preside over the judgment and punishment for infractions, and favored the 
use of corporal punishment, even for relatively minor failures. Constantine devised 
particularly cruel forms of punishment to indicate his dissatisfaction. During his reign, 
the Polish army had an unusually high number of suicides, retirements, and cases of 
mental illness, not to mention a very high desertion rate.468 Most of the practices 
Constantine employed to maintain control over the military in fact violated both codified 
military rules and the terms of the 1815 constitution. 
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 The Tsar did not act as a bulwark against Constantine's abuses, partly because he 
was loathe to interfere with his brother's rule, but also because he himself was shifting 
away from conciliation with Poland. During 1818-1820, the Tsar shifted towards a more 
authoritarian policy emphasizing control and repression. Thackeray traces this shift to the 
outburst of revolutionary movements in other parts of Europe, and to the continuing 
hostility of influential Russians to the Polish policy.469 One area where the shift was 
immediately evident was in press censorship. The 1815 constitution paradoxically 
enshrined freedom of press and the need to repress abuses of the freedom of press. This 
contradiction provided the basis for the creeping censorship evident in the Congress 
Kingdom, with both the education ministry and the police playing a role in supervising 
printed materials. This only became truly relevant in 1818 and 1819, when Polish 
publications arose that were markedly less friendly to the Russian administrators. In 
response to these publications, Zajaczek instituted two decrees on press censorship 
without waiting for confirmation from Petersburg (which was eventually provided after 
the fact), in direct contravention of the constitution.470 After complaining about its failure 
to curb abuses of freedom of press, Zajaczek decreed in 1820 that all political works and 
periodicals needed to be submitted to the police for censorship rather than the education 
ministry. Alexander confirmed this decision, but also gave the interior ministry some 
purview on the matter. Furthermore, censorship was extended to all publications, and not 
merely those areas that had previously been under censor jurisdiction. This was extended 
to foreign publications in 1821, and when the reactionary Grabowski was installed at the 
education ministry, press censorship reverted to that ministry in 1822. All of this had a 
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pernicious effect on Polish journalism, as the arbitrary character of the censorship sapped 
the will of the educated public, in much the same way it would under Nicholas I in Russia 
itself.471 
 More broadly, Polish life became subject to a heightened level of surveillance and 
policing. Constantine had always kept a close eye on areas within his jurisdiction, using 
spy agencies to keep his troops in order, but as relations in Poland chilled the use of these 
types of agencies extended throughout the system as a whole. In 1822, Constantine 
established his Secret Chancery to provide another layer of secret policing to his arsenal. 
In addition to investigating all ‘suspicious persons’, the chancery also spied on Russian 
officials including Novosiltsev and even the Tsar, to keep Constantine apprised of the 
state of affairs (and which demonstrates how jealously Constantine guarded his freedom 
of action even from the Tsarist state itself).472 During the course of the Congress 
Kingdom’s existence, Poland had 11 distinct police and spy agencies, ranging from those 
within the government to the military police and personal chanceries for high officials 
such as Constantine. A gendarme was also established, along the lines of those that would 
be instituted in Russia after the Decembrist rebellion. However, the effectiveness of the 
various spy organizations was limited by the presence of rivalries and disputes between 
them.473  
 Universities were watched especially closely, as they were assumed to be hotbeds 
of radicalism and dissent that could potentially subvert the next generation of Poles. 
Between 1819-1821, secret societies and student societies (which Alexander himself had 
once patronized) were gradually proscribed, beginning with a Warsaw University edict in 
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1819 forbidding students to associate and ending with the empire-wide ban on secret 
societies instituted in 1821. This by necessity drove associations underground and 
rendered them illegal in the same stroke. The ban on secret societies was in a large way 
produced by Novosiltsev constantly deluging the Tsar with largely fanciful tales about 
the extent of secret societies in Polish schools.474 In addition to this rooting out of 
subversive groups, the structure of education itself was also attacked. Under Potocki, 
Polish secondary education and universities had made great strides, and had the potential 
to develop into sophisticated European centers of learning. However, the reaction that set 
in led to the ouster of Potocki in favor of the obscurantist Stanislaw Grabowski. 
Grabowski presided over the destruction of the progressive educational edifice 
constructed by Potocki up until 1820, and subjected students to close surveillance by 
school police to guarantee against subversion. Unreliable instructors were harassed or 
dismissed by the ministry, and subjects which were deemed as not fit for the times were 
either radically scaled back or cut altogether, focusing mainly on areas such as history, 
philosophy, and literature.475 Previously, under Potocki, the number of young Poles who 
had access to quality education had increased dramatically, but under Grabowski the 
number of higher education students in institutions like the University of Warsaw 
contracted rapidly. The situation in regions outside of Warsaw was even worse, as access 
was shut off for most students. 
 This period also corresponded with Alexander's disenchantment with the 
government institutions of the Congress Kingdom and his increasing reliance on 
Constantine and Novosiltsev to unilaterally enforce his writ. Alexander lost his tolerance 
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for the Sejm's deliberations, mainly because of the emergence of the Liberal Opposition 
grouping that was openly critical of the Tsar and his policies. This produced a more 
confrontational attitude in the Tsar, and caused the government to include Sejm minutes 
within the preliminary censorship. These heavy-handed measures failed to cow the 
opposition and in fact drove more prominent Poles into the arms of that opposition.476 
The Liberal Opposition formed around 1820 under the leadership of the Niemojowski 
brothers, Sejm deputies from the city of Kalisz. Alexander viewed the Liberal Opposition 
and the Niemojowski brothers with such trepidation that he sought to find ways to bar 
them from taking their seats in the Sejm. When he was unsuccessful in suppressing the 
brothers, he directed his ire at the Sejm itself, implying that its continued conduct may 
lead him to reconsider his dedication to the 1815 Constitution. Alexander's inability to 
brook any form of opposition to his rule calls into question the sincerity of his 
constitutional beliefs, and does seem to support the assessment that Alexander was never 
a true enlightenment liberal. 
 The disenchantment with the Sejm led Alexander to seek alternatives for the 
effective rule of Poland. In 1822, a conflict emerged between Constantine and Alexander 
over authority in Poland. Alexander sought to imbue Constantine with ill-defined 
dictatorial powers (with the agreement of Zajaczek and Novosiltsev) to help stanch any 
nascent revolutionary threats in Poland. Constantine rejected this grant, claiming that he 
needed permanent authority to exceed the constitution and further cement his position in 
Poland and Lithuania. The resulting decrees merely confirmed some of Constantine’s 
powers, but did not solve the underlying conflict.477 However, after this point, 
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Constantine enjoyed increasing power and authority within Poland, and even within 
Lithuania after he was made head of the Lithuanian Corps. Pienkos suggests that there 
was a succession bargain struck between Alexander and Constantine, where Constantine 
surrendered his claim to the throne in return for greater control over Poland-Lithuania. 
Constantine’s expanding power within Poland suggests that this explanation has some 
merit.478 It may also help explain why Constantine's approach to dealing with Poland 
softened after 1822, even to the point where he acted as its advocate before his brother. 
Constantine understood that to cement his control he needed to cultivate support among 
Polish notables, and he began to do so in the early 1820s, mainly among the wealthy 
szlachta and the Roman Catholic clergy. However, by 1825 Constantine had become 
such a steady defender of Polish autonomy, he even managed to get the qualified support 
of Czartoryski, who had previously opposed him and his position fiercely.479 It is a 
strange inversion that preceding Alexander's death in 1825, it was Constantine who was 
viewed as Poland's protector, while Alexander was becoming increasingly intolerant of 
Polish liberties. 
 The death of Alexander, the failed Decembrist rebellion, and the accession of 
Nicholas I created a hostile context for the Congress Kingdom and its constitutional 
experiment. Although Alexander had not observed the terms of the 1815 Constitution 
with much diligence and though his agents did not respect its validity, Nicholas saw the 
constitutional experiment as an obvious mistake and only retained the 1815 constitution 
out of loyalty to his dead brother. However, Polish complicity (however limited) in the 
Decembrist rebellion threatened this fragile status quo. After the rebellion, the 
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involvement of the Polish Patriotic Society was uncovered, leading to an inquiry and a 
trial on the charges of treason for its key members. However, the tribunal returned a 
verdict stating that the Patriotic Society members were not guilty of treason, only of 
belonging to an illegal organization. This finding enraged both Constantine and Nicholas, 
although Constantine had defended the Poles earlier during the episode, even excusing 
the will to rebel.480 In reality, the involvement of the Patriotic Society was limited to a 
few contacts with the Decembrists and the discussion of a possible uprising in Poland to 
coincide with the Decembrist uprising, but this never materialized in practice during the 
rebellion, most likely due to the small size and lack of resources on the part of the 
Patriotic Society. However, for Nicholas even these links were evidence of the treasonous 
character of Poles, and he was not willing to accept the findings of the tribunal. The 
decision of Nicholas to retry the Patriotic Society’s leader, Krzyzanowski, in the late 
1820s caused a new rift between the Poles and Russians, while leading some prominent 
Poles including Czartoryski to question the Russian connection. Ultimately, this uncertain 
time period can be seen as the critical juncture leading up to the November rebellion in 
1830.481 
 After the outbreak of the November rebellion and the close escape of Constantine 
from Warsaw, the leaders within the Polish provisional government realized that they 
were unlikely to defeat Russia in a military confrontation, but instead hoped that they 
could use the leverage of the insurrection to gain concessions from Nicholas. In this hope, 
they misjudged Nicholas and how he was likely to respond to such a challenge to his 
authority. Nicholas viewed the rebellion as an existential threat to the empire, as it would 
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threaten Russia's status as a great power and also, in his mind, open the doors to other 
groups within the empire demanding similar constitutional concessions. Seeing firm, 
centralized autocracy as the only way to properly prevent the centripetal forces that 
threatened the empire, Nicholas resolved to firmly quash the rebellion immediately.482 
Nicholas' unwillingness to negotiate forced the situation into open military conflict, with 
the Poles eventually losing and most of their leaders going into exile in France or Britain. 
Czartoryski, the most notable figure who had supported the Russian connection, 
emigrated to Britain and then eventually to France where he continued to attempt to 
influence the course of events in Poland, though he was condemned to death in absentia. 
The other most notable figure of Congress Poland, Grand Duke Constantine, died of 
cholera in Vitebsk in 1831, after narrowly avoiding assassination in the tumultuous 
beginning of the insurrection. The wiping away of the all the significant political figures 
in Poland opened the way for Nicholas to impose his preferred outcome on the prostrate 
kingdom. 
 After the insurrection had been suppressed, Nicholas moved to eliminate most 
vestiges of autonomy within the Congress Kingdom. This included the abolition of 
distinctive Polish institutions, the disbanding of the Polish army, the closing of the 
University of Warsaw, and the demotion of Polish as official language in favor of 
Russian. Officers who served in the insurrection were deported to Siberia and nobles lost 
their estates.483 The Tsarist state also moved to remove the mint from Polish control, and 
to replace the Polish zloty with a Russian-backed currency. This was a move meant to 
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undermine the symbolic and fiscal independence of Poland.484 Above all else, the 
insurrection provided Nicholas with the justification to eliminate the hated 1815 
Constitution, which he saw as the primary obstacle to effectively ruling all the lands of 
the empire. In 1832, Nicholas abolished the 1815 Constitution and replaced it with the so-
called "Organic Statute" which set out of the terms of rule within the territory of Poland, 
but in reality Poland was administered by the brutal means of Nicholas' new viceroy, 
Marshal Paskevich. This inaugurated an era of creeping Russification under Nicholas, 
who gradually replaced Polish governing methods with Russian institutions and 
officials.485 However, even given Nicholas' desire to see Poland fully incorporated into 
the imperial system of governance, the Russification efforts were by necessity 
incomplete. Most of the members of the civil service remained Polish, the szlachta (at 
least the ones who had not participated in the insurrection) were permitted to retain their 
special status, the legal system remained largely in Polish hands, and the Polish language 
and the Uniate Church continued to be tolerated.486 This can primarily be attributed to the 
lack of personnel within the Tsarist civil service to take over the administrative functions 
of the former kingdom, a situation that would not fundamentally change even after the 
second insurrection of 1863-4. 
 The situation within Lithuania, the lands that had been incorporated into the 
empire during the partitions and which had not reverted to the control of the Congress 
Kingdom, was arguably worse. Following the partitions, the Tsarist government 
approached the governance of the Lithuanian lands in much the same way it had 
approached the Baltics and Finland. It relied upon collaboration with the local social 
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elites to maintain stability and did not interfere with existing social relationships, to the 
benefit of the gentry. The level of development in these lands was generally perceived as 
being higher than in the rest of the empire, so there was the hope that allowing regional 
government greater autonomy could allow for the region to act as an model for reforming 
other portions of the empire. Consequently, even though Alexander I did attempt some 
minor streamlining of the local governments, much of the institutional machinery was left 
in place, while Polish-style education and the Catholic Church were also permitted to 
retain their positions.487 However, despite these allowances, the quiescence of the 
Lithuanian lands proved to be inadequate in the face of Polish uprising. The 1830-1 
rebellion in Poland also prompted a smaller rising in the Lithuanian lands, but these were 
comparatively poorly-organized with unclear aims. The rebels lacked organization in 
urban centers and had few supplies, and were then treated with predictable repressive 
measures once the uprising was quashed.488 
 After 1831, the Tsarist government abandoned its traditional policy of allowing 
some degree of regional autonomy for the Lithuanian lands and moved to incorporate 
these lands more firmly into the empire. The first step taken was the abolition of the 
Lithuanian Statute and the introduction of Russian law, removing the most vital strut of 
regional autonomy. This included the elimination of some non-Russian governing 
institutions, the centralization of rule, and the replacement of local elites with Russian 
administrators.489 The state identified the szlachta in the Western Guberniia as the most 
dangerous source of opposition to the empire and moved to undermine their control over 
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political and economic institutions in Lithuania. Towards this end, 40% of the szlachta in 
the guberniia were reclassified as either state peasants or burghers, effectively eliminating 
their source of gentry privilege. Moreover, the Governor-General of the guberniia was 
instructed to fill local positions with officials from other guberniia in the empire, to help 
undercut Polish dominance in local government. These measures were only partly 
successful, as the majority of officials remained Polish Catholics.490 The state also tried 
to undermine szlachta power by pursuing land reform in the post-1831 period, so that 
Lithuanian (and Belorussian and Ukrainian) peasants would be empowered vis-a-vis their 
Polish landlords. The attempted reforms were modest and mainly took the form of 
producing inventories of peasant obligations so that the szlachta would not retain 
complete control over the peasantry, and so that the peasants themselves might develop a 
loyalty to the Tsarist state. However, the reforms met with limited success, as the number 
of Tsarist officials in the region was not adequate enough to enforce the inventories 
without the cooperation of the szlachta. As one would imagine, the szlachta were not 
forthcoming with this kind of assistance.491 
 Following the application of Russification measures in the wake of the 1830 
Insurrection and for the rest of the reign of Nicholas I, Poland remained under strict 
control by the Tsarist state to guarantee its quiescence. The government under Paskevitch 
slackened after the initial wave of repression, but Poland was never able to regain the 
degree of autonomy enjoyed in the other parts of the borderlands, where Nicholas' 
inconsistent Russification policy left a much lighter touch. However, after the death of 
Nicholas in 1855 and the accession of the relatively liberal Alexander II, Poland's 
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fortunes looked to improve at a time when the new Tsar was loosening restrictions put 
into place by his father. Specific measures directed towards Poland included amnesties 
for those still in prison due to the 1830-1 insurrection, an increase in autonomy for local 
government in Poland, and a stronger public role for the Polish elites.492 However, this 
relaxation of restrictions also allowed for the reemergence of resentment against Russian 
rule in Poland and eventually snowballed into a replay of the 1830-1 uprising when 
Poland and parts of Lithuania descended into open revolt in 1863-4. After the suppression 
of the Polish rebellion, the government concluded that it was necessary to undermine 
independent sources of Polish power and to forcibly integrate the region into the empire 
politically, culturally, and religiously. This would become the blueprint for later, albeit 
milder, Russification efforts in the borderlands.493 
 
Conclusion 
 
As Tsarist policy in the Western Borderlands indicates, the process of shifting from a 
decentralized, imperial system to a centralized, modern state, was hardly consistent and 
unambiguous. It progressed in fits and starts, with the state gradually encroaching on 
borderland privileges when opportunities were present and retreating when the potential 
costs of centralization were too high. The overriding concern with loyalty and 
maintaining geopolitical security blunted the impulse to centralization, and the territories 
and local elites which failed to deliver these benefits were the first targeted by aggressive 
efforts of administrative harmonization. Thus, the Baltics and Finland escaped from the 
process with modest modifications to their autonomy, while Ukraine and Poland saw 
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their autonomous existence compromised or eliminated, even though the state continued 
to rely on indigenous elites even in these latter cases. The nature of the Tsarist system 
compounded these inconsistent tendencies, as the accomplishments of centralizing Tsars 
were reversed or muted by subsequent Tsars less willing to follow through in creating the 
well-ordered police state. Peter's massive reforms were moderated by weak successors, 
Catherine II's were reversed by successors seeking to thwart her legacy (Paul I) or to 
reform it (Alexander I), and the reign of Nicholas I was marked by a internal ambiguity 
concerning the vigor of centralizing efforts. The persistence of informal governing 
mechanisms (private chanceries) and the relative absence of a consistent bureaucratic 
institutions further accentuated these swings, as Tsars in practice proved unwilling to 
sacrifice their personal prerogative to empower bureaucratic offices. 
 Up until the end of Nicholas I's reign in 1855, the process of centralization in the 
Western Borderlands reflected the inherent tension between imperial modes of 
governance and state-centric modes of governances. In conformity with the state-building 
literature, centralization proceeded under the pressures of geopolitical competition and 
the need for the state to extract more resources from the population. Extending social 
control through direct rule was the most obvious way of accomplishing this goal. 
However, this process was complicated by the imperial nature of the state, with the 
estates system and reliance on local elites vitiating the centralizing impulse unless the 
state was willing to employ coercion, as it did in Ukraine and Poland. As I hope the 
preceding sections demonstrate, the variable of primary importance in determining the 
direction of Tsarist centralizing efforts was the strength and orientation of the local elites, 
as well as their ability to manipulate Tsarist institutions to their own ends. This is most 
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clearly demonstrated in the case of the Baltics and Finland, where not only did the local 
elites successfully defend their positions, they oftentimes enlisted the nominally-Tsarist 
institution of the Governor-General to do the same. The under-bureaucratization of the 
Russian core allowed the Governor-Generals enough institutional autonomy to dictate 
their own path, since the state was incapable of directly managing these officials (though 
it occasionally tried to do so). 
 The ambiguities of Tsarist centralization efforts were mostly resolved in the 
second half of the 19th century, as the state moved from a strictly administrative form of 
Russification to an aggressive cultural Russification. The implementation of these 
policies still corresponded closely to the traditional position of borderland elites within 
the empire, but even compliant elites (Baltic Germans and Finnish elites) saw many 
privileges abridged during these years. In many ways, this was the logical consequence of 
the shift towards a state-centric mode of governance, as the Tsarist state faced off against 
external rivals that not only possessed a coherent and effective bureaucratic structure, but 
also were able to call upon nationalist sentiments among their populations. Combined 
with the shock of failure in the Crimean War which challenged the efficacy of Tsarist 
governance and the great reforms of the 1860s which removed serfdom as the traditional 
strut of loyalty among the gentry, the Tsar and his advisors increasingly came under the 
influence of Russian nationalists promoting policies designed to destroy the autonomy of 
ethnic and religious minorities. This process began under Alexander II, during his turn 
towards reactionary policies in the latter half of his reign, but only achieved its peak 
under the policies of Alexander III and Nicholas II. The next chapter details this process 
in the Western Borderlands, as the Tsarist state abandoned its traditional source of loyalty 
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in these territories in an (ill-fated) attempt to reconstruct the Tsarist Empire as a modern 
nation-state. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RUSSIFICATION AND THE END OF IMPERIAL AUTONOMY 
 
Up until the middle of the 19th century, the relationship between the Tsarist state and the 
Western Borderlands followed the logic of a decentralized, multi-ethnic empire. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, the initial incorporation of these regions was 
accompanied by large grants of political and cultural autonomy, usually reinforced by the 
corporate power of local elites. It was only during parts of the 18th and the early 19th 
century that this decentralized status quo was challenged, with the Tsarist state pursuing 
administrative centralization in response to perceived geopolitical weakness. This 
centralization was far from complete and mainly aimed to improve administrative control 
over the borderlands in order to increase extractive capabilities and to reinforce the 
empire's military position within Europe. With the exception of the Ukrainian Hetmanate, 
local elites retained their privileged position in the borderland regions and most areas of 
autonomy remained untouched by the central authorities. This was especially true for 
cultural autonomy, as the Tsarist ethos of loyalty trumped ethnic and religious concerns 
and provided little incentive to disrupt largely profitable relationships with influential 
local elites. Even Nicholas I's ideology of official nationality had little to do in practice 
with ethnic Russian nationalism.  
 This state of affairs, however, began to morph during the 19th century, when 
nationality gradually took on an ethnic-centered hue. During the pre-19th-century 
imperial period, rule came to be associated symbolically with the space of the empire. In 
this way, territorial control and sovereignty was the important hallmark, and the guiding 
conception of nationality. This only began to change in the 19th century, as this imperial 
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conceptualization of space began to give way to a more unitary conception of 
nationhood.494 Before this period, differences such as ethnicity and religion were 
considered by Tsarist administrators, and oftentimes those who were considered different 
were ill-treated, but the state never took it as an object, per se, to persecute differentness. 
Administrative distinctions such as inorodtsy (of a different people) and inozemsty (of a 
different land) existed, but they only became the basis of policy-making in the latter half 
of the 19th century when ethnic distinctions became important to the government. 
Evidence for this can be seen from the fact that communities of inorodtsy and inozemsty 
were ruled in a number of different manners (direct military government, indirect rule, 
and even constitutionalism) rather than being uniformly assimilated.495 Further evidence 
can be gleaned by the position of the Russians themselves in their own empire. Russians, 
as an ethnic group, lagged behind many non-Russian communities in terms of metrics 
like literacy, urbanization, and relative levels of education and affluence. Most Russians 
experienced worse living conditions than citizens in the western regions, and this only 
grew worse as one went further eastward. As a result, it is inappropriate to judge 
Russians writ large as the favored race of the empire, but rather it is better to view the 
empire as the preserve of a Russian-dominated multiethnic power elite from the more 
privileged estates.496 
 The emergence of narodnost in Russian politics during the course of the 19th 
century transformed the relationship between the core and the borderlands. Nicholas I’s 
‘official nationality’ and modest efforts to Russify non-Russian areas can be seen as the 
harbinger of this larger process of change, though his government for the most part 
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retained the traditional reliance on clients and dynastic loyalty. Significant groupings of 
Russian intellectuals (liberal and conservative) also adopted the language of narodnost, 
but with substantially more fervor than the state. The concept was fueled by the 
popularity of German romanticism embraced by the intelligentsia in the 1830s and 1840s, 
and eventually manifested itself in a vocal Russian nationalist movement epitomized by 
individuals like Mikhail Katkov who saw the Russification of the empire as necessary to 
its survival. After the Crimean War, this group exerted increasing influence over the 
government, and helped to impart a negative connotation on inorodtsy that was translated 
into laws and policies targeting non-Russian groups.497 As Kappeler notes: 
Simultaneously, in the growing public space, modern Russian 
nationalism was emerging and beginning to advocate the unity of the 
imperial or civic nation with the ethnic Russian nation. This new 
ideology, propagated during the 1860s mainly by Mikhail Katkov, 
weakened the old pillars of the empire – political loyalty to the autocrat 
and reliance on the elites regardless of their language or religion. 
Although the Tsarist authorities were suspicious of modern 
nationalism, which was connected with the growth of an autonomous 
and the spread of democracy, the new concept of a Russian ethno-
political nation began to influence their policies. Owing to the growing 
emphasis on ethnic issues, loyalty was increasingly identified with 
ethnicity rather than social status. Poles – and later Germans, Jews, and 
other nationalities – were regarded more and more often as “enemy” 
nations.498 
 
 Obrusenie, or Russification, became an overriding concern starting in the 1860s, 
despite previous, milder efforts to Russify. The concern with obrusenie emerged in 
response to defeat in the Crimean War and the conclusion that Russia needed to 
modernize and become a normal nation-state to keep up with the rest of Europe.499 Such 
efforts were not consistent, as the state had to contend with the fact that imperial stability 
was largely based on the old methods of incorporation, and these could not be wiped 
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away quickly even if they were viewed as outmoded in the age of nationalism.500 
Nationality policy was not uniform as some groups (such as the Baltic Germans, Finns, 
and Armenians among others) were treated relatively well, while others (Ukrainians, 
Poles, and Jews) were treated as potentially subversive groups. These latter groups were 
viewed as either alien or suspicious, with educational and linguistic rights severely 
abridged since those were mediums viewed as undermining Tsarist unity.501 By the last 
decade of the 19th century, however, obrusenie had come to embrace even the historically 
loyal non-Russian groups, including the Baltic Germans and the Finns, and the outcome 
was the alienation of these groups from Tsarist rule (this is most remarkable in the case of 
Finland, which shall be discussed below). Given the relations, or lack thereof, between 
the core and borderlands in the waning years of the empire, it is not for nothing that 
Lenin referred to the empire as the “prison house of nations.” 
 The creeping nationalization present during the late years of the Tsarist Empire 
represents the logical culmination of the state-building process and a definitive break 
with the imperial past. The abolition of serfdom in Alexander II's great reforms acted as a 
harbinger for this policy shift, as it did away with the tension that Poggi identified 
between the centralizing nation-state and the labor-repressive agricultural systems 
common to the political systems of Eastern Europe.502 By eliminating this vital strut of 
loyalty, Tsarism took an extraordinary risk by attempting to reconstruct the foundation of 
the state's legitimacy, which corresponds with Tilly's observation about the efforts of 
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states to homogenize their populations even if it could potentially provoke instability.503 
The shock of the Crimean War was seen as ample justification for this major departure 
from past policies, and the emergence of political radicalism and terrorism in the 1870s 
and 1880s only served to harden the state into the policy path of rigorous Russification. 
Yet, as the experiences of the individual borderland regions indicate (discussed in detail 
below), this newfound ardor for Russification did not solve the state's capacity problem 
in the imperial periphery, the disjuncture between the state's despotic power and its 
infrastructural capabilities.504 It may have been the state's goal, consistent with both the 
state-building literature and the empire literature,505 to eliminate the capability of internal 
elites to obstruct central policy in pursuit of this national dream, but the administrative 
arithmetic was not in the state's favor. 
 As such, it remains possible to perceive the continuing importance of local elites 
in the borderland regions, as the imperial state made this final, fateful step. The variation 
was not as stark as during the process of administrative centralization, as even "friendly" 
elites were forced to conform to at least some of the center's dictates, but the process was 
also by no means uniform. Indeed, Levi's discussion about the role of coercion versus 
quasi-voluntary compliance in resolving negotiations between the state and internal 
groups is extremely pertinent to the case of the Tsarist Empire.506 Where the state still 
faced coherent corporate power, it was necessary to decide between these two policy 
paths in attempting to gain compliance. In the case of Poland, coercion was costly, but it 
was also the logical outcome of the previous, failed policies of accommodation with the 
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szlachta (not to mention all the non-gentry groups that were now appearing on the stage 
of history). In the Baltics and Finland, the negotiating position of the local elites was 
partly compromised by the emergence of outside groups, usually in the form of 
nationalist movements, that could undermine the old compact of autonomy in return for 
social stability. However, the traditional elites were still viewed as potential allies such 
that quasi-voluntary compliance was still the state's strategy, especially in the Baltics. In 
Ukraine, the policy choice was largely moot due to the defection of the starshyna and the 
absence of a sufficiently influential elite group that could bargain with the state (as the 
Ukrainophile intellectuals were few in number and easily repressed). 
 This chapter, therefore, demonstrates the continuing relevance of local elites and 
their relationship with the empire, even if this relationship was threatened by dramatic 
changes in leadership choice in the imperial core. The process of Russification in the 
Western Borderlands in the latter half of the 19th century validates the importance of the 
variable of elite actions and ideologies in the imperial core. Focusing on the strength and 
orientation of elites in the borderlands themselves retains compelling importance in the 
theoretical model of direct and indirect rule employed here, but such a focus would be 
incomplete without also considering the agency of imperial officials and, above all, the 
Tsar. Nicholas I's "official nationality" laid the groundwork for later ideological shifts 
and provided important political space for ethnic Russian nationalism, even if Nicholas 
himself did not trust Russian nationalism. The reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II 
exemplify the culmination of this process and the way in which it placed pressure on the 
traditional methods of indirect rule employed in the borderlands. Yet, as this chapter 
shows, even the dramatic shift towards Russification was not enough to dislodge local 
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elite power, especially in the Baltics where the Baltic Germans remained important 
servitors up until World War I. 
 
Creating "Little Russians" 
 
With the successful consolidation of administrative control in the former Hetmanate, the 
Tsarist state turned to other modes of integration during the 19th century. Whereas 
previously the state had only cared about the loyalty and productivity of borderland 
territories, in the second half of the 19th century there was an increasing concern with 
nationalism and national unity, especially after the Great Reforms of the early 1860s 
destroyed the previous basis of the state (the labor-repressive system of serfdom). Thus, 
instead of emphasizing administrative harmonization and control, the state sought to 
mold imperial subjects into the dominant culture while also attacking the linguistic and 
cultural rights of other groups. This was true in all of the borderlands, but it assumed a 
different character in Ukraine (and Belarus) due to the historical lineage of the Kievan 
Rus and the perception that Ukraine "belonged" within the greater Russian national 
project (unlike the Baltic German Protestants or the Polish Catholics). Ukraine, though 
part of the borderlands in the same way as the Baltics or Poland, straddled a domestic-
foreign divide in Russian imperial imagination. It was seen as both an organic part of 
"Russia" and also as an exotic locale relevant to Russian interests. This perception can 
help to explain why the integration and assimilation of Ukraine found virtually 
unanimous approval across the Russian political spectrum, while this was not the case for 
the other parts of the borderlands. Any separate Ukrainian identity could be construed as 
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a direct threat to Russian identity itself.507 In addition, Russification efforts directed at 
subjects in regions like Poland were often interpreted as a kind of punishment for 
disloyalty to the state. In contrast, Russification in Ukraine and Belarus were seen as 
benign processes bringing the other Russian peoples back into the mother culture.508 This 
was the logic that helped to drive Russification efforts in the former Hetmanate during 
the latter half of the 19th century. 
 Cultural Russification occurred in the Hetmanate prior to this period of time, but 
it was not the product of a consistent set of policies on the part of the Tsarist state. The 
process of nationalization under the Romanovs took far longer than in other parts of 
Europe, partly because of how much the dynasty resisted the emergence of national 
identity among all the peoples of the empire, including Russians. There was not much 
coordination between the state and the population, and the insistently autocratic nature of 
government resisted the expanded popular participation and civil society that came hand-
in-hand with nationalization.509 As a consequence, policies directed towards language and 
culture tended to be isolated incidents rather than part of an ambitious Russification 
campaign. In the early 18th century, the starshyna were encouraged to marry into 
Russian families and adopt their traditions rather than marrying Poles and Lithuanians. 
This policy was mainly directed towards minimizing Polish influence and power. In 
addition, a 1720 action by the Senate ordered that Ukrainian books be inspected to 
guarantee that they were consistent with Great Russian Orthodox church books, but this 
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was directed towards doctrinal unity in the Orthodox churches.510 During the 18th 
century, the height of Russian efforts towards administrative centralization in the 
Hetmanate, Ukrainian language and culture were being undermined by the incursion of 
Great Russian culture, but it would be a mistake to attribute this to a conscious effort of 
cultural Russification. Instead, as Andreas Kappeler argues, it would be more appropriate 
to consider this incursion more as a product of "spontaneous" acculturation, as the 
starshyna took on the trappings of Russian culture in an attempt to protect and extend 
their estate privileges.511 This process of acculturation was important to the assimilation 
of Ukraine, but it was fundamentally driven by the economic and political interests of the 
local elite. The peasantry and rank-and-file Cossacks by and large retained Ukrainian 
language and customs. 
 It was not until the early 19th century that a serious effort was made to develop 
Ukrainian into a modern, national language that corresponded with a Ukrainian culture. 
The effort to turn Ukrainian into a fully-fledged national language was difficult, as it was 
perceived as a colloquial language spoken by the common folk, while Ukrainian elites 
tended to speak in Russian. Only in the 19th century did the first Ukrainian intellectuals 
start to make an effort to spread Ukrainian language instruction and create a standardized 
orthography.512 Initially, the Tsarist government was supportive of the Ukrainian 
awakening in the early 19th century, since the emergence of a "Little Russian" culture 
was seen as a potentially useful addition to Russian identity. Especially after the 1830-1 
Polish Uprising, this awakening was supported as a way to separate Ukrainians from 
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Polish influence. This official support, however, dried up almost entirely with the 
discovery of the Society of St. Cyril and Methodious.513 Official support was also no 
guarantee of support within the Russian intellectual community. Although some Russian 
intellectuals supported the educational and literary efforts in Ukrainian, even some liberal 
members of the intelligentsia such as the critic Vissarion Belinsky were dismissive of 
"Little Russian" efforts. Belinsky went so far as to denigrate the literary quality of 
Ukraine's first national poet, Taras Shevchenko, and suggested that Russian would be a 
more effective medium for artistic achievement. 
 Official support for Ukrainophile activity ended with the discovery of the Society 
of St. Cyril and Methodious, a secret society based in Kiev that called for an overhaul of 
the existing political order. Since the Society was discovered during the height of the 
1848 European revolutions, the Tsarist state was less likely to tolerate such political 
activities. The Society constructed a political program that called for Slavic union, with 
Slavic peoples uniting together under a federal style system that followed the precepts of 
Christ and operated with an assembly (Sejm) and substantial autonomy for each area. The 
program was not all that different from that of Russian Pan-Slavist groups. The Society 
was denounced in a rather exaggerated report by the informant Petrov, at which point its 
members were arrested by the Third Section and their possessions (primarily their 
personal papers) were seized as evidence. The case was viewed as being important 
enough that the head of the Third Section, Count Orlov, and his director General Leonty 
Dubelt, were tasked with handling the it.514 In Orlov's report, it was acknowledged that 
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the Society amounted to very little in practical activity, but was restricted to the realm of 
ideas. However, these ideas, especially the poetry of Shevchenko, were seen as 
potentially more threatening than action. Although as a whole the sentences were rather 
mild, individuals like Shevchenko were punished more severely for the ideas they 
expressed. This would be similar to the treatment of the ideas of the Ukrainophiles in the 
1860s and 1870s.515 At the time, the reasoning the state employed for the light sentences 
(except in the case of Shevchenko and another member, A. Gulak) was that harsh 
repression may trigger additional opposition later on, and so leniency was used to 
guarantee against the emergence of another Polish problem.516 
 After the suppression of the Cyril-Methodians, the Ukrainophile movement went 
into relative abeyance for the last, repressive years of Nicholas I's reign. The reign of the 
new Tsar, Alexander II, reopened the possibilities of Ukrainophile organization. In 1861, 
during the period of the Great Reforms, the Ukrainophile movement enjoyed a brief 
resurgence with the creation of the first Ukrainian hromada, which sought to return 
Ukrainians to their cultural roots. Although the hromada movement was caught up in the 
repression following the 1863-4 Polish Uprising, it was not completely snuffed out and 
became an important center of Ukrainophile activity in towns and cities throughout 
Ukraine.517 In the early 1860s, the Ukrainophiles turned to education and church 
structures to transmit their message (and language). While not officially approved, the 
use of Ukrainian primers was also not explicitly banned by the Tsarist government, and 
the ability of primary education to inculcate Ukrainian identity was seen as crucial.518 
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However, during this period Russian nationalism was also on the rise, and the 
reemergence of Ukrainophilism was vulnerable to its influence both with the authorities 
and in the press. Mikhail Katkov, the noted Russian nationalist and publicist, undertook 
attacks on the Ukrainophiles in 1862-1863, criticizing fundraising for publishing popular 
works in Ukrainian, and finding all efforts at spreading another "Russian" language as 
subversive to the unity of the Russian nation. In 1863, his polemics successfully 
provoked Ukrainophiles to respond, and his equation of their movement with the Polish 
problems helped to spur the authorities to considering the Ukrainophiles as more of a 
dangerous movement than a harmless fancy of intellectuals.519 
 Katkov's argument, which helped to stimulate the decision to impose the 
notorious Valuev Edict in 1863, is interesting from the perspective of state-building in the 
Tsarist Empire. Russian nationalists like Katkov operated under the assumption that the 
process of state-building in the empire was not all that different from the process of state-
building in Western European states. To support this assessment, he pointed to smaller 
communities within European states like the Scots or the Huguenots being successfully 
assimilated despite their desire for cultural autonomy.520 For the supporters of the "All-
Russian" project (which included a substantial number of Little Russian intellectuals who 
saw Ukraine and Russia as naturally linked), a core component of this assimilation was 
the submersion of regional dialects like Provencal or Celtic or other local vernaculars into 
"national" languages like French, English or Spanish. This comparison was politically 
useful for Russian nationalists, since for them it was obvious that Russian was the 
"national" language while Ukrainian was a quaint dialect that could not act as a basis for 
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an independent cultural existence.521 Operating under this rubric, even though 
Ukrainophilism shared many characteristics and goals of the Russian nationalists 
(primarily a flavor of Pan-Slavism), its suppression was justified as in the case of the 
Cyril-Methodians because Ukraine having an "independent existence" was fundamentally 
inimical to the goals of the imperial state.522 Nationalisms within the empire, such as 
could be found in the Baltics, Poland, and Finland, were a threat, but they were still 
outside the "national body" itself. In contrast, Ukrainian nationalism, even of a fairly mild 
variety, posed a potential "corruption" of the "national organism."523 
 The Valuev circular, issued in 1863, was the capstone of this scare concerning 
nationalist groups. The circular banned the publication of books in Ukrainian intended for 
popular audiences, though it did not address publications for specialist audiences, since it 
was only the spread of Ukrainian identity among the masses that was seen as threatening 
to Russian state interests.524 Furthermore, unlike other imperial pronouncements 
concerning the borderlands, the Valuev edict was applied vigorously such that by 1871 
the Ukrainian historian Mykola Kostamarov could claim that such publications had 
ceased to exist.525 To understand the reasoning behind the Valuev edict, it is necessary to 
differentiate two strains of Ukrainophilism that emerged after the accession of Alexander 
II. The first strain, high-brow Ukrainophilism, was directed towards the purpose of 
converting Ukrainian into a literary language and developing high culture. This strain 
was represented by intellectuals like Kostamarov, Panteleimon Kulish (who published 
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Notes on Southern Rus), and the various individuals behind the publication of the 
periodical Osnova (Foundation). Unlike with the Cyril-Methodians, this strain was seen 
as relatively harmless and was generally excluded from Tsarist repression during the 
1860s (though this changed with the Ems Edict in the 1870s).526 Quite simply, it was seen 
as involving so small a portion of the population of Ukraine that it was not a serious 
threat to state interests. 
 In contrast, the second strain of popular education in Ukrainian language and 
culture was seen as a serious threat to Tsarist state interests and the Russian national 
project. This strain of Ukrainophilism manifested itself in the foundation of local schools 
and Sunday schools that sought to teach the Ukrainian language in a more standardized 
fashion. These schools generally operated outside the control of the state and used 
primers written by Ukrainian intellectuals intended to increase awareness of Ukrainian 
identity, which was problematic given the Tsarist desire to place all social institutions 
under its administrative umbrella.527 This strain was perceived as more of a threat to 
Tsarist interests because if the spread of Ukrainian was successful, then the mass of 
Ukrainian peasantry may start to believe that they possessed an identity that was 
significantly separate from the Great Russian identity, rather than being a branch of that 
identity.528 The state and Russian nationalists viewed this possibility with trepidation 
because if the basis for loyalty to the state was going to shift to the nation after the 
Emancipation, the defection of Ukrainians from the Russian fold would threaten Russian 
predominance within the empire. As Dominic Lieven, Geoffrey Hoskings and others 
note, at this point Russians only comprised 44% of the empire's inhabitants, while 
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Ukrainians made up another 18%.529 Or, as a Third Section report articulated the threat 
when considering a primer written by Shevchenko: 
The publication both of this booklet and of others like it, namely works 
written in Little Russian for the common people of Little Russia, 
betrays an intention... to call back to life the Little Russian nationality, 
the gradual and durable fusion of which with the Great Russian 
nationality into a single, indissoluble whole ought to be the subject of 
pacific but nevertheless constant endeavors on the part of the 
government... [I]n no way must the natural course of the 
rapprochement of the two peoples be obstructed and the government 
must not, by enlivening Little Russian speech and Little Russian 
literature, facilitate the emergence of that separation of the two related 
tribes which was once so fatal for both of them and which might even 
be dangerous from the point of view of the unity of the state.530 
 
Toward this end, later in the 1860s, the government considered not only keeping in force 
a ban on instruction in Ukrainian, but also starting a proactive drive to spread Russian 
literacy through the funding and dispersion of Russian primers.531 
 By the mid-1870s, the Valuev circular was no longer viewed as effective enough 
for the purposes of the state. As a consequence, the state expanded its aim beyond strictly 
educational material to literature and other categories of writing. In 1875, a document 
was prepared for the Special Council on the Ukrainian question which argued that 
Ukrainian literature could not be compared to the development of something like a 
Latvian literature. While the Latvians could develop a national literature without 
threatening the integrity of the empire, this was not true for the 13 million Ukrainians 
who were part of the 'triune' concept of the Russian nation (Russian, Belorussian, 
Ukrainian). Any Ukrainian literature would by definition be a disunifying force.532 This 
conclusion led directly to the implementation of the Ems Edict in 1875. The Ems Edict 
                                                 
529
 Dominic Lieven, “Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918. Power, Territory, Identity,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 34, no. 2 (April 1999): 163–200. 185; Hosking, Russia. 378-380. 
530
 Quoted in Saunders, “Russia and Ukraine Under Alexander II.” 41. 
531
 Miller, The Ukrainian Question. 134. 
532
 Ibid. 180. 
226 
 
extended the goals of the Valuev Circular by banning all Ukrainian publishing outside of 
"historical documents" and "belles-lettres." Primers, orthographies, or any published 
material with a potential popular appeal were banned, and educational institutions were 
expected to "purify" their libraries. Alongside these proscriptions, the government also 
established a plan to patronize the Lvov newspaper Slovo as a Russifying mouthpiece, 
while Ukrainian publications like the Kievskii Telegraf were closed.533 These kinds of 
Russifying measures characterized the later, more reactionary, period of Alexander II's 
reign, and would only be deepened by the reign of his successor, Alexander III. 
 Despite the stringency of Tsarist policies and their success in suppressing the 
Ukrainian movement in the short term, the state was nonetheless unsuccessful in 
inculcating a Russian identity in the broad mass of Ukrainians. This can mostly be traced 
to administrative limitations on the part of the state and Russia's relative economic 
position versus other European states that had successfully assimilated minority groups. 
During this time period, the Tsarist government was also crippled by an administrative 
lack of capacity in Ukraine (which was also not uncommon in others parts of the 
borderlands). The ratio of officials to the population as a whole was 1:1642, which 
compared unfavorably with even some far-flung European colonies. It fell dramatically 
short of the ratio observed in places like Great Britain, France, and Germany, which was 
roughly 1:141.534 Furthermore, Miller judges that a key limitation on Tsarist assimilatory 
potential was that it lacked the resources that other European states like France had at 
their disposal during their own nation-building project. Schools, the military, and local 
government simply did not have the resources, the expertise, or the social status to 
                                                 
533
 Ibid. 183-4. 
534
 Ibid. 143-4. 
227 
 
communicate Russian identity. The fact that the Tsarist government would not 
compromise its monopoly on power even after the emancipation severely hindered the 
potential emergence of autonomous social institutions that could contribute to nation-
building.535 In Western Europe, the cause of nation-building was aided by the fact that 
industrialization preceded national awakening, giving the state vital resources to pursue 
its goals. In Russia (and in other parts of Eastern Europe and also Austria-Hungary), 
industrialization followed or coincided with the emergence of nationalism, making 
adaptation on the part of the state very difficult.536 Repression provided an alternate 
strategy, but as the experience of the borderlands indicates, it was a strategy with short-
term benefits but diminishing returns. 
 
National Awakening in the Baltics and Finland 
 
The process of attempted cultural Russification in the Baltics and Finland highlights the 
shift from an imperial logic of governance to the logic of a centralized nation-state. The 
Baltic Germans and conservative Finnish elites were consistent servitors of Tsarist 
government and delivered social stability in their respective territories. This consistent 
service acted as the most important factor in explaining the relatively minimal 
administrative centralization, as the Tsarist state was loathe to undermine the loyalty of 
these elites. However, this service did little to protect the Baltics and Finland from more 
thoroughgoing efforts at cultural Russification in the latter half of the 19th century, as the 
government became more and more committed to a centralized state predicated on the 
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dominance of Great Russians. Although there were intermittent efforts under Nicholas I 
to privilege the status of the Russian language and Orthodoxy, these efforts were never 
carried through to their logical conclusion and were ineffective in replacing German or 
Swedish as the official language or Lutheranism as the privileged religion. This changed 
after the Crimean War and the Great Reforms, as the Tsarist state moved to bring 
autonomous regions not only under the administrative control of the center, but also 
under the influence of a desired national culture. Alexander III and Nicholas II both 
continued to pursue these policies, even as they disrupted the stability of these regions 
and undermined the loyalty of the elite strata. The metamorphosis of Finland from the 
most stable and loyal border region to a restive and tumultuous territory by the end of the 
19th century especially epitomizes this dynamic. 
 After the Decembrist revolt, the censorship measures instituted in the Russian 
core were extended throughout the empire, though enforcement of the policies remained 
inconsistent with non-Russian language publications (which benefited the Baltics, as 
most publications were in German). The Third Section was also employed in the 
oversight of the dissent in the borderlands, but the numbers employed were rather 
minimal compared to the number of gendarmes in Moscow and Petersburg. Pressure was 
also applied through the Governors-General, which tended to be less sympathetic to 
autonomy and Baltic privileges during Nicholas’ reign. One of the areas where the state 
pursued Russification measures (however modest) was in education. Uvarov's attempted 
reforms in the 1830s was an early form of educational Russification, with Baltic schools 
being forced to emphasize more Russian language training and the use of Russian 
instructors. The results of this program were mixed, as the gentry provided resistance, as 
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well as the Lutheran church.537 The reason why education was targeted first and why the 
local elites resisted educational Russification so seriously was that the state identified 
education as an important source of Baltic autonomy and German identity. When the 
Baltics came into the Russian orbit, the empire lacked the resources to install a new 
educational infrastructure, and in any case, the education that already existed in the 
Baltics was generally superior to that available in Russia. As a result, education was left 
to the purview of the Baltic Germans and Lutheran pastors, which allowed the local elites 
to instill a distinctive identity in students in the borderlands.538 By the 1840s, as part of 
the program of educational Russification, all students in the borderlands had to pass a 
Russian language exam, but in terms of practical effects the changes still existed mainly 
on the superficial level.539 
 Another sphere where the Tsarist state occasionally pursued Russification efforts 
was in the religious domain. Lutheran pastors retained substantial power in the Baltic 
territories, as they were not only deeply involved in educational institutions, but they 
were also responsible for producing documentation for their congregations to the Russian 
authorities, which they were permitted to do in German.540 While not officially 
sanctioned, Tsarist authorities generally permitted the Lutheran religion to operate 
without interference in the Baltics, but this began changing in the 19th century as the state 
became more interested in not only administrative but also cultural Russification, and in 
cultivating a national ideology. Throughout the 19th century, there were several official 
and semi-official waves of Orthodox proselytism, which sought to undermine the 
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political power of the local elites. The peasantry, given their adversarial relationship with 
the Baltic Germans and the hope that conversion would open up economic opportunities, 
converted to Orthodoxy in significant numbers, but actual religious practice remained 
fairly superficial. Additional measures were instituted to consolidate this newfound 
Orthodox demographic, including the policy that children of mixed marriages needed to 
be raised in the Orthodox Church, while also formally forbidding conversion away from 
Orthodoxy (although, again, in practice this only drove conversions underground.)541 
During Nicholas’ reign efforts at religious Russification were generally modest, but they 
set the precedent for the far more intrusive regulations that would be put in practice by 
succeeding governments which aimed to limit the sphere of influence of the Baltic 
Germans.542 
 After the end of Nicholas’ reign, and especially after the Polish revolt in 1863, a 
couple different processes conspired to change the status quo in the Baltics and threaten 
the privileged position of the Baltic Germans. The first was the mobilization the Estonian 
and Latvian peasantry, which represented the emergence of a national consciousness 
among these previously politically “deactivated” parts of the populace. An educated 
national elite had already formed during the course of the 19th century, but it was only in 
the second half of the century and especially after 1880 that their message of nationalism 
infiltrated the population at large.543 The national awakenings in the decades after 1850 
among Latvians and Estonians challenged the traditional predominance of the Baltic 
German landowners, and prompted the landowners to petition Petersburg to protect them 
from such revolutionary elements. The Baltic populace in essence fractured along class 
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and ethnic lines.544 These awakenings also posed a problem for the Tsarist state, as the 
1850s and 1860s saw an increase in the number of peasant uprisings and general unrest in 
the Baltic territories, some of which required the military to suppress.545 
 The second process of importance was a more thoroughgoing approach to 
Russification on the part of the Tsarist state under Alexander II and his successors. 
Although Alexander II defended the Baltic Germans against nationalist polemics, and 
although Alexander II has the historical reputation for being a reformer while Nicholas I 
was a repressive autocrat, Alexander II’s government was actually markedly harsher on 
the autonomy of the borderlands.546 This took the form of more rigorous top-down 
Russification measures, but also sought to take advantage of the emerging rift between 
the Baltic Germans and the peasantry. Alexander II tried to break the pattern of Baltic 
German autonomy by introducing reforms designed to increase the use of Russian in 
education and administration, while also trying to bring Baltic institutions more in line 
with imperial laws.547 This culminated in an edict in 1869 which dictated that all official 
business in the empire had to be conducted in Russian.548 Municipal reforms in the 1870s 
attempted to impose new governing structures on the Baltics, with the intent of 
undermining the gentry’s seat of political power, although the Baltic Germans were able 
to resist these measures enough to retain their traditional magistrates and guilds.549 
Alongside these measures, the state also implemented policies designed to improve the 
position of the peasantry vis-à-vis the Baltic Germans. Included among these were the 
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abolition of the corvee, restrictions on corporal punishment, provisions for the creation of 
peasant self-government structures, and better protection under local judicial 
institutions.550 At least in the short term, this divide and conquer tactic succeeded, as it 
managed to cultivate a welcoming attitude among Latvians and Estonians for 
Russification measures. By the late 1800s, all evidence indicates that the Estonian 
peasantry actually held strongly pro-Russian views, as they assumed that the Russians 
would eventually release them from the clutches of the Baltic Germans. This perspective 
was shared by the emerging national intelligentsia, which associated Russification 
measures with the erosion of Baltic German privileges and the opening up of new 
political space for ethnic Latvians and Estonians.551 In the long term, Russification 
policies jumpstarted processes of ethnic mobilization that would ultimately undermine 
the coherence of Tsarist rule and help contribute to the revolutionary situation in the early 
20th century. 
 The next stage of Russification in the Baltics occurred during the reign of 
Alexander III, who was more committed to Russian nationalism and Russification than 
his father. The impetus for this stage was the inspection of the Baltic territories by 
Russian Senator Nikolai Manasein, and his proposals for deepening Russian control of 
the region. Some of the first measures undertaken to deepen Russification in the Baltics 
was to reinforce the use of Russian as an official language. This policy had already been 
instituted in 1850, but had been poorly implemented, necessitating closer oversight and 
enforcement on the part of the Tsarist state. Senator Manasein's proposals for linguistic 
Russification in the early 1880s were formalized in 1885 and 1889 ukases instituting the 
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mandatory use of Russian in regional and municipal government. Manasein's proposals in 
education were similar, with the use of Russian in seminaries and elementary schools 
emphasized, as well as making Russian (rather than German) the official language of 
instruction at the University of Dorpat.552 The state also moved to reinvigorate religious 
Russification in the 1880s, with families of mixed religion required to raise children in 
the Orthodox Church and with a renewed drive towards Orthodox conversion. For a brief 
time period Lutheran pastors could be prosecuted for violating the religious standards of 
the empire, but this was deemphasized in the 1890s as the state toned down the religious 
side of Russification.553 
  These efforts to expand Russification in the Baltics proved to be temporary, 
although they nevertheless succeeded in alienating substantial segments of the Baltic 
population (the Baltic Germans remained loyal because they realized their position relied 
on the continued patronage of the state, but the Tsarist autocracy had little means to cope 
with the escalating nationalism in the region). Manasein also intended to eliminate the 
institutional basis of Baltic German hegemony, but the state was obviously not willing to 
jettison this last tenuous link of traditional imperial policy. Towards this end, Manasein 
proposed the reorganization of the Baltic guberniia, with the three regions being replaced 
by two centered on Latvian and Estonian language divisions. The proposal was intended 
to subvert the influence of German and to provide an administrative apparatus for local 
zemstvos, but the proposal was not acted on by Petersburg.554 Other Russification 
measures slackened in the 1890s as the state stopped short of abandoning the Baltic 
Germans in order to cultivate the support of Latvian and Estonian peasants. Russification 
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continued in education, but was halted or reversed in other areas as the Baltic Germans 
successfully retained most of their influence in local government.555 The tragedy of these 
policy changes (at least from the perspective of the state) was that they effectively 
abandoned the national movements that the state had helped create as part of the divide-
and-conquer strategy, leaving those movements with little reason to remain loyal to the 
state in the long-term. Some of the more radical segments of the Baltic national 
movements helped to contribute to the revolutionary agitation before and after 1917. 
 Russification in Finland occurred later than in any other of the borderlands, and 
during the time period when the other regions were feeling the heavy hand of Tsarist rule 
Finland was actually succeeding in carving out more political autonomy. This success 
can be largely attributed to the deft maneuvering of Finland's political class and the rise 
of a Fennoman movement that sought to define a Finnish identity separate from both the 
Swedish past and the Russian present. The Fennoman movement originated in the first 
half of the 19th century, largely as a result of conflict between Finnish speakers and the 
Swedish speakers that dominated the Grand Duchy's elite. However, the Fennoman 
movement also came to view Russian rule as restrictive even if it was relatively lenient, 
laying the groundwork for the idea of a separate Finnish nation.556 Although not 
recognized as the official language of Finland, Finnish became increasingly important 
over the last decades of the 19th century, with a significant number of Finnish language 
private schools opened during the time period. The ability to conduct this kind of low-
level nationalist campaign, which embraced more than half of Finnish students by 
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century's end, helped to consolidate the idea of the Finnish nation.557 On the political 
side, Finland entrenched its autonomy through the maintenance of a separate military 
infrastructure, a separate monetary system, and retention of control over educational 
institutions. One of the greatest successes of Finnish autonomy was concession by 
Alexander II that allowed Finland to maintain a regular Diet, which had not been 
convened since the reign of Alexander I. Although unimpressive compared to other 
European parliaments, the Finnish Diet Act of 1869 established the permanency of the 
representative body, with the Diet to be convened every five years. The Diet lacked 
extensive formal powers, but it did provide a forum for political discussion and push for 
reform.558 
 Despite these achievements, however, Finland's autonomy drew the ire of both 
government officials and nationalist journalists during the second half of the 19th 
century, who viewed Finnish autonomy as an outdated arrangement that needed to be 
revisited. Fears that Sweden may take advantage of Russian weakness during the 
Crimean War helped to contribute to an atmosphere in Petersburg that overemphasized 
the separatist threat in Finland. As C. Leonard Lundin notes, this led to the paradoxical 
situation where Russian efforts to curb the perceived separatist threat served to create the 
discontent that fueled separatist ambitions.559 The extremist nationalist press in Russia 
helped to reinforce this fear of Finnish separatism, as these organs attacked Finland's 
position in the final decade of the 19th century. Some of the military men who became 
responsible for Finnish policy also wrote for these publications, and the government of 
                                                 
557
 Kirby, A Concise History of Finland. 118-9. 
558
 Ibid. 108-9. 
559
 Thaden, at al, Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914. 373-4. 
236 
 
Nicholas II was loathe to question such nationalist positions.560 This fear of Finnish 
separatism culminated in the appointment of Nikolai Bobrikov as Governor-General in 
1898, a man who was committed to eliminating Finnish autonomy. Upon being appointed 
Governor-General, Bobrikov targeted several areas for reform that would increase 
Russian control over Finland. These included the integration of the armed forces, the 
weakening of the State Secretary and the strengthening of the Governor-General, the 
abolition of separate customs and monetary systems, and the introduction of Russian into 
government administration and the school system.561 These initiatives set the stage for 
increasing imperial intrusion and the beginnings of serious conflict between the Finns and 
imperial officials. 
 One of Bobrikov's first moves, with the approval of the Tsar, was to curtail the 
political autonomy that Finland had accumulated in key institutions like the Diet and the 
State Secretary. The February Manifesto outlined a series of legal changes that shifted 
legislative authority away from the Diet and towards the corresponding Russian minister 
and the Tsar. The Diet and other Finnish institutions were to be reduced to an advisory 
role and Finnish autonomy was to be thoroughly compromised.562 The Manifesto 
prompted a political crisis in Finland, as many Finnish senators resigned in protest over 
the order to promulgate the manifesto and were subsequently replaced by officials 
deemed more likely to be compliant with imperial designs. Given the impotence of their 
governing institutions to resist the changes, Finnish civil society mobilized to formally 
protest imperial policy with the hope of lobbying the Tsar to reverse the changes. The 
Finns composed the Great Address objecting to the changes and garnered over half a 
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million signatures to present to the Tsar. The Tsar refused to meet with the 
representatives presenting the address, and when it was finally routed through the proper 
channels (mainly Bobrikov), the Tsar only indicated that no action was to be taken to 
address the concerns.563 The Russian autocracy had little regard for the political activities 
of civic groups (including even loyal Russian groups), and by dismissing the Great 
Address the state served to radicalize an important segment of the Finnish populace. 
Additional Russification was undertaken with the Language and Army Manifestos, which 
were not even written with the minimal consultation required by the February Manifesto. 
The Language Manifesto sought to make Russian into the official language of Finland, 
despite the considerable difficulties in implementing such a measure. The Army 
Manifesto abolished Finland's separate military establishment and subjected Finns to 
military service in the Tsarist army for the first time.564 
 In addition to the Finnish governing elites and civil society, the Tsarist state also 
had to deal with two other groups it had difficulty placating. The first group was 
Finland's peasantry, which had little love for Finland's Swedish-speaking elite or the 
educated Fennoman movement. A Tsarist tactic was to cultivate discontent among the 
Finnish peasantry towards the elites, mainly through the use of propaganda and limited 
financial inducements. However, Russia's own vexing agrarian problem prevented the 
state from taking more extensive measures and the program met with only limited 
success.565 Compared to a similar effort in the Baltics where the state succeeded in 
gaining some support from Latvian and Estonian peasants, Tsarist efforts to divide the 
Finnish populace were a failure. The state had even greater problems dealing with the 
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second group, organized labor. The development of a labor movement coincided with the 
rise of nationalism in Finland and contributed an undercurrent of labor discontent to the 
agitation for Finnish status. This divided different factions in the Finnish movement, but 
it also served to mobilize the lower classes against the conservative strata that had been in 
power in Finland for decades.566 Compared to the other borderland regions, Finland had a 
militant and well-established labor movement by the early decades of the 20th century. 
The alienation of the most important social groups in Finland helps to explain the rise of 
more violent and radical means to resisting Russian rule. Borrowing a page from the 
Russian terrorist playbook, Finnish nationalists targeted key officials for assassination. 
The assassination of Bobrikov by a Finnish nationalist in 1904, followed shortly by the 
assassination of Plehve (Finnish State Secretary as well as Tsarist Interior Minister) by a 
Russian group a few weeks later marked a significant blow against the forces of 
Russification in Finland.567 
 By the late 1800s when the Tsarist state was beginning to pursue Russification in 
a more thorough manner, the Third Section no longer existed, though its functions had 
been replicated in similar policing institutions. However, the army remained the most 
important repressive force in the borderlands, though obviously more important in places 
like Poland where Russian rule was actively militarized. Elsewhere in the empire, 
Russification also took unofficial form, as in the Black Hundreds and pogroms in Ukraine 
and Poland. This remains beyond the scope of the present study. In the Baltics and 
Finland, the increasing restiveness of the local populaces (a function of their “national 
awakening”) made the implementation of Russification more repressive and conflict-
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ridden, with the first decade of the 20th century featuring summary judgments against 
those who resisted imperial designs. The last couple decades of the Tsarist Empire's 
existence demonstrated the weakness of the state's Russification policy, as hitherto stable 
and quiescent regions such as the Baltics and Finland became hotbeds of radicalism and 
resistance to Tsarist rule. 
 
Erasing Poland 
 
In contrast to the other borderland regions where administrative and cultural 
Russification were pursued over different time periods (though overlapping), 
Russification in Poland-Lithuania generally combined these two strands. A reason that 
can be adduced to explain this discrepancy concerns the different position that the Tsarist 
state held vis-a-vis the Poles when compared to other borderland populations. Although 
the state considered the autonomy carved out by other border regions to be dangerous to 
the unity of the state, the historical rivalry between Poland and Russia led to distrust of 
the Poles and concerns over potential treason. The experiences of 1830-1 and 1863-4 
only served to heighten these fears, making the primary goal of Russification the erosion 
of Polish identity and culture. In Poland itself this took the form of persecution of 
Catholicism and the Polish szlachta, and the symbolic elimination of the name of Poland 
(replaced by the term 'Vistula region' after the second insurrection). In Lithuania, it took 
the form of active efforts to disseminate Russian culture and the Orthodox religion and a 
commensurate effort to attack anything that was viewed as Polish in origin. Although 
Russification efforts were occasionally relaxed, after the end of the Congress Kingdom 
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experiment Russification in Poland-Lithuania was markedly harsher (and more violent) 
than in the other parts of the borderlands. 
 The 1830 November Insurrection and its eventual quashing by Russian forces 
definitively ended the Congress Kingdom experiment, but given the views of Nicholas I 
it is likely that the arrangement would have been revisited eventually. Nicholas 
considered the creation of a semi-independent Polish kingdom as a 'regrettable' mistake 
and believed that it had weakened rather than strengthened Russia's borders. A new 
partition would likely have been preferable, but the 1830 rebellion offered him a perfect 
pretext to do away with this independence and to seek to squash the dangerous effects of 
nationality.568 After all, as previously mentioned it was during Nicholas' reign that the 
Tsarist state reconsidered its traditional methods of integrating non-Russian territories 
and moved towards a policy that increasingly emphasized the deleterious effects of 
nationality and the necessity for Russification, even if these policies were not consistently 
followed until the late 19th century. Nicholas inherently distrusted the Poles, and sought 
to find methods that would erode their 'Polishness' and replace it with a more loyal 
'Russianess'. This explains why during Nicholas' early reign, he attempted to expose 
Polish officials and elites to 'good' Russian influence by incorporating Poles in the 
Western borderlands into the imperial military and civil service systems. This represented 
an overly optimistic (and perhaps naive) approach of sliianie, or the bringing together of 
the two nations. When this approach failed to take hold and Poles throughout the empire 
persisted in their distinctive identity, sliianie gave way to the more vigorous Russification 
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that would define the post 1830-1 period.569 Alongside this goal of converting Poles into 
loyal imperial subjects was a corresponding fear of the undermining influence of 
Polonism. The Pole was viewed with suspicion by Tsarist officialdom as an inevitable 
participant in sedition, treason, or other activities that worked to sap the empire of its 
vigor.570 This perspective came to color all official policies concerning Poland and 
undoubtedly played a role in the harshness of the repression that followed the November 
Insurrection. 
 This fear of the corrupting influence of Polonism also drove imperial policy in the 
Lithuanian lands, where uprisings also occurred, although not to the same extent or with 
the same organization as in the Polish core. This set the stage for what would become a 
prevailing concern of Russification policy in the Lithuanian lands: cleansing the 
Lithuanians of pernicious Polish influence and bringing them into the Russian fold. 
Cultural Russification measures implemented in the Lithuanian lands after the uprising 
included the encouragement of conversion to Orthodoxy, the forbidding of converting 
from Orthodoxy, and the expectation that interfaith marriages would raise children as 
Orthodox. The University of Vilna was closed, and Russian replaced all other languages 
as the language of official business and eventually school instruction.571 A distinctively 
Russian university was founded in Kiev to replace the University of Vilna as the 
educational center of the region and the Tsarist education ministry exerted strong control 
over the character of the education promoted there. And although the Catholic Church 
was not proscribed, a number of Catholic monasteries that were judged to have a 
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deleterious impact on the loyalty of Lithuania were suppressed. Finally, the Tsarist 
government repudiated one of the central hopes of the Polish-Lithuanian lands when 
Nicholas specifically rejected the possibility that Poland and Lithuania might one day be 
reunited as a single political unit. The Lithuanian Corps were abolished and Poles within 
the Lithuanian government were vigorously purged since Polonism was viewed as a 
primary influence undermining Tsarist control.572 
 The measures implemented by the state in the Lithuanian lands laid the 
groundwork for the ethnoreligious conflict that in a large way drove the development of 
the Lithuanian national movement in the late 19th century. The change in terminology 
that the government of Nicholas I used to describe the Lithuanian territories after the 
insurrection demonstrates this, as Mikhail Muraviev (later Governor-General and 
"hangman" of Vilna) referred to the territories as "eternally Russian land."573 Heinz-
Dietrich Lowe argues that the most important measures that served to alienate the 
Lithuanians after the uprising were the anti-Catholic and Uniate measures, part of which 
included the forcible conversion of the Uniates to Orthodoxy and a ban on leaving the 
Russian Orthodox Church.574 Some of the Russification measures were softened after the 
Russian defeat in the Crimean War, as the government of Alexander II saw the benefit in 
cultivating a better relationship with the Lithuanian gentry. However, this relaxation was 
minimal and was of course subsequently terminated by the 1863-4 uprising, which 
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convinced the Tsarist state that there could be no accommodation in the Polish and 
Lithuanian lands.575 
 The response of the Russian authorities after the 1863-4 rebellion was harsher 
than the response in 1830-1, despite there being a more progressive Tsar in power. The 
first step was the reversal of the Alexander II's earlier concessions and a return to close 
Russian control over the rebellious territories. Poles were once again expelled from 
government offices, although this policy was not as total as Russification advocates 
would have desired. Although Poles were replaced by Russians in all the highest-ranking 
posts within education, the judiciary, the police, and economic departments, Russian 
officials generally avoided lower-ranked (and therefore lower-prestige) positions, which 
were left to Polish officials. As Dobrowski notes, even though the goal of the Tsarist state 
after the 1863-4 rebellion was the complete administrative Russification of Poland, over 
50% of officials remained Catholic or Polish when it was measured in 1897.576 As with 
the limitations of Tsarist power in the Baltics and Finland, even in a place like Poland 
where Russia sought to exercise its sovereign authority, a relative dearth of skilled 
officials made the realization of those goals problematic. Russia could suppress Poland, 
but it proved incapable of transforming it entirely.  
 Alongside these attempted measures, the state also took symbolic steps to 
undermine the legitimacy of the Polish national idea, by completely eliminating the name 
"Poland" and renaming the territory as the "Vistula Lands" (a resurrection of one of the 
objectives of the original partitions).577 Moreover, not only was Russian reasserted as the 
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official language of government administration, but Tsarist authorities also sought to 
actively drive Polish out of public life, including the banning of instruction in Polish and 
the use of Polish in signage.578 Finally, the policy of cooperation with local elites was 
completely abandoned in Poland after 1863-4, and the Catholic Church was treated with 
hostility and discriminatory policies, alongside the forced conversion of Uniates. 
However, emancipation was offered to peasants on generous terms, partly to place Russia 
as their protector and deepen the divide between the sectors of the Polish populace.579 
Perversely, the repression in Poland caused the situation in regions like the Baltics and 
Finland to improve, as the Tsar sought to buttress support in the borderlands and fend off 
criticism of Russian despotism in the borderlands. As a result, the 1860s was marked by 
the strange duality of the repression and Russification of Poland and Lithuania alongside 
increasingly lenient and flexible policies in the Baltics and Finland.580 
 The reaction to the uprising in the Lithuanian lands was similar. Leading up to 
1863, Tsarist officials had attempted to separate Lithuania from the influence of Polish 
culture, so as to inoculate the region against a repeat of 1830-1. The management of 
ethnic minorities in the Hapsburg Empire partly served as a model, as the government 
sought to strengthen ethnic communities without their own social elites, so as to play 
them off against the Polish-influenced Lithuanian elites. The hope was that by acting as a 
patron of these smaller ethnic communities, the Tsarist state could inculcate a sense of 
loyalty in them and remove a vital base of support for rebellious activities. This kind of 
policy was pursued as late as 1862, in a proposal to establish a network of schools 
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dedicated to teaching "folk" languages and cultures.581 This was a tactic that would also 
be employed in the other borderlands once the Tsarist state definitively turned to 
Russification under Alexander III, but it was only partly successful in the case of 
Lithuania. When the rebellion broke out in Poland in 1863, uprisings also occurred in the 
Lithuanian (and Belorussian) lands, but there were divisions between the Poles and the 
Lithuanians, with the latter viewing the former as yet another potential oppressor. The 
failure of the uprising, and the subsequent repression under Muraviev, saw over a 
hundred executed, almost a thousand sentenced to forced labor, and thousands more 
deported, generally to Siberia. Lithuania was renamed the "Northwest Province" and 
stifling measures were applied to the cultural and educational realm.582 After the uprising, 
the objective was no longer to convert Lithuanians into loyal Orthodox Russians, but 
simply to forcibly remove them from Polish influence, with the previous measures being 
viewed as inadequate to the task. As Staliunas notes, Tsarist authorities did not even 
necessarily view Lithuanians (who were mainly peasants) as an ethnic community 
"capable of reaching civilized norms," unlike other ethnic communities like the Baltic 
Germans who demonstrated a higher degree of development.583 
 Although the measures taken in Lithuania after the 1863-4 uprising were harsh, 
they were still fundamentally directed towards the goal of inoculating the Lithuanians 
against pernicious Polish influence. This manifested itself in efforts to bring Lithuanian 
culture into the Russian orbit, but it also underestimated the vitality of the Lithuanian 
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national movement, which was viewed as mostly harmless to Tsarist interests. The 
changes that Governor-General Muraviev instituted were mainly in the areas of education 
and religion, which were viewed as areas of Polish strength. In 1864 he ordered that all 
Lithuanian textbooks be rendered in Cyrillic rather than Latin letters, and by 1865 this 
order had been extended to a ban on any publications in the traditional alphabet.584 
Muraviev also closed the majority of Lithuanian secondary schools, since many of these 
institutions were run by either Polish elites or the Catholic Church, with the predictable 
negative effect on Lithuanian educational development.585 These educational changes 
occurred alongside efforts to control Lithuanian religious life, including a renewed effort 
at Orthodox proselytism, the confiscation of Catholic Church property, and the placing of 
the Church under direct government supervision.586 Conversion to Orthodoxy was in fact 
the only way that Lithuanians could qualify for normal rights and privileges, as it was 
viewed as sufficient evidence that the individual was becoming more "Russian." 
Converting to Orthodoxy had the significant benefit of opening up occupational 
opportunities for teachers and civil servants and also carried with it a reduction in 
taxation.587 
 Nevertheless, the Tsarist state did not evince much concern about Lithuanian 
culture outside of what was perceived as Polish influence. The continued economic and 
political dominance of the Polish elite masked the growing strength of the Lithuanian 
national movement and its orientation against both Polish and Russian influence.588 
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Russian chauvinism about the non-viability of the Lithuanian nation helped to feed this 
myopia. Government officials perceived increasing conflict between Poles and 
Lithuanians in the last couple decades of the 19th century, but because they were still 
viewing the region through the anti-Polish lens of Tsarist policy, they judged that the 
growth of the Lithuanian movement was actually a positive development and held no 
danger for Tsarist interests.589 As Theodore Weeks argues, the combination of selective 
repression and official neglect was an important impetus behind the ability of the 
Lithuanian national movement to build up its strength and put itself in the position of 
being able to maintain a separate political existence.590 Although the Tsarist state 
maintained the posture that Lithuania was an eternally Russian land, relatively few 
resources were directed towards making this an administrative reality. 
 A key difference between the repression and Russification following the 1830 
Insurrection and that following the 1863-4 rebellion was the newfound emphasis on 
nationalism, especially among ethnic Russians. Russian ethno-nationalism, promoted by 
individuals like Mikhail Katkov and some officials within the Tsarist government, 
represented a serious challenge to the traditional Tsarist policy of cooperating with and 
co-opting local elites and emphasizing loyalty over identity. Even though the Tsarist 
government was to some degree fearful of nationalism (being a phenomena that they 
could not necessarily control), it influenced the policies of how to deal with the 
borderlands and especially in places like Poland it emphasized that Poles were an "enemy 
nation" that was not capable of being fully assimilated into the empire.591 Katkov, 
through his organ Moskovskie vedomosti (Russian News) emphasized linguistic 
                                                 
589
 Ibid. 110. 
590
 Ibid. 114. 
591
 Kappeler, “The Ambiguities of Russification.” 293-4. 
248 
 
assimilation as important above all else, meaning not only the active promotion of 
Russian, but also the active suppression of other tongues.592 This can perhaps help to 
explain the emphasis on language policies in the borderlands during the second half of 
the 19th century. Katkov's account of the nation, or narodnost, also emphasized the 
survival of the fittest character of competing nationalisms. Under his rubric of nation-
building all distinct nations should strive for political autonomy, but not all will be 
successful. Poland had failed in its bid for an independent political existence while Russia 
had succeeded and expanded, therefore it was only natural that the Polish narodnost 
should be absorbed into the greater Russian nation. Any allowance of an independent 
Poland at this stage would only threaten the "peaceful development" of the successful 
Russian nation.593 
 This conflict between the traditional imperial logic and the modern national logic 
produced inconsistencies and contradictions in Tsarist Russification strategies. Although 
the ostensible goal of Russification was to produce loyal subjects among the non-Russian 
peoples (by inculcating them with Russian linguistic and cultural norms), in the case of 
Poland and to some degree Lithuania Russification policies seemed to amount more to 
segregationist strategies rather than assimilationist. Poles were specifically proscribed 
from taking up careers as teachers and civil servants (though as the previously cited 
statistics indicate, this was not completely effective), and a quota policy was put into 
force in Russian educational establishments in 1864 where no more than 10% of the 
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student body could be "persons of Polish descent" (or, to a lesser extent, Catholic 
Lithuanians).594 Moreover, as Kappeler notes, 
Other contradictions abound. Most bureaucrats advocated support for 
Orthodoxy and the Russian language, but they distrusted autonomous 
initiatives by Russian society (e.g. the Orthodox brotherhoods) that 
pursued the same aims but were not under their control. Sometimes, 
officials in the borderlands sided with the peasant peoples in their 
grievances against the Poles, whereas the imperial center opposed 
supporting primitive peasant cultures. There were also disparities 
between the different agencies of the Russian government and between 
particular officials or between officials and publicists.595 
 
The Tsar and high government officials did not seek to resolve these contradictions, as 
that would have implied choosing a side in the conflict between the different sources of 
loyalty in the empire. Cultivating national pride and support was useful, especially after 
the emancipation of serfs in the early 1860s, but the traditional imperial policy still 
yielded favorable results in the Baltics and Finland. 
 The remainder of the 19th century displayed the extension of Russification and 
the increasing importance of ethnic identity. The assassination of Alexander II in 1881 
convinced Alexander III to reconsider Baltic rights and privileges and apply a gentler 
version of the Russification experienced in Poland-Lithuania in 1863-4. This included 
closer administrative Russification, book bans, closer police oversight, teaching and 
administrative conducted in Russian, and active Orthodox proselytism.596 As detailed in 
the previous section, this strategy failed even in the formerly compliant Baltic states and 
Finland, as the processes of national awakening undermined the basis of Tsarist rule and 
the turn to nationalism by the Tsarist state only exacerbated the tensions. In many ways, 
the processes triggered in the last couple decades of the 19th century, and which 
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ultimately culminated in the nationalities problem that faced Nicholas II in the first two 
decades of the 20th century, can be seen the spread of the type of problem that the Tsarist 
state had been experiencing in Poland since the beginning of the 19th century. Whereas 
the Baltic Germans initially embraced the leverage offered by Tsarist rule to reinforce 
their own rule, the Polish szlachta rejected the same offer because their corporate identity 
had already formed in a manner inimical to Russian interests. 
 According the Kappeler, Russia's problems with Poland can also be traced to 
Poland's own transformation over the course of the 19th century. Initially, the 'noble's 
republic' only faced the empire with the prickly and noncompliant szlachta, but the 
repressions after 1831 and 1864 helped to mobilize the rest of the people and transform 
Poland into a more modern nation. The abolition of serfdom, the persecution of the 
Catholic Church, and other Russification measures served to create a larger body of Poles 
who could identify themselves as such vis-a-vis the Tsarist authorities. In this way, the 
measures used to contain Poland actually helped to expedite the national problem of the 
empire.597 The inconsistency of the Tsarist bureaucracy concerning Russification and the 
lack of coordination among different government agencies guaranteed that the state was 
unable to adequately address the problems in the borderlands, forcing regional officials to 
construct ad hoc policies that didn't necessarily match up with the official policies 
emanating from Petersburg. The fundamental approach of the bureaucracy, that of 
reacting to situations as they arose, prevented it from systematically imposing a policy of 
assimilation.598 The confused mixture of autonomy with Russification proved to be a 
                                                 
597
 Kappeler, The Russian Empire. 218-9. 
598
 Dolbilov, “Russification and the Bureaucratic Mind in the Russian Empire’s Northwestern Region in the 
1860s.” 247. 
251 
 
worse policy for the stability of the empire than decisively pursuing either the strategy of 
regional autonomy or thorough Russification. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The evolution of Tsarist policy in the borderlands from accommodation to Russification 
mirrors a broader shift in the state's perception of the empire's inhabitants. The 
transformation of the term inorodtsy over the course of the 19th century captures this 
shift and indicates the growing importance of ethnic and cultural identity in the empire in 
its last few decades. As John Slocum observes, the legal category of inorodtsy originated 
in the 1822 Ustav that set out the obligations of these groups to the state (although usage 
of the term predated the Ustav). The Ustav established the inorodtsy as the Eastern 
nomadic or wandering peoples of the empire, who were for the moment incapable of 
being fully assimilated. It laid down special taxes that these groups had to pay (primarily 
the iasak, but also local taxes) and the terms of administration, which was usually done 
indirectly through existing tribal or clan structures.599 Over the 19th century, the legal 
view of the inorodtsy also acquired the aura of a threat, as the inorodtsy were no longer 
simply the inassimilable in the Russian hinterlands, but also danger to imperial unity. The 
goal therefore became assimilating the inorodtsy to eliminate the threat, but the 
perception of alienness raised the possibility that such assimilation was impossible.600 As 
identity became more closely associated with language in the latter half of the 19th 
century (and linguistic Russification was indeed the overriding concern of many Russian 
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nationalists), the concept of inorodtsy expanded beyond its simple legal definition to 
eventually encompass all non-Russian ethnic groups within the empire (with the 
exception of Eastern Slavic groups like the Ukrainians and Belorussians). Whereas 
groups like the Finns, Poles, Baltic Germans, Armenians and others had previously been 
viewed as members of the empire, they gradually became lumped into the category of the 
alien "other."601 
 The evolution of the concept of inorodtsy was hardly a development that the 
Tsarist state viewed favorably, as it represented an assault on the ability of the state to 
define the parameters of loyal imperial citizenship. Nicholas I's ambivalence towards 
cultural Russification demonstrates the discomfort the state felt when it tinkered with the 
traditional formula of imperial patriotism, which had allowed the inclusion of non-
Russian groups and cultivated the loyalty of those groups to the overarching goals of the 
imperial state. As Jeremy Renner argues, although Russian nationalism was indisputably 
loyal to the state, it was also extremely dangerous since it sought to redefine the terms of 
imperial membership and supersede the traditional understanding of the autocracy.602 
This serves to explain the state's original antipathy towards groups such as the 
Slavophiles, because although they were conservative monarchists, the kind of empire 
they envisioned conflicted with Tsarist goals. The "Westerner" opposition also shared 
this nation-oriented worldview, due largely to the influence of German philosophy, such 
that reform-minded intelligentsia like Boris Chicerin could speak about creating a 
"Russlandic" nation that would concentrate on the "inner unity" of the Russian people.603 
Thus, the shifting definition of inorodtsy can be seen as evidence of the failure of the 
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state to respond to these pressures, which in the last decades of the 19th century forced 
Tsarism to link itself with Russian nationalism in the face of rising non-Russian 
nationalisms throughout the empire.604 As this chapter demonstrates, this strategy failed 
even in the most compliant of the borderland regions, as efforts to create a broader 
Russian nation only served to kindle the kinds of movements that the state feared in the 
first place. 
 Even as the state shifted into more coercive Russification policies in the second 
half of the 19th century, these policies varied depending on the constellation of factors 
surrounding the position of the borderland elites. The elites were not able to successfully 
defend autonomy to the same extent as during earlier processes of administrative 
centralization, but they were nevertheless able to influence whether the Tsarist state 
pursued strictly coercive policies or policies premised on quasi-voluntary compliance. 
The effect of the two Polish insurrections of the 19th century was that the state no longer 
entertained the notion that accommodation would work in Poland or Lithuania and 
instead moved to quarantine 'treasonous' Polish influence. This goal was pursued through 
segregationist and discriminatory policies and was only partly successful, as the empire 
lacked the requisite number of Russian officials to take over previously Polish-held 
offices. In Ukraine, coercion was employed by default, as there were no longer elite 
intermediaries to negotiate with due to the defection of the starshyna and the weakness of 
the Ukrainophile intellectuals. Additionally, Russian perceptions of Ukraine prevented 
any possible acknowledgement of a separate Ukrainian identity. Conversely, in the 
Baltics and Finland Russification was at least somewhat moderated by the continuing 
presence of compliant elites, even if these elites no longer completely dominated their 
                                                 
604
 Slocum, “Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsy?”. 174. 
254 
 
respective regions due to the emergence of ethnic nationalist movements. Serious 
Russification measures were undertaken linguistically, religiously, and educationally, but 
their actual impact was limited due to less-than-rigorous enforcement and local elite 
resistance. Local elite strength and orientation was clearly less important at this late stage 
of the Tsarist Empire, but it nevertheless made a discernible impact on government policy 
in the borderlands. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
The preceding chapters have established four separate phases of Tsarist policy in the 
Western borderlands of the empire. These phases reflected the evolution of the traditional 
imperial logic to a more state-based approach to governance, with the evolution propelled 
by the changing geopolitical context of Europe and the pressures of military competition. 
The progression of the phases also helps to demonstrate the extent (and limitations) of the 
penetration of Tsarist power in these regions, and the way in which the breadth and depth 
of state power projection dictated the success or failure of policy in the borderlands. The 
first phase of Tsarist policy in the borderlands covered the period of the initial 
incorporation of the regions into the empire and the degree of autonomy afforded to the 
regions. Tsarist assurances of political and cultural autonomy were predicated on the 
relative inability of the state to directly administer these territories and the need to secure 
dynastic loyalty in the face of ongoing geopolitical threats (whether from Sweden or 
Poland or Prussia). The second phase of cooperation with local elites followed closely on 
the incorporation agreements and sought to establish a reliable administrative class to 
help serve Tsarist interests in the borderlands. The effort to integrate these local elites 
into the Tsarist governing apparatus (either civilian or military) was intended to secure 
loyalty by offering lucrative paths of political and economic advancement. Both of these 
first two phases conform to the logic of an empire extending its territory to protect its 
heartland and cultivating local clients for the purpose of indirect rule (since direct rule 
was too costly and impractical). 
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 The third phase signaled a shift away from this decentralized pattern of imperial 
rule towards a more centralized state. The impetus for this shift originated in military 
necessity, with the Tsarist state seeking more resources to keep up with European 
military developments. Peter I's reforms led the way in this regard, with an effort to 
overhaul civilian and military infrastructure to increase the extractive capacity of the state 
(both in terms of economic assets and manpower), but the reforms were incomplete and 
were inconsistently reinforced by the later governments of Catherine II, Alexander I, and 
Nicholas I. In the borderlands this process took the form of creeping administrative 
centralization, a greater presence of Russian officials, and the harmonization of regional 
policy with the official policy of the center. The degree to which this centralization 
progressed depended largely on the character of the state's relationship with the local elite 
(positive relationships yielded less harsh centralization and vice-versa) and the ability of 
those elites to resist imperial policy. The final phase represented the logical conclusion of 
the shift to a state-centered political system, as prior administrative centralization was 
deemed insufficient and any form of regional autonomy was judged a threat to the 
cohesion of the empire as a whole. This phase, Russification, moved beyond the 
boundaries of administrative centralization and sought to reconstruct the multi-ethnic 
imperial state as a Great Russian-dominated national state. This necessitated the 
abrogation of cultural, linguistic and religious autonomy, and an aggressive effort to 
promote Russian nationalism, even though the state itself was often uncomfortable with 
even friendly nationalism. Once again, the state's relationship with the local elites largely 
determined how extensive this Russification was, but firm policies were pursued even in 
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more cooperative borderland territories. The eventual fate of the Tsarist Empire in 1917 
in part helps to capture the long-term failure of these policies. 
 Within the different borderland regions, the consequences of these phases of state-
building varied dramatically. The most salient factor appears to have been the strength 
and cohesion of the local elites, and the nature of their relationship with the imperial 
state. In the Baltics and Finland the local elites became heavily integrated in Tsarist 
power structures, with the Baltic Germans being represented well in the civilian 
bureaucracy and the Finnish elites being represented well in the military. This degree of 
collaboration, combined with the social stability of these regions and the reliance of the 
elites on the Tsarist state in protecting their entrenched privileges, mitigated the extent of 
centralization and the vigor of Russification. In contrast, the Ukrainian starshyna did not 
succeed in protecting Ukrainian autonomy, as the elite classes proved to be much weaker 
than other borderland elites and far too easily absorbed into the Russian gentry. Tsarist 
offers of privilege within the ranks of the traditional Russian dvorianstvo proved too 
great a temptation to Cossack elites, leaving the institutions of the Hetmanate vulnerable 
to imperial incursions. The Polish-Lithuanian case offers the most tragic example of the 
importance of the relationship between the state and local elites. Although the Polish-
Lithuanian szlachta were the most numerous and powerful of the borderland gentry 
classes, they were also the one whose interests clashed the most with Tsarist governance. 
The long history of gentry power and freedom during the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth made the prospect of subjection to Tsarist administration less than 
palatable and produced a seething conflict that erupted twice during the course of the 
19th century. As such, Tsarist efforts to centralize administration and Russify Polish and 
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Lithuanian subjects were harsher than in the other borderlands, even if they proved 
incapable of truly assimilating their targets. 
 It is my contention that the importance of local elites to the process of state-
building in the Tsarist Empire offers the most compelling explanation for the variation in 
Tsarist policies. The literature in the social sciences that is concerned with the 
construction of the modern state has long recognized the awkward political transition that 
this signaled for imperial polities, but does not in my opinion adequately explain the 
unevenness and inconsistency of the process. The state-building literature is concerned 
with the question of the role of internal elite groups and the bargaining process the state 
must go through to gain the compliance of those groups, but this is largely articulated in 
the language of economic side-payments. These types of side-payments were certainly 
relevant to the labor-repressive system of agriculture that the Tsarist state propagated, but 
they are nevertheless overshadowed by the political and cultural 'side-payments' made by 
the state to ensure imperial loyalty. The historiographical literature on the Tsarist Empire 
does a better job of acknowledging the role of local elites within the empire, and the 
traditional tendency of the Tsarist state to co-opt those elites, but it generally does not 
situate these elite-state relationships within a specific theoretical framework. If we 
acknowledge that the Tsarist Empire was undergoing an (eventually unsuccessful) 
attempt to transform itself into a coherent national state, we would expect Tsarist policy 
to oscillate over time and in intensity across the different regions, but we would not 
necessarily expect diametrically opposed policies within the same time period. However, 
the presence of the repression of the second Polish insurrection alongside a deepening of 
autonomy in Finland (as well as multiple other similar moments in Tsarist policy) forces 
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us to confront the presence of intervening variables during the process of transformation. 
The strength and orientation of local elites emerges as the most important intervening 
variable, translating the generalized pressures of state-building in the European context to 
the local conditions of the individual regions of the Western Borderlands. 
 As the preceding chapters make clear, the character of elite strength and 
orientation can be understood as a constellation of factors, of which numerical strength is 
not the most important. In the case of the Western Borderlands, the presence of stable 
political and economic institutions (as with the Baltic German Ritterschaften or the 
political institutions of the Polish szlachta) was important, but it was also mitigated by 
the presence or absence of elite cohesion (the factions among the szlachta thereby made 
them 'weaker' than the Baltic Germans when it came to dealing with the Tsarist state). 
Bracketing these characteristics of elite strength was the orientation of those elites 
towards the Tsarist state, which assumed an overriding importance in influencing the 
course of imperial policy. Cohesive and cooperative elites were better able to carve out 
(and extend) zones of autonomy, since they offered the Tsarist state the attractive 
payment of loyalty and regional stability (assuming that the elites held significant control 
over the regional population, which was not necessarily true in the Ukrainian Hetmanate). 
These variables of elite strength and orientation were instrumental in setting the terms of 
the relationship between the state and the specific regional elites, and these foundational 
arrangements exerted considerable downstream influence on Tsarist policy. In this way, 
the course of Tsarist policy in the Western Borderlands demonstrates the salience of path 
dependence as described by historical institutionalism, with original arrangements only 
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being significantly revised during times of severe political or economic stress.605 These 
periods of stress were not uncommon during the time period considered (the Great 
Northern War, the Polish Insurrections, the Crimean War), but they were also not 
sufficient to completely abrogate traditional borderland policy outside of Poland-
Lithuania, which was the epicenter of much of the conflict and repression. The lasting 
ability of the local elites to resist Tsarist incursions, even up until their power bases began 
to be eroded by the national awakenings of the late 19th century, points to the importance 
of these elites in influencing Tsarist policy. 
 Finally, the role of leadership choice in the imperial core should not be 
overlooked, as the actions of Tsarist officials and government ideology placed important 
constraints on the position of the borderlands. Here the role of the Tsar has the most 
salience, as the autocratic system of the empire featured oscillations in policy from one 
reign to the next, with obvious implications for local rule in the latter half of the 19th 
century. The gradual adoption of ethnic Russian nationalism (and the attendant policy of 
Russification) represented the most important departure from past policies with respect to 
the borderlands, and this shift occurred regardless of the strength and disposition of the 
borderland elites (though these factors naturally provided a source of resistance to 
Russification policies). Furthermore, the actions of individual Tsarist officials are also 
relevant, especially in the case of key officials like the Governors-General, who in many 
situations opted to buttress regional autonomy rather than central rule. The logic behind 
this decision reflected how the interests of the center could easily diverge from the 
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interests of its agents, a phenomenon common across much of imperial history (and not 
just Tsarist imperial history). Altogether, the factors of local elite strength and orientation 
along with the decision-making of Tsarist officials represent the theoretical contribution 
of this study to theories of direct and indirect rule. As argued by Gerring, Ziblatt, et al. 
degree of political institutionalization is a crucial contextual variable in explaining 
differential outcomes in direct and indirect rule, but it is my contention that this 
framework can be profitably modified to include the above intervening variables in the 
Tsarist and other cases. 
 
Where do we go from here? 
 
The logical question to ask at this point is: to what extent can the experiences of the late 
Tsarist Empire be generalized to other cases? Such generalization must naturally be 
limited, as the historical boundedness and contingency present in the Tsarist case 
obviously limits its application to other cases. The experiences of the late Tsarist Empire 
occurred at a nexus of major state-building and military competition in Europe, a context 
not easily replicated. Moreover, its position as a multiethnic empire in transition 
dramatically limits the potential case universe of direct comparisons. However, this 
understanding need not sap the present research of its potential explanatory power. As 
Charles Tilly noted regarding large historical cases and processes of political change, the 
specifics of a case may be restricted to a particular time and place, but we can 
nevertheless use such cases to cast new light across a range of other cases. Although the 
political systems of territorially-extensive empires proved to be incapable of surviving 
into the contemporary period, some of the basic conundrums they faced remain relevant 
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to territorially-extensive nation-states or nation-states with uneven dispersions of 
population. Although technologies of governance and bureaucratic structures are more 
sophisticated today, this sophistication is not universal and even where it is present it still 
relies to a large degree on the compliance of local populations. As such, the question of 
cultivating local proxies or clients is still essential to the problem of statecraft, and this 
need for local clients usually requires the devolution of some government authority to 
those clients. The degree to which the center has to abandon some of its power to the 
periphery can be influenced by a few variables. One variable is the capability of the 
center to exert direct control over the periphery, which can be a function of the presence 
of adequate infrastructure or transportation. Another variable is the size and relative 
strength of the periphery, especially insofar as it possesses military or economic 
resources that give it leverage over the center. These considerations have not been 
eliminated even in the most developed states, but they are especially salient in states still 
engaging in state-building processes. In many ways, the conflict represents a game 
between two (or more) players who are interested in maximizing their own power while 
protecting their existing prerogatives. 
  
Historical Comparisons 
 
Drawing historical comparisons with the Tsarist case is relatively attractive, as there are 
contemporaneous examples of territorially-extensive, heterogeneous empires. The 
Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire provide a ready comparison with the Tsarist 
Empire. Both were large, multiethnic polities experiencing the same pressures as the 
Tsarist state, with escalating military competition and state-building in European rivals. 
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The frequency of conflict between these three continental empires in fact highlights the 
extent to which they spurred each other's political development, with the Tsarist and 
Ottoman empires in particular fighting each other regularly over their long period of 
political contact. The Habsburg and Ottoman Empires also demonstrate different 
potential solutions to the treatment of internal elites, with the Habsburg Empire providing 
greater political autonomy while the Ottoman Empire provided some religious and civil 
autonomy, but not political autonomy. The Habsburg and Ottoman Empire likewise 
shared the fate of the Tsarist Empire, dissolving as a result of the tumult of WWI and 
giving way to independent nation-states in their place. A comparison of the effect of 
state-building on the political systems of these three empires would provide the 
foundation for a longer study than that which is presented here. 
 The Habsburg Empire shares the greatest similarity with the Tsarist Empire. In 
addition to containing a wide array of ethnic and religious groups over an extensive 
territory (albeit nowhere as extensive as Tsarist Russia), the Habsburg Empire was ruled 
by a nominally-autocratic multiethnic elite which in practice conceded a substantial 
portion of governance to local elites. Aside from the more dominant Austrian and 
Hungarian nationalities, the empire also possessed substantial numbers of Poles and 
Ukrainians which would permit a direct comparison with Tsarist governance of these 
groups. The Polish partitions of the late 18th century ceded these areas to the Habsburg 
Empire, and the degree to which the state permitted these areas to manage themselves 
contrasts with the more stringent measures taken by the Tsarist state against the 
Ukrainian Hetmanate or Congress Poland. In addition, the Habsburgs dealt with the same 
issues of state-building as the Tsarist state, bordering a growing Prussian/German power 
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while also being involved in general European power politics. The pressures of regional 
military competition spurred a similar cycle of modernizing reforms and authoritarian 
retrenchment in the Habsburg Empire, with activist emperors being superseded by more 
reactionary or inactive rulers. Much in the same way that the Tsarist state went through 
bursts of modernization followed by periods of abeyance (Peter I and his successors, 
Catherine II and Paul, Alexander I and Nicholas I, etc), the Habsburgs offered an 
inconsistent response to the demands of state-building in modern Europe. 
 The Ottoman Empire possessed more extensive territories than the Habsburgs, 
spread over Europe, Asia, and Africa. Deeply involved in European affairs and a 
participant in many wars against the Tsarist Empire, the Ottoman Porte faced many of the 
same pressures as the Tsarist state and attempted many of the same solutions. The 
impetus for serious thinking about reform in the empire actually derived in part from a 
series of defeats in wars against Russia, with the Porte concluding that it had fallen 
behind its rival due to the reforms implemented by Peter I. Reforms commenced in the 
military domain in the late 18th and early 19th century, but quickly spread to political 
institutions, especially in the Tanzimat period of 1839-1876. These reforms were 
intended to modernize the military, introduce new banking and economic practices, and 
develop the foundation of secular law. Successes were significant but were often 
countered by efforts from reactionary forces, including traditional religious elites and 
janissary military forces who opposed military modernization. In addition to these 
convulsions of reform, the Porte also faced an empire of enormous heterogeneity, which 
was only heightened by the national awakenings experienced in parts of the Balkans 
especially. The Porte's solution was a mixture of local autonomy with the millet system, 
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which insulated non-Muslim religious groups from religious law. Although non-Muslims 
were treated as second-class citizens their position was not unlike tolerated non-Orthodox 
groups in the Tsarist Empire. Like the Tsarist and Habsburg governments, the Porte was 
ultimately unsuccessful in its efforts to modernize state-building, but the Ottoman Empire 
unraveled more rapidly due to the state's increasing reliance on foreign loans to buttress 
its economic position. 
 The final set of historical comparisons I will consider here are the European 
maritime empires. Although the maritime empires are usually treated separately from the 
extensive and contiguous empires of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the literature on direct 
and indirect rule examines them at length and that theoretical commonality should allow 
for more ambitious comparisons with Tsarist Russia. Gerring, Ziblatt, et al. largely base 
their theoretical model off the experiences of the British Empire, and the texts they use in 
support of their theory extend from British North America through sub-Saharan Africa to 
British India. However, as I made clear in the introduction, the experiences of the British 
Empire can also be understood in terms of relations with local elites and the ways in 
which those local elites influence the mode of rule adopted. As such, the British (and 
French, and Spanish, and Portuguese, etc.) Empire provides a direct test of my theoretical 
addition to Gerring, Ziblatt, et al.'s model, and I am confident that the test vindicates the 
addition. As Naseemullah and Staniland note with respect to establishing the varieties of 
indirect rule, the question of direct and indirect rule is in many respects a false 
dichotomy.606 By integrating explanatory variables such as political institutionalization, 
elite strength and coherence, elite orientation, and central leadership choice, we can 
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bypass this stale dichotomy and establish a richer continuum for explaining the variations 
in rule across a broader array of cases. 
 
Contemporary Comparisons 
 
The most apt historical comparisons with the Tsarist Empire are typically territorially-
extensive empires undergoing the stresses of transitioning to a modern age defined by the 
nation-state. In the contemporary period these comparisons are largely absent, due to the 
dissolution of these territorial empires in the first couple decades of the 20th century. The 
exception would be the Soviet Union, which recreated the territorial boundaries of Tsarist 
Russia and stitched itself together with violent repression, rapid industrialization, and 
rigid ideology. The USSR attempted to solve the problem of centralization versus 
decentralization through rigorous, top-down bureaucratic management. When this failed, 
the state partly compromised by devolving some responsibilities back to local regions, in 
the form of the local branch of the Communist Party, so long as the interests of the 
central state were observed. The USSR likewise attempted to solve the problem of 
heterogeneity first by inculcating the concept of the Soviet Man (or Woman) and then by 
punishing ethnic groups who proved to be insufficiently amenable to these designs (the 
forced deportation of groups in the Caucasus is one of many examples). Great Russians, 
by and large, retained ethnic dominance within the Soviet state, which only served to fuel 
what would become a new series of national uprisings in the waning days of the Soviet 
state. 
 Post-Soviet Russia is the most compelling contemporary example, as it retains the 
basic conflict between centralization and decentralization and a heterogeneous population 
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that the state has a difficult time governing. Although the Russian Federation no longer 
controls the Baltic states, Poland, Ukraine or other borderland regions, the remaining 
territory encompasses a significant degree of ethnic and religious diversity. The most 
problematic region for Post-Soviet Russia has been the Caucasus, with destructive 
conflicts in Chechnya that have spread to some degree to neighboring regions like 
Dagestan. Moreover, there is a simmering conflict with Georgia and its breakaway 
regions of Abkhazia and Ossetia that the Russian state has gotten involved in. By and 
large, the most common issue of governance related to heterogeneity concerns the 
substantial Muslim population, which the Russian government has handled with a 
mixture of ineptitude and discrimination. Orthodox Christianity remains the official 
religion and enjoys favored status, and while Islam is recognized by the state it has 
clearly been consigned to second-class status. The emergence of terrorism directed at 
Russia has only heightened the awkwardness of state policy, as a substantial part of the 
core Russian population supports discriminatory measures against the Caucasus. The use 
of servile proxies for Russian state interests has done little to address the inherent tension. 
 The challenge of heterogeneity is also sharpened by the basic conflict between 
centralization and decentralization in the post-Soviet period. After decades of stifling 
Soviet rule, Boris Yeltsin famously offered subnational units in the Federation as much 
sovereignty as they could swallow. With the complicated subdivision of Russia into 
Oblasts, Republics, Krais, and Okrugs, this produced a considerable variation in the 
degree of local self-government, with several ethnic Republics seeking formal autonomy. 
This experiment with radical decentralization began ending as a result of the destructive 
Chechen wars and the ascension of Vladimir Putin as Yeltsin's successor. Putin's 
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objective was to reassert the 'power vertical' of the state and eliminate much of the 
decentralization implemented under the Yeltsin government. Towards this end he 
instituted presidential representatives for super-regions of the Federation (essentially 
latter-day governors-general) answerable only to Moscow and took measures to curtail 
the power of local governors and assemblies. After the Beslan school siege ended in the 
deaths of hundreds of students and adults, he took the next step of abolishing 
gubernatorial elections and made governorships into appointed offices. This resumption 
of control by the federal center has been aided by the construction of Putin's United 
Russia party, which has effectively spread its tendrils throughout the country. However, 
there remains a considerable degree of decentralization in practice due to the inability of 
the central state to consistently project power throughout its territory. It remains an open 
question whether the current status quo is sustainable or whether there will be another 
oscillation if Putin and United Russia prove incapable of holding onto power. The Post-
Soviet period therefore offers an interesting variation in state-elite relations, with Yeltsin 
pursuing greater accommodations and Putin pursuing greater centralization. Comparing 
these two policy approaches vis-a-vis local elites could provide an interesting perspective 
on the Post-Soviet Russian case. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The preceding examples are simply illustrative sketches regarding ways in which this 
research may be extended to other cases. The historical comparison with other 
heterogeneous empires is the most pertinent comparison, but that does not prevent 
creative contemporary applications. In my own view, a comparison of the governance 
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problems faced by the Tsarist empire with the similar governance problems faced by the 
Russian Federation is the most enticing option and could allow some new ways to 
conceptualize contemporary Russian politics. As I hope my research has made clear, my 
account of the political transformations in the Tsarist Empire and its borderlands is 
mainly a story about the transformations wrought by the construction of the modern state. 
As Michael Mann observed, in empires constructed before the modern age the direct 
control of the state was contingent on calculations of physical distance and the 
transportation necessary to bring troops from the center. These limitations made the 
cultivation of local proxies a desirable political strategy (insofar as it substantially 
reduced the costs of governance). With the advent of technologies that improved 
transportation of large numbers of troops, as well as improving the distribution of 
resources necessary to sustain those troops, this limitation was in part mitigated. In the 
more coherent national states of Europe these advances allowed for substantial 
centralization of government power without compromising the breadth and depth of that 
power. However, in the more extensive imperial states, these limitations remained. 
Railways and other modern technologies may have reduced costs, but they could not 
eliminate the essence of bargaining between the center and the periphery. Our 
contemporary conceit that the information age and globalization have made geographic 
distance trivial has not eliminated the persistence of these limitations in extensive states. 
They are a challenge not only for weak states (such as in sub-Saharan Africa), but also 
for moderately strong ones (such as the Russian Federation). The relationship between 
states and their internal elites can serve to capture some of the specific dynamics 
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undergirding the choice between direct and indirect rule, especially in territorially-
extensive polities. 
271 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Alexseev, Mikhail A. “Decentralization Versus State Collapse: Explaining Russia’s 
Endurance.” Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 101–106. 
Anderson, Benedict R. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. Rev. ed. London; New York: Verso, 2006. 
Anderson, Perry. Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: N.L.B, 1974. 
Annenkov, P.V. The Extraordinary Decade. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1978. 
Armstrong, John A. “Administrative Elites in Multiethnic Polities.” International 
Political Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique 1, no. 1 
(January 1, 1980): 107–128. 
———. "Mobilized Diaspora in Tsarist Russia: The Case of the Baltic Germans," in 
Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices. New York: Praeger, 1978. 63-104. 
Bartlett, Roger. “The Russian Nobility and the Baltic German Nobility in the Eighteenth 
Century.” Cahiers Du Monde Russe Et Soviétique 34, no. 1/2 (June 1993): 233–243. 
Beauvois, Daniel. The Noble, the Serf, and the Revizor: The Polish Nobility Between 
Tsarist Imperialism and the Ukrainian Masses (1831-1863). Chur, Switzerland; 
New York: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1991. 
Becker, Seymour. “Russia and the Concept of Empire.” Ab Imperio no. 3–4 (2000): 329–
342. 
Belinsky, Vissarion. Selected Philosophical Works. Honolulu: University Press of the 
Pacific, 2001. 
Bendix, Reinhard. Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978. 
Berdyaev, Nicolas. The Origin of Russian Communism. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, 1972. 
Berlin, Isaiah. Russian Thinkers. London: Penguin Books, 1978. 
Billington, James. The Icon and the Axe. New York: Vintage Books, 1970. 
Blackburn, Christopher A. Napoleon and the Szlachta. East European Monographs no. 
497. Boulder, Colo.: New York: East European Monographs; Distributed by 
Columbia University Press, 1998. 
Blum, Jerome. The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1978. 
Breyfogle, Nicholas. “Enduring Imperium: Russia/Soviet Union/Eurasia as Multiethnic, 
Multiconfessional Space.” Ab Imperio no. 1 (2008): 75–129. 
Brower, Daniel. “Fathers, Sons, and Grandfathers: Social Origins of Radical Intellectuals 
in Nineteenth-Century Russia.” Journal of Social History 2, no. 4 (1969): 333–355. 
Brown, Edward. Stankevich and His Moscow Circle, 1830-1840. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1966. 
Burbank, Jane, et al, Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700-1930. Indiana-
Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2007. 
Call, Charles T. “Democratisation, War and State-Building: Constructing the Rule of 
Law in El Salvador.” Journal of Latin American Studies 35, no. 4 (November 1, 
2003): 827–862. 
272 
 
Cederman, Lars-Erik, and Luc Girardin. “Growing Sovereignty: Modeling the Shift from 
Indirect to Direct Rule.” International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 1 (March 2010): 
27–48. 
Chaadaev, P.Y. Philosophical Letters, & Apology of a Madman. 1st ed. Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1969. 
Cherniavsky, Michael. “Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political 
Theory.” Journal of the History of Ideas 20, no. 4 (October 1, 1959): 459–476. 
Chernyshevsky, Nikolai. Selected Philosophical Essays. Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1953. 
Cooley, Alexander. Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States, and 
Military Occupations. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2005. 
Covey, R. Alan. How the Incas Built Their Heartland: State Formation and the 
Innovation of Imperial Strategies in the Sacred Valley, Peru. History, Languages, 
and Cultures of the Spanish and Portuguese Worlds. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2006. 
Crews, Robert. “Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in 
Nineteenth-Century Russia.” The American Historical Review 108, no. 1 (February 
2003): 50–83. 
Custine, Astolphe. Journey for Our Time; the Journals of the Marquis De Custine. New 
York: Pellegrini & Cudahy, 1951. 
Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy. Memoirs, Prince Adam Czartoryski and His Correspondence 
with Alexander I: With Documents Relative to the Prince’s Negotiations with Pitt, 
Fox, and Brougham, and an Account of His Conversations with Lord Palmerston 
and Other English Statesmen in London in 1832. The Russian Series, V. 8. Orono, 
Me.: Academic International, 1968. 
Dabrowski, Patrice M. “Russian-Polish Relations Revisited, or The ABC’s of ‘Treason’ 
Under Tsarist Rule.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 4, no. 1 
(2003): 177–199. 
Dobrolyubov, Nikolai. Selected Philosophical Essays. Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1956. 
Dolbilov, Mikhail. “Russification and the Bureaucratic Mind in the Russian Empire’s 
Northwestern Region in the 1860s.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian 
History 5, no. 2 (2004): 245–271. 
Downing, Brian M. The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of 
Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1992. 
Doyle, Michael W. Empires. Cornell Studies in Comparative History. Ithaca, N.Y: 
Cornell University Press, 1986. 
Eisenstadt, S. N. The Political Systems of Empires. New Brunswick (U.S.A.): Transaction 
Publishers, 1993. 
Ertman, Thomas. Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and 
Early Modern Europe. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997. 
Florinsky, Michael. “Russian Social and Political Thought, 1825-1855.” Russian Review 
6, no. 2 (1947): 77–85. 
273 
 
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1979. 
Frank, Joseph. Dostoevsky: The Seeds of Revolt, 1821-1849. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976. 
———. Dostoevsky, the Years of Ordeal, 1850-1859. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1983. 
Gerasimov, Ilya, et al, Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-
description in the Russian Empire. Russian History and Culture v. 1. Leiden; 
Boston: Brill, 2009. 
Gerring, John, Daniel Ziblatt, Johan Van Gorp, and Julián Arévalo. “An Institutional 
Theory of Direct and Indirect Rule.” World Politics 63, no. 03 (2011): 377–433. 
Giddens, Anthony. A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1981. 
Górski, Karol, V. Raczyńska, and C. Raczyńska. “The Origins of the Polish Sejm.” The 
Slavonic and East European Review 44, no. 102 (January 1, 1966): 122–138. 
Gudziak, Borys. Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest. Harvard Series in Ukrainian 
Studies. Cambridge, MA: Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Ukrainian 
Research Institute, Harvard University, 1998. 
Hagen, Mark von. “Does Ukraine Have a History?” Slavic Review 54, no. 3 (October 1, 
1995): 658–673. 
Halicz, Emanuel. The 1863 Polish Uprising and Scandinavia: The Year 1863, the 
Turning-Point in Russo-Scandinavian Relations. Rapporter / Københavns 
Universitets, Slaviske Institut 17. København: Copenhagen University, Institute of 
Slavonic Studies: Distribution, C.A. Reitzels, 1988. 
———. Polish National Liberation Struggles and the Genesis of the Modern Nation: 
Collected Papers. Odense University Studies in History and Social Sciences v. 73. 
Odense, Denmark: Odense University Press, 1982. 
Hamburg, G. M. “Imperial Entanglements: Two New Histories of Russia’s Western and 
Southern Borderlands.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9, 
no. 2 (2008): 407–431. 
Hariri, Jacob Gerner. “The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood.” The American 
Political Science Review 106, no. 3 (August 1, 2012): 471–494. 
Hechter, Michael. “Alien Rule and Its Discontents.” American Behavioral Scientist 53, 
no. 3 (November 1, 2009): 289–310. 
Hellie, Richard. “The Structure of Russian Imperial History.” History and Theory 44, no. 
4 (December 2005): 88–112. 
Herbst, Jeffrey Ira. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and 
Control. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 2000. 
Herzen, Alexander. My Past and Thoughts. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1982. 
Hintze, Otto. The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1975. 
274 
 
Hinz, Henryk. “The Philosophy of the Polish Enlightenment and Its Opponents: The 
Origins of the Modern Polish Mind.” Slavic Review 30, no. 2 (June 1, 1971): 340–
349. 
Hobsbawm, E. J. The Age of Empire, 1875-1914. 1st Vintage Books ed. New York: 
Vintage, 1989. 
Hosking, Geoffrey A. Russia and the Russians: A History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2001. 
———. Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1997. 
Jussila, Osmo. From Grand Duchy to Modern State: A Political History of Finland Since 
1809. London: Hurst & Co, 1999. 
Kappeler, Andreas. The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History. Harlow, England: 
Pearson Education, 2001. 
———. “The Ambiguities of Russification.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and 
Eurasian History 5, no. 2 (2004): 291–297. 
Karamzin, Nikolaĭ Mikhaĭlovich. Karamzin’s Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia. A 
Translation and Analysis. New York: Atheneum, 1966. 
———. Letters of a Russian Traveler, 1789-1790; an Account of a Young Russian 
Gentleman’s Tour Through Germany, Switzerland, France, and England. New 
York: Columbia Universty Press, 1957. 
Kharkhordin, Oleg. “What Is the State? The Russian Concept of Gosudarstvo in the 
European Context.” History and Theory 40, no. 2 (May 2001): 206–240. 
Kirby, D. G. A Concise History of Finland. Cambridge Concise Histories. Cambridge, 
UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Kivelson, Valerie A. “Cartography, Autocracy and State Powerlessness: The Uses of 
Maps in Early Modern Russia.” Imago Mundi 51 (January 1, 1999): 83–105. 
Kluchevsky, V. O. A History of Russia. New York: Russell & Russell, 1960. 
Knudsen, Tim, and Bo Rothstein. “State Building in Scandinavia.” Comparative Politics 
26, no. 2 (January 1, 1994): 203–220. 
Kohut, Zenon E. Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of 
the Hetmanate, 1760s-1830s. Monograph Series / Harvard Ukrainian Research 
Institute. Cambridge, Mass: Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Harvard 
Ukrainian Research Institute, 1988. 
Kutscheroff, Samuel. “Administration of Justice Under Nicholas I of Russia.” American 
Slavic and East European Review 7, no. 2 (April 1, 1948): 125–138. 
LeDonne, John P. The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. 
———. “Administrative Regionalization in the Russian Empire 1802-1826.” Cahiers Du 
Monde Russe 43, no. 1 (March 2002): 5–33. 
———. “Regionalism and Constitutional Reform, 1819-1826.” Cahiers Du Monde Russe 
44, no. 1 (March 2003): 5–33. 
———. “Russian Governors General, 1775-1825: Territorial or Functional 
Administration?” Cahiers Du Monde Russe 42, no. 1 (March 2001): 5–30. 
———. “The Eighteenth-Century Russian Nobility: Bureaucracy or Ruling Class?” 
Cahiers Du Monde Russe Et Soviétique 34, no. 1/2 (June 1993): 139–147. 
275 
 
Leighton, Lauren G. “Freemasonry in Russia: The Grand Lodge of Astraea (1815-1822).” 
The Slavonic and East European Review 60, no. 2 (April 1, 1982): 244–261. 
Leslie, R. F. “Politics and Economics in Congress Poland, 1815-1864.” Past & Present 
no. 8 (November 1955): 43–63. 
Levi, Margaret. Of Rule and Revenue. California Series on Social Choice and Political 
Economy 13. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. 
Lieven, Dominic. “Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918. Power, Territory, Identity.” Journal 
of Contemporary History 34, no. 2 (April 1999): 163–200. 
———. “Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918. Power, Territory, Identity.” Journal of 
Contemporary History 34, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 163–200. 
———. “The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities.” Journal of 
Contemporary History 30, no. 4 (October 1, 1995): 607–636. 
Lincoln, W. Bruce. Nicholas I. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978. 
Lossky, N.O. History of Russian Philosophy. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1952. 
Low, D. A. Fabrication of Empire: The British and the Uganda Kingdoms, 1890-1902. 
Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Lowe, Heinz-Dietrich. “Poles, Jews, and Tartars: Religion, Ethnicity, and Social 
Structure in Tsarist Nationality Policies.” Jewish Social Studies 6, no. 3 (2000): 52–
96. 
Löwe, Heinz-Dietrich. “Poles, Jews, and Tartars: Religion, Ethnicity, and Social 
Structure in Tsarist Nationality Policies.” Jewish Social Studies 6, no. 3. New Series 
(April 1, 2000): 52–96. 
Luckyj, George Stephen Nestor. Young Ukraine: The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and 
Methodius in Kiev, 1845-1847. University of Ottawa Ukrainian Studies no. 13. 
Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991. 
Lukowski, Jerzy. Liberty’s Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 
Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795. Routledge, 1991. 
———. “Political Ideas Among the Polish Nobility in the Eighteenth Century (To 
1788).” The Slavonic and East European Review 82, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 1–26. 
———. “Towards Partition: Polish Magnates and Russian Intervention in Poland During 
the Early Reign of Stanislaw August Poniatowski.” The Historical Journal 28, no. 3 
(September 1, 1985): 557–574. 
Magocsi, Paul R. A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples. 2nd, rev. and 
expanded ed. Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2010. 
Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Mann, Michael. States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology. Oxford 
[Eng.]; New York, NY, USA: Basil Blackwell, 1988. 
———. The Sources of Social Power. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
Marshall, P. J. The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America 
C.1750-1783. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Masaryk, T. G. The Spirit of Russia: Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy. 2nd 
ed. London: Allen & Unwin, 1955. 
276 
 
Mazour, Anatole Gregory. The First Russian Revolution, 1825; the Decembrist 
Movement, Its Origins, Development, and Significance. Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press, 1961. 
McCaffray, Susan P. “Confronting Serfdom in the Age of Revolution: Projects for Serf 
Reform in the Time of Alexander I.” The Russian Review 64, no. 1 (January 1, 
2005): 1–21. 
Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
Miller, Alexei. The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the 
Nineteenth Century. Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 
2003. 
———. “Shaping Russian and Ukrainian Identities in the Russian Empire During the 
Nineteenth Century: Some Methodological Remarks.” Jahrbücher Für Geschichte 
Osteuropas 49, no. 2. Neue Folge (January 1, 2001): 257–263. 
Monas, Sidney. The Third Section; Police and Society in Russia Under Nicholas I. 
Russian Research Center Studies 42. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1961. 
Moon, David. “The Inventory Reform and Peasant Unrest in Right-Bank Ukraine in 
1847-48.” The Slavonic and East European Review 79, no. 4 (October 1, 2001): 
653–697. 
Moore, Barrington. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in 
the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. 
Naseemullah, Adnan, and Paul Staniland. “Varieties of Indirect Rule: Explaining 
Governance Beyond Weberian Sovereignty.” Unpublished Manuscript. University of 
Chicago, 2013. 
Nettl, J. P. “The State as a Conceptual Variable.” World Politics 20, no. 4 (July 1, 1968): 
559–592. 
Newbury, C. W. Patrons, Clients, and Empire: Chieftaincy and Over-rule in Asia, Africa, 
and the Pacific. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Okinshevich, Leo. Ukrainian Society and Government, 1648-1781. Series - Ukrainian 
Free University: Monographs; V. 27. Munich: Ukrainian Free University, 1978. 
Paul, Michael C. “The Military Revolution in Russia, 1550-1682.” The Journal of 
Military History 68, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 9–45. 
Philpott, Daniel. Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International 
Relations. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001. 
Pienkos, Angela T. The Imperfect Autocrat: Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich and the 
Polish Congress Kingdom. East European Monographs 217. Boulder: New York: 
East European Monographs; Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1987. 
Pierson, Paul. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004. 
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Old Regime. London: Penguin Books, 1974. 
Plakans, Andrejs. A Concise History of the Baltic States. Cambridge Concise Histories. 
Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
———. “Peasants, Intellectuals, and Nationalism in the Russian Baltic Provinces, 1820-
90.” The Journal of Modern History 46, no. 3 (September 1974): 445–475. 
277 
 
Poggi, Gianfranco. The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects. Stanford, Calif: 
Stanford University Press, 1990. 
Prazmowska, Anita. Poland: A Modern History. London: I. B. Tauris, 2010. 
Presniakov, A. E. Emperor Nicholas I of Russia, the Apogee of Autocracy, 1825-1855. 
Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1974. 
Radishchev, Aleksandr Nikolaevich. A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958. 
Raeff, Marc. “Filling the Gap Between Radishchev and the Decembrists.” Slavic Review 
26, no. 3 (1967): 395–413. 
———. Plans for Political Reform in Imperial Russia, 1730-1905. Russian Civilization 
Series. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1966. 
———. Michael Speransky, Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772-1839. 2nd rev. ed. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. 
———. Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia. Boulder, Colo: Westview 
Press, 1994. 
———. The Decembrist Movement. Russian Civilization Series. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: 
Prentice-Hall, 1966. 
———. The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change Through Law in 
the Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. 
———. Understanding Imperial Russia: State and Society in the Old Regime. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1984. 
Reinterpreting Russia. London: Arnold, 1999. 
Remy, Johannes. “The Valuev Circular and Censorship of Ukrainian Publications in the 
Russian Empire (1863-1876): Intention and Practice.” Canadian Slavonic Papers / 
Revue Canadienne Des Slavistes 49, no. 1/2 (March 1, 2007): 87–110. 
Renner, Andreas. “Defining a Russian Nation: Mikhail Katkov and the ‘Invention’ of 
National Politics.” The Slavonic and East European Review 81, no. 4 (October 1, 
2003): 659–682. 
Riasanovsky, Nicholas. A History of Russia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
———. A Parting of Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia, 1801-1855. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976. 
———. Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855. Russian and East 
European Studies. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959. 
Romaniello, Matthew P. The Elusive Empire: Kazan and the Creation of Russia, 1552-
1671. Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. 
Sahadeo, Jeff. “Visions of Empire: Russia’s Place in an Imperial World.” Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 11, no. 2 (2010): 381–409. 
Saunders, David. “Russia and Ukraine Under Alexander II: The Valuev Edict of 1863.” 
The International History Review 17, no. 1 (February 1, 1995): 23–50. 
Schneider, Aaron. “Decentralization: Conceptualization and Measurement.” Studies in 
Comparative International Development 38, no. 3 (September 1, 2003): 32–56. 
Schrader, Abby M. “Containing the Spectacle of Punishment: The Russian Autocracy 
and the Abolition of the Knout, 1817-1845.” Slavic Review 56, no. 4 (December 1, 
1997): 613–644. 
278 
 
Screen, J. E. O. “The Finnish Cadet Corps, 1819-1903: A Reflection of Finno-Russian 
Relations and the Language Conflict in Finland.” The Slavonic and East European 
Review 81, no. 2 (April 2003): 217–235. 
Semyonov, Alexander. “Empire as a Context-Setting Category.” Ab Imperio no. 1 
(2008): 193–203. 
Shkandrij, Myroslav. Russia and Ukraine: Literature and the Discourse of Empire from 
Napoleonic to Postcolonial Times. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2001. 
Siroky, David S., Valeriy Dzutsev, and Michael Hechter. “The Differential Demand for 
Indirect Rule: Evidence from the North Caucasus.” Post-Soviet Affairs 29, no. 3 
(2013): 268–286. 
Slocum, John W. “Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the Category 
of ‘Aliens’ in Imperial Russia.” Russian Review 57, no. 2 (April 1, 1998): 173–190. 
Social Science Research Council (U.S.). The Formation of National States in Western 
Europe. Charles Tilly Ed. Studies in Political Development 8. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1975. 
Social Science Research Council (U.S.), Committee on Latin American Studies Joint, and 
Committee on Western Europe Joint. Bringing the State Back In. Peter Evans, 
Dietrich Rueschemayer, and Theda Skocpol Eds. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
Squire, P. S. “Nicholas I and the Problem of Internal Security in Russia in 1826.” The 
Slavonic and East European Review 38, no. 91 (June 1, 1960): 431–458. 
Staliunas, Darius. “Did the Government Seek to Russify Lithuanians and Poles in the 
Northwestern Region After the Uprising of 1863-64?” Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History 5, no. 2 (2004): 273–289. 
Stammler-Gossman, Anna. “Who Is Indigenous? Construction of ‘Indigenousness’ in 
Russian Legislation.” International Community Law Review 11 (2009): 69–102. 
Stone, Daniel. The Polish-Lithuanian State, 1386-1795. History of East Central Europe v. 
4. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001. 
Strayer, Joseph R. On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State. Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1970. 
Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge 
Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 
1992. 
Subtelny, Orest. “Mazepa, Peter I, and the Question of Treason.” Harvard Ukrainian 
Studies 2, no. 2 (June 1, 1978): 158–183. 
———. “Russia and the Ukraine: The Difference That Peter I Made.” Russian Review 
39, no. 1 (January 1, 1980): 1–17. 
———. Ukraine: a History. 3rd ed. Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 
2000. 
Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1993. 
———. “Studying Empires.” Ab Imperio no. 1 (2008): 205–213. 
Tazbir, Janusz. “Polish National Consciousness in the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth 
Century.” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 10, no. 3/4 (December 1, 1986): 316–335. 
279 
 
Thackeray, Frank W. Antecedents of Revolution: Alexander I and the Polish Kingdom, 
1815-1825. East European Monographs no. 67. Boulder [Colo.]: New York: East 
European Monographs; distributed by Columbia University Press, 1980. 
Thaden, Edward C. Russia’s Western Borderlands, 1710-1870. Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1984. 
Thaden, Edward, et al, Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914. 
Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1981. 
Thelen, Kathleen. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 2, no. 1 (June 1999): 369. 
———. How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, 
the United States, and Japan. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Thies, Cameron G. “National Design and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa.” World 
Politics 61, no. 4 (October 1, 2009): 623–669. 
———. “State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial 
Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000.” International Studies Quarterly 
48, no. 1 (March 1, 2004): 53–72. 
———. “War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America.” American Journal of 
Political Science 49, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 451–465. 
Tilly, Charles. Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons. Russell Sage 
Foundation 75th Anniversary Series. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984. 
———. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992. Rev. pbk. ed. Studies in 
Social Discontinuity. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992. 
Turgenev, Ivan. Literary Reminiscences and Autobiographical Fragments. New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1958. 
Vakar, Nicholai P. “Russia and the Baltic States.” Russian Review 3, no. 1 (October 1, 
1943): 45–54. 
Velychenko, Stephen. “Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who 
Administered the Borderlands?” Russian Review 54, no. 2 (April 1, 1995): 188–208. 
———. “Nationalizing and Denationalizing the Past: Ukraine and Russia in Comparative 
Context.” Ab Imperio no. 1 (2007): 477–494. 
Walicki, Andrzej. A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism. 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1979. 
Weeks, Theodore R. “Russification and the Lithuanians, 1863-1905.” Slavic Review 60, 
no. 1 (Spring 2001): 96–114. 
———. “The Challenges of Writing a Multi-national History of the Russian Empire.” Ab 
Imperio no. 4 (2008): 365–372. 
Werth, Paul W. “In the State’s Embrace? Civil Acts in an Imperial Order.” Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 7, no. 3 (2006): 433–458. 
Wright, Henry T. “Early State Dynamics as Political Experiment.” Journal of 
Anthropological Research 62, no. 3 (October 1, 2006): 305–319. 
Yekelchyk, Serhy. Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
Zawadzki, W. H. A Man of Honour: Adam Czartoryski as a Statesman of Russia and 
Poland, 1795-1831. Oxford [England]: New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford 
University Press, 1993. 
280 
 
———. “Russia and the Re-Opening of the Polish Question, 1801-1814.” The 
International History Review 7, no. 1 (February 1985): 19–44. 
Ziblatt, Daniel. Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the 
Puzzle of Federalism. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2006. 
 
